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Abstract 
 
Jason Paul Clark, “Evangelicalism and Capitalism: A reparative account and diagnosis 
of pathogeneses in the relationship.” Doctor of Philosophy, Middlesex University, 2018. 
 
No sustained examination and diagnosis of problems inherent to the relationship of Evangeli-
calism with capitalism currently exists. Where assessments of the relationship have been un-
dertaken, they are often built upon a lack of understanding of Evangelicalism, and an uncritical 
reliance both on Max Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic and on David Bebbington’s Quadrilateral 
of Evangelical priorities. This then gives rise to misunderstandings and faulty prescriptions for 
the future of Evangelicalism. This thesis seeks to remedy this situation by providing a robust 
diagnostic, not to refute Evangelicalism, but as a reparative. This reparative attends to the faulty 
responses of either over-dichotomising capitalist markets against ecclesial life, or the further 
capitulation of ecclesial life to the deforming forces of capitalism. It also allows for an alterna-
tive proposal for the future of Evangelicalism. 
To achieve this, the thesis makes use of some methodological innovations and pro-
posals, and also extends them. First, the thesis proposes and deploys its own 'map-making’ 
method as a kind of heuristic concept map to trace correspondence between church acts and 
beliefs. This 'map-making' ensures that the thesis provides evaluation and resourcing for de-
ployment to current and related Evangelical contexts. Second, the thesis proposes that, contrary 
to methodological worries by others, it is possible to talk about and make an account of the two 
broad domains of Evangelicalism and capitalism. Third, in order to provide a reading of eccle-
sial life, the main accounts for this thesis draw upon and deploy the ‘binocular dialectic’ and 
method of Martyn Percy, by reading theology with social science. This ‘binocular' method es-
tablishes the thesis in two parts. Part one is an account of Evangelicalism and capitalism con-
structed from social science sources; part two follows with theological explication of this ac-
count. 
Chapter one establishes the research problem, method and research design. Following 
chapter two’s review and modulation of Bebbington’s quadrilateral, chapters three and four 
make an account and reading from social science, drawing upon both with an ‘ideal type ac-
count’ with Max Weber, and a ‘materialist account’ with Karl Polanyi. Here, Evangelicalism 
is revealed to be both a creature of and response to capitalism, where Evangelical anxieties 
around assurance migrated into anxieties about providence. Where Evangelicals initially used 
the disciplined ascetics of the market for identity and relationships, these market ascetics ulti-
mately deformed and replaced Christian social imaginaries, with market imaginations around 
Providence.  Chapter five constructs a theological reading of the ascetics of that account, using 
Neo-Augustinian sources, in particular Vincent Miller, Daniel Bell and William Cavanaugh. 
From this, the thesis problematises capitalist markets as rival schools of desire to ecclesial life, 
not as a dichotomy, but rather as modes of resistance, resonance and co-creation. Drawing on 
the work of Graham Ward and James K. A Smith, chapter 6 shows how the ascetics of com-
modification leverage the nature of human agency around imaginations for Providence. This 
results in weakened resistance to, and further co-option to, the deforming forces of capitalism 
by Evangelicalism. The thesis reveals that producing more effective worship curricula is insuf-
ficient to the task of resisting the deforming forces of capitalism.  
Ultimately the thesis functions as a 'minority report' proposing that Evangelicalism, 
armed with the findings from this thesis, is uniquely situated to respond to the problems it has 
caused. Understanding how Evangelicalism has lost its resistance to the deforming forces of 
capitalism, and in some ways perfected those forces, is the beginning of understanding how it 
might then respond constructively to the problems it has caused, and with its own internal re-
sources.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: The research context, problem, limits, and methodology 
 
Have we, over time and with good intentions and pure motivations, turned our churches 
into vendors of religious services and goods? 
 
— Dan Kimball, The Emerging Church: Vintage Christianity for New Generations 
1.1 Locating the Research and Researcher 
Has my church, and my Evangelical kin, become captive to a mode of ‘dispensing 
religious goods and services’ to consuming participants? It is my church community and 
concern for its members that gives rise to my research project here. My over twenty years 
of pastoral ministry leave me with a sense, measure, and intuition of the implicit textures 
to the daily life of my church community. There are many textures that a pastor ‘knows’ 
by participation, observation, and reflection from the thousands upon thousands of daily 
interactions with his ecclesial community.1 Within those textures, there seems to be a 
dominant, and persistent, strand and force, discerned from ‘deep listening’ and ‘sounding 
the depths’ of congregational life.2 That captivating force would appear to be located in 
the mode of ‘dispensing of religious goods and services.’ Or, as Daniel Hardy describes, 
there is an abduction of human affections, an ‘extensity’ intrinsic to the human condition 
that draws us away from God, where “Capitalism is a major source of this culturally 
induced extensity”.3 
My pastoral instincts observe and discern that this ‘extensity’ is a symptom of a 
disorder in the aspirations of the members of my church. It also infiltrates my aspirations 
as their pastor: my church members confess that, all too often, they are not living up to 
                                                 
1 I am an observer participant, as per James Hopewell, Congregation: Stories and Structures 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 89. 
2 Martyn Percy draws on James Hopewell to explain the deeper task of paying attention to 
congregation, and for scholars to be immersed in their field of inquiry. It was immersion in my 
congregation that led me to this field of inquiry; see Martyn Percy, Engaging with Contemporary 
Culture: Christianity, Theology, and the Concrete Church (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 209–210. 
3 Daniel W. Hardy, Wording and Radiance: Parting Conversations on God and the Church 
(London: SCM Press, 2010), 68. 
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the imaginations and desires of their faith, with a pervading sense that something 
particularly pernicious has taken hold of their daily lives. I am not the first to ask this 
question. Jan Boer asked rather pointedly, looking through the lens of Western missions 
into Nigeria, “Are Christian missions stooges of capitalism?”4 The recent Emerging 
Church Movement (ECM) has a stated aim to reject consumer constructions of 
ecclesiology.5 Yet, in my participant observer role in the ECM, I perceived that, despite 
their aspirations, the new forms of ecclesiology that emerged were funded and shaped by 
deeper commitments to capitalist lifestyles. Even detailed critiques of the ECM miss this 
nature and influence of capitalism upon Evangelicals, with scant or no reference to it.6 
Even more broadly sustained critiques of Evangelicalism fail to explore the intersections 
with capitalism.7 This thesis is an attempt to diagnose and better understand what gives 
rise to this problem. It aims to do so in a way that equips my congregation and others like 
them for the faithful living to which they aspire. 
 
1.1.1 Deep Listening: Pastoral and ministry observations 
I find many pastors within my wider denomination, as well as those in extended 
relationship, asking similar questions.8 When we share as colleagues our most pressing 
challenges, all too similar descriptions are made of the day-to-day textures of pastoral 
life. Those textures seem to reveal that, all too often, the members of our churches engage 
                                                 
4 Jan H. Boer, Missions: Heralds of Capitalism or Christ? (Indianapolis: Day Star Press, 1984). 
5 See Gerardo Marti and Gladys Ganiel, The Deconstructed Church: Understanding Emerging 
Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 149. 
6 For example, see Hannah Steele, New World, New Church?: The Theology of the Emerging 
Church Movement (London: SCM Press, 2017); Jeremy Bouma, Understanding Emerging Church 
Theology: From a Former Emergent Insider (Grand Rapids, MI: Theoklesia, 2014); Doug Gay, Remixing 
the Church: Towards an Emerging Ecclesiology (London: SCM Press, 2011); and David Mark Rathel, 
Baptists and the Emerging Church (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014). 
7 D. G. Hart, Deconstructing Evangelicalism: Conservative Protestantism in the Age of Billy 
Graham (Grand Rapid, MI: Baker Academic, 2004); Gary Dorrien, The Remaking of Evangelical 
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998). 
8 Conversations about my research inspired and led to a pastoral friend publishing this short work; 
Andy Hickford, Retail Therapy (Goring by Sea: Verité CM, 2011).  
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in worship as a means to a particular end. And those ends are usually not about receiving 
a Christ-directed life, but about the request for God to deliver things, items, experiences, 
or to use the vernacular, ‘stuff’. Through the practices of prayer and worship, people’s 
imaginations for life are brought into contact with their lived experiences. In those 
worship practices, it seems that God is all too often meant to provide for any lack in 
material experiences. Otherwise, a sentiment is often manifest: that God is not doing his 
job properly.9 We must ask: “What are we doing when we pledge allegiance to the 
accumulation of material possessions and consumer products?”10 
Now, none of the pastors I work with have a spirituality that separates God from 
the everyday ‘stuff’ of life. We believe God is greatly concerned with the materiality of 
our existence, and is very involved within it. An instinctive and intrinsic belief in the 
incarnation and the cross as Evangelicals necessitates that. But what is startling is how 
much of the Christian life in my own church often collapses into prayers for ‘things’, for 
a certain way of life, imagined and expected. That which funds the imagination for life, 
and in particular the Christian life, seems to have become captive to something other than 
a Christian, and claimed Evangelical imagination. Evangelicals such as myself, my wider 
church community, and pastoral colleagues, would claim one thing as the source and fund 
for the imaginations of everyday life. That is the person and the work of Jesus Christ. 
That affirmation is not just close to the surface for our pastors but would also be the stated 
claim of most of our churches’ members. For Evangelicals, the Christian life is readily 
understood as being one centred on the pursuit of Jesus Christ. The things of this life, 
along with all material existence, are to be willingly submitted in faithful service to Christ 
and His mission through us, to be Christ-made.11 Yet as I have mentioned, the opposite 
                                                 
9 My friend Alan Jamieson, who encouraged me into theological research, has asked, but not 
explained, why capitalist lifestyles have taken hold of the desires of Christians, now deemed to be 
essential to their lives; see Alan Jamieson, Chrysalis: The Hidden Transformation in the Journey of Faith 
(Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), 3. 
10 James K. A Smith, The Devil Reads Derrida (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009).  
11 Already, I am making anecdotal claims about the nature of Evangelicalism, but for now see 
Bruce Hindmarsh, “What is Evangelicalism?” Christianity Today, last modified 14th March 2018, 
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all too often takes place. Jesus is expected to be faithful in the provision of the things of 
life, for the life we are making ourselves.12 This is, I suggest, where Jesus is being called 
upon for the ‘dispensing of religious goods and services.’  
My initial reflections give rise to some questions, questions that begin to locate the 
key criteria for my research methods. What are the forces that led to this re-orientation of 
faith and practice? Most importantly, do my anecdotes here and the cursory understanding 
I have developed over twenty years of my ministry practice bear up under further 
scrutiny? These questions lead me to my primary and initial research question — what is 
really happening, and why? How and why has the Evangelicalism in which I am located 
become captive to a false imagination, enacted in our worship? By false, I mean not true 
to the claims and aspirations of faithful living for Christ that is central to the 
Evangelicalism within which my church is situated. Furthermore, does Evangelicalism 
have its own internal resources to respond to the problems that I might diagnose it to have 
caused? Of course, this begs the question, what is Evangelicalism? My thesis will attend 
to the definition of what I mean by Evangelicalism immediately after this chapter. For the 
moment, I will talk broadly about Evangelicalism, as that church context that I, and 
members of my church would recognise as their ecclesial constituency.   
 
1.1.2 Capitalism and Evangelicalism: Initial working definitions 
I have the privilege of travelling around the world, and teaching Evangelical leaders, from 
the more progressive to the slightly more conservative. I have had regular occasion to 
teach conservative Evangelicals, whose natural inclination might be a defence of 
                                                 
accessed 11th April 2018, https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2018/ march-web-only/what-is-
evangelicalism.html.  
12 As early as 1978, questions were being asked about the nature of worship in relationship to 
contemporary culture and material life. See Ion Bria, “The Liturgy after the Liturgy,” International 
Review of Mission, 67.265 (1978): 86-90. For a more recent exploration of the consumer nature of 
contemporary worship, see Pete Ward, Selling Worship: How What We Sing Has Changed the Church 
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005).   
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capitalism and Evangelical lifestyles within that. Then I find myself with more 
progressive Evangelicals, more socially democratic in orientation, who are far more 
critical of capitalism and its collusion with Evangelical faith. These two constituents are 
both Evangelical, one perhaps located more in support of capitalist lifestyles, and unaware 
of Evangelical complicity with market forces, and the other far more self-reflexive of the 
problems of Evangelical faith in capitalism. Their ecclesial life is “deeply flavoured” in 
different ways from their cultural “terroir”.13 They have a different “ecclesial terroir” to 
each other, but they share a very similar vision and horizon for the practice of faith planted 
and cultivated in those contexts, i.e., Evangelical, concerned to bring people to Christ 
more than to convert anyone to the category of Evangelicalism.14 Being able to summarise 
your thesis in a few sentences for wider conversation is considered de rigueur for 
researchers, as a means to ensure they have a clear focus to their research.15 But it is also 
important when asked by non-academics. When I explain my project to both ends of this 
Evangelical constituency, I do by saying I am exploring problems in the relationship 
between Evangelicalism and capitalism and how we might respond as Evangelicals. I 
have never been asked in response what I mean by Evangelical, nor asked what I mean 
by capitalism.16 It is only academics who reply that such examination cannot possibly be 
made, with Evangelicalism being too diffuse, and capitalism too broad for any meaningful 
review. Mark Knoll, a leading church historian, asserts that academics are wrong to claim 
the term Evangelical, despite “ambiguity, fluidity and imprecision” that cannot 
                                                 
13 Here I draw on Percy’s notion of “ecclesial terroir”, and the analogy between the different 
environments that produce the taste of a wine, i.e., soil, weather, topography, etc. and the nature of local 
ecclesial identity. See Martyn Percy, “Response to Part II: Savouring the Social-Sacred: Reading the Real 
Church,” in Reasonable Radical: Reading the Writings of Martyn Percy, ed. by Ian S. Markham and 
Joshua Daniel (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2018), 129. 
14 Hindmarsh makes this claim about Evangelicals. See Hindmarsh, “What is Evangelicalism?”  
15 There is even an international Three Minute Thesis’ competition, see “Vitae: Realising the 
Potential of Researchers,” accessed 2nd April 2018, https://www.vitae.ac.uk/events/ three-minute-thesis-
competition, and “The Graduate School,” accessed 2nd April 2018, 
https://graduateschool.nd.edu/assets/32665/ elevator_pitch_presentation.pdf.  
16 Indeed, at a non-academic level, many Evangelical leaders have been querying the relationship 
between the two domains of Evangelical life and capitalism, for example see Sam Van Eman, On Earth 
as it is in Advertising (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005). 
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“meaningfully designate any single group of Christians.”17 I use the term Evangelical for 
now as a kind of illocutionary shell noun, i.e., an abstract noun to convey complex 
concepts, whose specific content will be explored in more detail later.18 Many of the 
academic interlocutors for the rest of this chapter use the term in their work without 
definition.19 Indeed, academics have even produced award-winning books about the 
future of Evangelicalism which do not define what they mean by Evangelicalism.20 
 
1.1.3 Observed Impulses: Towards and away from the church 
Over my years of full time ministerial life, I have seen two impulses manifest in response 
to the forces I am looking to diagnose. Many Evangelicals have simply drifted away from, 
or dramatically left, the church.21 For these Christians, participation in any particular 
church is deemed unnecessary for faithful Christian living.22 I want to discover if such 
post-church manifestations are actually a further and continuing capitulation to the very 
forces they claim to rail against.23  
                                                 
17 “National Association of Evangelicals,” accessed 10th April 2018, https://www.nae.net/ 
evangelical-whats-name/. 
18 John R. Searle, “A Classification of Illocutionary Acts,” Language In Society, 5.1 (1976): 1–23. 
19 Andrew Root, a leading scholar in the area of Youth Ministry and Practical Theology, has 
produced a very recent work that seeks in part to trace the path of consumer mentality via Charles 
Taylor’s understanding of authenticity. Whilst acknowledging that is it capitalism that underpins such 
consumerism, Root uses the term capitalism with no definition. See Andrew Root, Faith Formation in a 
Secular Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017). 
20 Soong-Chan Rah, The Next Evangelicalism: Freeing the Church from Western Cultural 
Captivity (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2009). 
21 For an early ethnographic survey of this phenomenon, see Alan Jamieson, A Churchless Faith: 
Faith Journeys Beyond the Churches (London: SPCK, 2002). 
22 Luke Bretherton has identified four streams of Evangelical response to contemporary concerns 
that support my own observations here. See Luke Bretherton and Andrew Walker, “Introduction”, in 
Remembering our Future: Explorations in Deep Church, edited by Andrew Walker and Luke Bretherton 
(Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), xvii. 
23 Perhaps one of the books that started the whole post-church movement and gave expression to 
Evangelicals ceding their imaginations for ecclesiology to modern culture, is found in Cathy Kirkpatrick 
et al., , The Prodigal Project: Journey Into the Emerging Church (London: SPCK, 2000). Then, there is 
Dave Tomlinson, whose 1995 Post-Evangelical book has been released as an SPCK “Classic”. Dave 
Tomlinson, The Post-Evangelical (London: SPCK, 2014). Tomlinson ended up becoming an Anglican 
priest after his post-church foray. I heard him speak at an event, explaining how he had become an 
Anglican as he realised he could gather a crowd in a pub to drink beer and talk about Christianity, but 
never get those people to follow Jesus and make any commitments required for community.  
7 
 
I have also observed another impulse, a turn not away from the church, but perhaps 
back towards it. Evangelicals, realising their ecclesiology has all too often been amnesiac, 
have turned back into the church to recover a sense of Christian memory and identity.24 
Many of my contemporaries have made this turn, with a journey towards Rome and 
Canterbury. Some have done so in terms of church membership and association. Some of 
my pastoral colleagues have gone further with ordination into an Anglo-Catholic mode 
of ecclesial life.25 I am of course readily aware that one can be Anglican and Evangelical. 
However, I have often also perceived some of my Evangelical Anglican friends to be 
making a move out of their Anglican traditions due to their Evangelicalism.26 That is 
rather different to Evangelicals making a turn into Anglo-Catholic traditions. For many 
Evangelicals, it is as if they have reached a kind of jumping-off point. Some move out of, 
and away from, all church commitments, whilst others at the existential ecclesial 
precipice have instead turned around and back into a discovery of identity within the 
historical church.27  
                                                 
24 This process is seen in the works of D. H. Williams, Retrieving the Tradition and Renewing 
Evangelicalism: A Primer for Suspicious Protestants (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999); 
also Melanie C. Ross, Evangelical versus Liturgical: Defying a Dichotomy (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2014); Kenneth J. Stewart, In Search of Ancient Roots: The Christian Past and The 
Evangelical Identity Crises (London: IVP Books, 2017); and Remembering our Future, ed. by Walker 
and Bretherton. This recovery project to resource Evangelicals has even moved to a resourcement for 
Pentecostals with Gordon T. Smith, Evangelical, Sacramental & Pentecostal: Why the Church Should Be 
All Three (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Press, 2017). 
25 For example, my friend, and former Vineyard Church senior pastor colleague, who is now an 
Anglican ordinand, writes about becoming a priest. See Daniel Warnke, “Practically Priest: Privileging 
the Lived in Ministerial Training”, in Reasonable Radical, 164–179. 
26 Since April 1967, when the first National Evangelical Anglican Congress (NEAC) met at Keele 
University, many Evangelical Anglicans have been trying to work out if they are Evangelicals first and 
Anglicans second, or vice versa; see Melvin Tinker, The Anglican Evangelical Crisis (Fearn: Christian 
Focus, 1995). 
27 For an example of a text that precipitated and catalysed the evacuation of church by many 
Evangelicals, see James Thwaites, Church Beyond the Congregation: The Strategic Role of the Church in 
the Postmodern Era (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2000). “Congregations are inherently evil and are 
to be shaken off to enable Christians to engage fully in mission.” George Barna, the US Christian pollster, 
vainly claimed that the fastest-growing group of Christians in the USA were those abandoning 
congregational life for the fertile lands of missional engagement; see George Barna, Revolutions (Carol 
Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2005), 61–-68. Recent research shows this constituency are in fact 
the ‘Dones’ who cease to practice their faith with others, and whose faith collapses into the private God-
spaces of secular and consumer culture; see Josh Packard and Ashleigh Hope, Church Refugees: 
Sociologists Reveal Why People Are Done with Church But Not Their Faith (Loveland, CO: Group 
Publishing, 2015). Alan Jamieson’s research was one of the earliest studies and sample of ‘exiles’ of 
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Personally, I have found this Anglo-Catholic turn attractive in many ways. It seems 
to result in an ecclesiology that makes more of church, not less of it. As I listen to my 
peers describe their new Anglican ecclesial environs, they seem a little more able to resist 
the false imaginations to faithful Christian living that I battle. Not that I am lionising their 
church experiences, but I do perceive something about their Anglo-Catholic turn that 
provides them with a funded resistance to the deforming forces that are the focus of my 
thesis. There does seem to be a natural inclination for those from an Anglo-Catholic 
tradition to be more alert to the disposition of bodies in worship, and culture and 
theology.28 For I know that I do not want to end up within a post-ecclesial existence, a 
place that seemingly makes nothing of church and capitulates completely to anomic 
imaginations for life. These personal reflections lead me to realise that my research 
project is inherently an ecclesial one. For my research problem is about the construction 
and disposition of bodies, social bodies, and the organisational forces that come to bear 
upon those bodies. Ultimately, my research project is about how the body of Christ is 
instantiated through belief and practice in everyday life, in relationship to other social 
bodies. My pastoral observations show that imaginations lead to practices and habits 
which then orient and create the social realities of life. In other words, life is first imagined 
before that imagination is then enacted. I want to know if my observations are correct and 
how Evangelicalism has imagined and practised its imaginations. As I now begin to move 
from these anecdotes of my own experience, I have already started to frame these into my 
initial research questions, that I now delineate further. 
 
                                                 
those done with church and permanently isolated with their faith, unable to form the commitments 
required for community life, see Alan Jamieson, A Churchless Faith. Another study explored those 
shifting from Evangelicalism to Rome, see Scot McKnight and Hauna Ondrey, Finding Faith, Losing 
Faith: Stories of Conversion and Apostasy (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008). 
28 For example, see Tom Beaudoin, Consuming Faith (Plymouth: Sheed & Ward, 2003), 79. 
Beaudoin details how his Catholic experience of the mass oriented him instinctively to reflections on the 
nature of human bodies in social and worship arrangements. Also, see the work of Catholic John F. 
Kavanaugh, Following Christ in a Consumer Society (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981). 
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1.1.4 Resistance: Immune systems and pathogenesis 
Luke Bretherton suggests that the church in terms of doctrine, belief and practice, can be 
understood in terms of its contextual challenges, like an immune system. This immune 
system defends against threats and adapts to new challenges.29 I suggest his metaphor of 
an immune system can be extended further into the mechanism of pathogenesis. The 
church as a body in its contextual relationships, subject to immunological responses, often 
results in sickness and disease. Pathogenesis is the biological mechanism (or 
mechanisms) that give rise to the condition of disease. The term is also used to describe 
the origins and development of a disease, and diagnosis of whether it is chronic or acute, 
etc. With my ecclesial concerns, I find myself needing a similar diagnostic. For I am 
trying to determine the mechanisms, origins, and conditions of ill health in the 
Evangelical body. I want to understand the development of the disorders in structure and 
function by Evangelical ecclesiology, and what gave rise to the symptoms that my 
pastoral experience has seen manifest, such as ‘the dispensing of religious goods and 
services’. 
The body of Christ is subject to interactions with environmentally mutating 
pathogens. There is no pristine DNA-encoded form of church despite the claims of some 
to the contrary.30 The church has always been a corpus mixtum in terms of theological 
geography and especially in terms of its ‘biology’. I do not seek a ‘pure’ Evangelical 
ecclesiology. But I do propose my Evangelicalism as having lost something of its initial 
DNA where it was once better able to resist environmentally deforming interactions. I 
want to recover some of the resistance genes, so to speak, of my Evangelicalism to 
pathogenic mechanisms. My research therefore is initiated from an observed pathogenesis 
between Evangelicalism in its relationship to capitalism. For now, similarly with my use 
                                                 
29 Luke Bretherton, “Beyond the Emerging Church,” in Remembering our Future, ed. Walker and 
Bretherton, 50. 
30 Martyn Percy, Shaping the Church: The Promise of Implicit Theology (Explorations in 
Practical, Pastoral and Empirical Theology) (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 165. 
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of the term Evangelical, I use the term capitalism, knowing that term needs defining, and 
I note this for now as a methodological consideration to which I will attend later. 
If I can make a suitable account and diagnosis of the pathogenesis within this 
relationship, how might I then respond with resources that are internal to my own 
Evangelical tradition and vision of the body of Christ? In short, my overall method and 
aim is an account and diagnosis in the mode of ‘physician heal thyself’. For I make my 
research in a dialogical as well as dialectical mode;31 I wish to be diagnosing and 
repairing, rather than refuting and abandoning. 
Having presented the main questions I intend to explore in the thesis, I now turn to 
consider the method I will use to answer them. First, with John Milbank, I examine 
whether capitalism in its relationship with Evangelicalism warrants my focus, and begin 
an examination of the diagnosis of that relationship. Second, with the work of William 
Connolly, I examine further the potential primary pathogenic mechanisms within that 
relationship. Third, I consider how Evangelicals have addressed this relationship and the 
suitability or lack thereof of their work for my research. Fourth, and finally, drawing on 
the work of Peter Ochs, Nicholas Healy, and Martyn Percy, I then explain and confirm 
my thesis method. 
 
1.2 Evangelical Christianity: A new mutation of Protestantism? 
Today then, Protestant Christianity may be functional for capitalism. But equally, 
capitalism is functional for the logic of Protestant Christianity carried to a new extreme. 
 
— John Milbank, “Stale Expressions” 
 
                                                 
31 By dialectical, I have in mind the method of Jacques Ellul’s, and his three levels of the 
interpretive, which I will outline later in this chapter. Jacques Ellul, “On Dialectic,” in Clifford G. 
Christians and Jay M. Van Hook, eds., Jacques Ellul: Interpretative Essays (Champaign, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 1981), 293–304.  
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In 2008 Milbank produced his provocative paper, “Stale Expressions”.32 In it, he claims 
that Evangelicalism has “consummated” a general Protestant tendency into a specific 
relationship. That relationship is one where Evangelical Christianity and capitalism are 
intensely functional to the logic of each other.33 Milbank does not define what he means 
by Evangelicalism or capitalism in his short paper. His view is one of the harshest 
critiques of the relationship between Evangelicalism and capitalism. If his intention was 
to provoke, he succeeded with me. For it was reading his article that spurred me on to 
consider my own research here, in part, to examine if his claims are true. My research 
will show that his claims rest on an ignorance of Evangelicalism, and an unwillingness to 
engage with readily available resources about Evangelicalism.  
 
1.2.1 A Diagnosis: Commodification and voluntarism 
For Milbank, Protestant Christianity and capitalism are not only mutually dependent on 
each other, they are mutually constituent to each other. Within that symbiotic relationship, 
something has recently emerged that is “quite simply a new mutation of Protestantism in 
its mutually constitutive relationship with capitalism.”34 For Milbank, that mutation is 
Evangelicalism itself. If I parse that through my earlier suggestion of pathogenesis, 
Evangelicalism becomes a disease, and manifestation of a symbiotic relationship with 
capitalism. 
Milbank goes further, insisting that Evangelicalism is where workers are 
“expendable” and consumers are simply a means for “recycling resources” to maximise 
profits. He writes, “There is only one business that can capitalise even this unavoidable 
                                                 
32 John Milbank, “Stale Expressions: The Managerialist-Shaped Church. A Call for the Parishes 
of England to Rise up against the Powerful Usurpers of Their Canonic and Constitutional Authority,” in 
Society for the Study of Christian Ethics: The Ideology of Managerialism in Church, Politics and Society 
(Oxford: Wycliffe Hall, 2007), 121. 
33 Although the above quote refers to Protestantism, Milbank’s article makes the claim that this 
Protestantism has developed into Evangelicalism, which embodies this functional logic par excellence, 
see Milbank, “Stale Expressions”, 117. 
34 Ibid. 
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point of transitional indifference […] It is the trade in souls as perfected by Evangelical 
Christianity.”35 Capitalism in its nascence is “reciprocally” linked to the Reformation. 
That reciprocal relationship develops and intensifies over time, until we arrive at the 
situation today where “the point of Christianity becomes mainly the production of more 
Christians.”36  
The desire of Evangelical church communities to see others come to faith in Christ 
emerges from a particular mechanism — the production of more Christians. Here we are 
to understand the Evangelical desire to see others come to faith in Christ as being fused 
with capitalism, where “Christianity is reduced to a readily graspable product.”37 For 
Milbank, Evangelicalism is to be understood as an ecclesiology that intrinsically “further 
perfects capitalist practice.”38 There is no resistance, only a deep symbiosis between 
capitalism and Evangelicalism. If true, this situation - this symbiotic relationship between 
Evangelicalism and capitalism - has an internal logic and practice generated by the forces 
and mechanisms of capitalism. Milbank points towards commodification as the mutating 
mechanism at work. The desire to see others come to faith becomes a process of the 
commodification of people’s souls. This commodification of souls prevents any move 
from “person as object to becoming person as subject.”39 Here, the ‘redeemed person’ has 
not surrendered anything of his identity, but instead he has increased his ‘freedom’ within 
a market society to form his own identity.  
It is this captivity to free market logic that allowed Evangelicalism with its appeal 
through voluntarism to revive and spread itself so strongly.40 We can understand Milbank 
here to be claiming that previous growth of Evangelicalism was due to its captivity to the 
logic of commodification in concert with a Protestant voluntarism. By voluntarism, one 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 118. 
36 Ibid., 119. 
37 Ibid., 120. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 121. 
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assumes Milbank, in taking aim at the Protestant origins of Evangelicalism, has in mind 
a type of Weberian Protestant Work Ethic voluntarism.41 From Milbank, we are left with 
the prognosis that this captivity now carries the DNA of Evangelicalism’s undoing, 
generating captivity to the forces of ‘dispensing religious goods and services.’ 
Milbank’s account of the Evangelical body is a little like that of a pathologist. He 
provides a diagnosis of a likely mechanism of disease. But he is unable to describe what 
life and better health might be like for Evangelicals in their ecclesiology. Yet, like 
Milbank, I am left asking - “what is going on here?”42 What is going on in the confluence 
of life in capitalism with the habits and practices of Evangelicalism? 
 
1.2.2 Resistance and Capitulation: Re-Catholicisation and intensification 
Milbank claims that the capitulation to the forces of commodification is only “half the 
story.” The other half concerns two trajectories. First, an ongoing resistance and, second, 
an ongoing capitulation.43 The resistance is a continuation of and “generalisation of the 
Oxford Movement.”44 This is an educated Protestantism increasingly engaging in a 
process of “re-catholicisation which has come to a higher valuation of the sacramental 
and of the church as a spiritual society whose purpose is to be the body of Christ and not 
simply to “bring people to the resurrected Jesus”, as if this reality could be encountered 
outside sacramental and ecclesial mediation.”45 This correlates with my own earlier 
anecdotal observations of my peers, along with cited sources for an established reality, of 
an Anglo-Catholic turn. Milbank also confirms my other observation concerning an 
alternative post-church trajectory. He evidences this reality with refence to recent 
ecclesial developments within the Anglican church of alternatives to any re-
                                                 
41 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (Mineola, 
N.Y: Dover Publications, 2003), 243. 
42 Milbank, “Stale Expressions”, 118. 
43 Ibid., 122. 
44 Ibid., 121. 
45 Ibid., 122. 
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catholicisation. Here, Milbank has “fresh expressions” in his sights. For “fresh 
expressions” and ‘“mission-shaped church” run the risk of perpetuating an Evangelical 
problem.46 That problem is the forming of church around further voluntarist behaviours 
of the “like-minded, who associate in order to share a particular taste, hobby or 
perversion.”47 Within this, “the refusal to come out of oneself and go to church is simply 
the refusal of church per se.”48 Milbank admits there is value to associations around 
shared interests, but he does assert most forcefully that the “state of affairs” of 
Evangelicalism in concert with capitalist practices is “manifestly evil” and is a substitute 
for real embodied church and mission.49  
Whilst Milbank’s claims align with some of my personal observations, they are 
also jarringly disjunctive. Is Evangelicalism really so completely enmeshed within the 
logic of capitalist practices that it is inherently evil? Beyond any hyperbole, I understand 
Milbank’s claim to be ecclesial, and Anglo-Catholic. Is the body of Christ competing 
against all other social bodies, and are all other bodies in relationship to the Body of 
Christ the anti-Christ? Milbank’s assertion does lead me to an ecclesial question. Has 
Evangelicalism resulted in an anomic existence that joins people directly to Jesus but not 
to his body, the church? Does Evangelicalism have an ecclesiology that has colluded and 
combined with the processes of commodification? Also, are there really only two 
trajectories, as Milbank claims, where “mass and élite Protestantism are going in two 
different directions”?50 Are my alternatives either an elitist re-Catholicisation, or a 
continued mass market capitulation to market forces? 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 124. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 127. For a more detailed assessment of Fresh Expressions, see Martyn Percy, “Old Tricks 
for New Dogs? A Critique of Fresh Expressions” in Martyn Percy and Louise Nelstrop, eds., Evaluating 
Fresh Expressions: Explorations in Emerging Church (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2008), 27–39. Percy 
reveals the obsession with the new, and rejection of any notion of previous understandings of the Church, 
manifest through a continuation of the homogenous group unit principle. The suspicion is that bourgeois 
niche self-interest funds much of the associations of these new groups. 
50 Milbank, “Stale Expressions”, 122 
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The Anglo-Catholic resistance to which Milbank points is an immediate ecclesial 
challenge to my own Evangelical ecclesiology, where it seems I have to jettison my 
Evangelicalism no matter what response I make. For Milbank seems to see the Anglo-
Catholic turn as a move away from Evangelicalism, and a response not just to capitalism 
but to Evangelicalism itself. Even if Milbank is correct, and I have yet to test the validity 
of his claims, his response is insufficient for my desired reparative. For Milbank himself 
considers that resistance to the dislocating forces of consumer life within capitalism 
“seems well-nigh impossible,” even for the re-Catholicisation to which he directs us.51   
 
1.3 Cultural Despisers and Cultural Accommodators 
There is certainly capitalism without Christianity. But my focus is on Christian-capitalist 
assemblages … Christianity and Capitalism have formed multiple assemblages, composed 
partly of elements that impinge upon one another, partly those that are differentially 
incorporated or infused into each other, and partly of those that exceed the reach of such 
connections. 
 
— William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style 
 
In the same year as Milbank’s article, 2008, Connolly produced his own work focussing 
on a diagnosis of the dependence of Evangelicalism and capitalism to each other. Where 
Milbank sees capitalism and Evangelicalism as mutually fused with each other, Connolly 
instead argues that it is Evangelicalism which has deformed the nature of capitalism. I 
now explore that claim and Connolly’s method, and correlate it further with Milbank. I 
will show that neither account or method provides the diagnostic and reparative I seek. 
 
1.3.1 Resonance and Resistance: The Evangelical capitalist resonance machine 
Connolly, in Capitalism and Christianity, American Style, sets out to diagnose how the 
“capitalist project” has been perverted and warped by its resonant relationship with 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 127. 
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conservative right-wing Christian religious beliefs.52 “The premise, the drive and anxiety 
informing this book” is the deforming forces of late capitalism and how Christianity gave 
rise to those forces.53 Connolly’s work “addresses elements of volatility in capitalism and 
Christianity, as it also addresses resonances between them.”54 Connolly names this 
intersection and resonance the evangelical-capitalist machine.55 More specifically, 
Connolly claims that it is the relationship between the American Evangelical religious 
right and capitalism that gives rise to a variety of pathological behaviours in that 
relationship.56 
Connolly’s work, when first written, was provocative (rather like Milbank’s “Stale 
Expressions”), giving rise to some significant and important responses in terms of 
research projects and symposia.57 Connolly’s work animated some Evangelicals to begin 
to explore what the real relationship between Evangelicalism and capitalism might be.58 
Indeed, my reading of Connolly alongside Milbank spurred on my own research interests, 
and ultimately my project here. As my research has continued these last few years, I have 
noticed the responses to Connolly, after an initial flurry, have been rather scant.59 
                                                 
52 William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008), xi–xii.  
53 Ibid., 9. 
54 Ibid., x. 
55 Ibid., xi. 
56 Ibid., 45. Connolly assumes a history and development of the relationship between American 
Christianity and capitalism. For a more comprehensive history, which is a fascinating, insightful and, at 
times, jocular assessment of Christianity in America, see Stephen J. Nichols, Jesus Made in America: A 
Cultural History from the Puritans to the Passion of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008). 
For an extremely extensive history of modern Evangelicalism in the US, see Matthew Avery Sutton, 
American Apocalypse: A History of Modern Evangelicalism (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2014). 
57 For example, see the symposium of the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, “Political Theology Network,” accessed 1st August 2017. 
http://www.politicaltheology.com/blog/symposium-on-william-e-connolly. This led to several articles in 
Political Theology as a response to Connolly, and Connolly himself countering those responses. See 
William Connolly, “Capitalism, Christianity, America: Rethinking the Issues,” Political Theology, 12, no. 
2 (January 2011): 226–236. 
58 For example, see Mathew Guest, “Evangelicalism and Capitalism in Transatlantic Context,” 
Contemporary British Religion and Politics, 4, no. 2 (2010): 257–299. Guest’s paper is a direct response 
to Connolly. 
59 A detailed search for accounts of Evangelicalism in relationship to capitalism show that very 
few have been made. Despite its title, John Hayes’ 2012 article focuses on mid eighteenth-century pre-
Civil War Evangelicalism and the transmission of a type of Evangelical culture into present-day Southern 
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Connolly is sensitive and alert to there being multiple forms of capitalism. He sees a 
trajectory and development of various types of capitalism, where we have arrived at a 
particular version today.60 This is late capitalism: “the latest incarnation of the capital-
Christian complex, finding active expression in the United States, is distinctive and 
fateful in the danger it presents.”61 Those ‘fateful dangers’ are something Connolly 
spends little time delineating. His work begins with a short personal narrative on the 
demise of labour unions and democratic capitalism.62 Other than this, he offers no 
particular outline of the dangers he sees late capitalism as presenting. Indeed, he seems 
ambivalent about capitalism itself, the first sentence of his work making that very claim: 
“My relationship to capitalism [h]as long been ambiguous.”63 But he is less ambiguous 
in wanting to “identity potential means by which to usher in new configurations” of 
capitalism.64 He appeals for a vision of a new kind of capitalism, an “eco-egalitarian 
capitalism.”65 
My research problem does not seek a new form of capitalism, and I am perhaps 
ambiguous like Connolly about various forms of capitalism. Central to Connolly’s 
diagnosis is a contention that sits at the centre of my own research problem. For Connolly 
claims that previously a religious ethos was able to resist the pathologies of early 
capitalist consumption.66 Connolly determines that later manifestations of capitalism 
                                                 
US Evangelicalism; see John Hayes, “The Evangelical Ethos and the Spirit of Capitalism,” Perspectives 
in Religious Studies, 39, no. 3 (2012): 205-217; and Brian Steensland and Zachary Schrank, “Is the 
Market Moral? Protestant Assessments of Market Society,” Review of Religious Research, 53, no. 53 
(2011): 257-277. 
Brian Steensland and Zachary Schrank’s 2011 paper is more helpful for my project, employing a 
discourse analysis of market-related topics in two prominent Christian periodicals over a twenty-year 
period. An extensive search of online recent thesis results in locating this one work of practical theology, 
focused on the impact of brands and branding within Evangelical Christianity, see Chris Hodder, “Are 
relationships with brands problematic or beneficial to Christian faith?” (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Derby, 2017). 
60 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 9. 
61 Ibid., 9. 
62 Ibid., vii-viii. 
63 Ibid., vii. 
64 Ibid., 9. 
65 Ibid., 117. In contrast for a defence of capitalism as the basis of liberal democracy, see Michael 
Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1982). 
66 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, xiii. 
18 
 
emerged with forces that a religious ethos was unable to resist. An Evangelical ethos 
developed through its resonance with capitalism, that was then unable to resist the 
pathologies it had created in its relationship with capitalism.67 
 
1.3.2 An Embedded Ethos: Assemblages and countermovements 
Connolly proposes that historical, ideological, and institutional variations of capitalism 
are best understood through the methodology of assemblages. In other words, different 
forms of capitalism exist due to varying cultural and contextual assemblages. In the 
western world, in particular the USA, Connolly claims capitalism has created a particular 
assemblage with US right-wing Evangelicalism.68 To understand this assemblage we 
need to understand capitalist practices and the ethos embedded within those practices. It 
is the practices of capitalism and the practices of Evangelicalism, in concert and 
combination, that create a “spiral of resonances”69. This concert is made through 
‘assemblages’ of media, churches, cultural consciousness, and a “spiral of resonances” 
that produce the Evangelical capitalist resonance machine.70 
Like Milbank’s “Stale Expressions”, Connolly’s book was researched and written 
just prior to the international credit crunch of 2007 and published as that was unfolding.71 
He later provided a response to critics of his book that pays heed to that credit crunch.72 
Connolly suggests that the credit crunch did not cause a pause in the “evangelical-
resonance machine,” but rather led to an intensification and “re-kindling” of it.73 Here, 
the claim is that all political economies have an embodied ethos within them. It is not that 
                                                 
67 Ibid., xiii. 
68 Ibid., 9-22. 
69 Ibid., xi. 
70 Ibid., xi. 
71 Mervyn King was governor of the Bank of England from 2003 to 2013. King provides a first-
hand account of how the credit crunch began in August 2007, see Mervyn King, The End of Alchemy: 
Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global Economy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017). 
72 William Connolly, “Capitalism, Christianity, America: Rethinking the Issues”. 
73 Ibid., 228. 
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capitalist markets have disembedded from any religious ethos, but rather that they have 
taken their current shape from a new religious ethos provided by right-wing 
Evangelicals.74 An embedding of a religious, and in particular Evangelical, ethos with 
capitalism has taken place. Connolly relies on Max Weber in order to assert that the 
Protestant Work Ethic is the ethos that was initially embedded in early capitalism.75 
Pathologies of early capitalist consumption were constrained by that Weberian Protestant 
Work Ethic and ethos. Where economists consider late capitalism to have become 
disembedded from any religious ethos, Connolly would have us understand how the 
Protestant Work Ethic mutated and intensified into the relationship between 
Evangelicalism and capitalism with an embedded religious ethos.76 The Protestant Work 
Ethic and issues of providence in creation are the basis for the resonances that these 
beliefs have with the capitalist system. There is nothing original about Connolly’s claim 
here, in linking certain forms of Protestant Christianity with capitalism.77  
Evangelicalism is not only incapable of resistance to any deforming forces of 
capitalism; it is now the primary driver of those forces. It is here where Connolly contends 
that only through an alternative and “counter political movement,” 78 a democratic and 
left-wing visualisation of a new ethos, that capitalism might be redeemed.79 In particular, 
Connolly’s vision requires a “world without divine providence, a self-regulating market, 
or consummate capacities of human mastery of the world.”80 Connolly has assumed that 
capitalist markets are redeemable and need to be redeemed. He also presumes that this 
liberal democratic vision stands in contrast to any Evangelical religious ethos. Connolly’s 
boldest claim is aimed at questioning Evangelicals like myself, suggesting that those on 
                                                 
74 Ibid., xiii. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 24. 
77 For example, see Guest, “Evangelicalism and Capitalism in Transatlantic Context,” 261. 
78 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, xii. 
79 Ibid., xiii–xiv. 
80 Ibid., xiv. 
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the edge of the “evangelical resonance machine” might connect with his vision.81 Taking 
aim at Evangelicals is easy sport, as we have seen with Milbank. It does not do justice to 
the complexity of how Evangelicals really relate to the world. Indeed, as already noted, 
Connolly’s presentation of Evangelical Christianity is decidedly anaemic. Whilst 
Connolly tries to show awareness of the various types of Christianity including 
Evangelicals, he does very little to show an understanding of their internal visions and 
aspirations.82 Instead he focuses on the epiphenomena of Evangelical worship practices 
in concert with late capitalism. The understanding and nuance he displays for neo-liberal 
non-Christians is not afforded for the object of his scrutiny — Evangelicals. Connolly’s 
jump from Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic to the practices of Evangelicals today is also 
insufficient warrant for his claims, and will not suffice for my own account.83 I recognise 
the secondary, i.e., epiphenomena, of Evangelical behaviours in capitalism, but I do not 
recognise myself and my Evangelical peers in Connolly’s account of the ethos and nature 
of Evangelicals. Evangelicals may well spring from a Weberian Protestant Work Ethic 
and ethos and may also have a new ethos unable to resist the deforming forces of 
capitalism. But how did Evangelicals arrive at that condition today, and has their ethos 
lost all capability for resistance? Connolly does not provide an answer to that question. 
Connolly is not seeking a non-religious ethos for his countermovement, just as he 
is not looking for a Christian one. His ambivalence about Christianity is clearly expressed: 
“The quickest way to put the point is therefore to say that the evangelical-capitalist 
resonance machine both poses dangers to resist and expresses one symptom of a larger 
condition to be addressed.”84 Christianity, whilst the problem, can also be serviceable as 
                                                 
81 Ibid., xiv. 
82 For example, Guest reminds us of how Connolly presents Evangelicalism as a monolithic 
block, unaware of its complexity and diversity, and is, for example, unable to pay heed to those 
Evangelicals already resisting associations between Evangelicalism and capitalist markets. See Guest, 
“Evangelicalism and Capitalism in Transatlantic Context,” 263. 
83 Guest demonstrates how Connolly is heavily indebted to Max Weber for making those links 
yet, having made that elucidation, remains overly indebted to Weber himself, see ibid., 261. 
84 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 64. 
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part of the solution. Connolly, for example, is grateful for the spirituality of his Christian 
parents, for how spirituality and a Christian ethos can lead to healthy social 
arrangements.85 This, however, is my main problem with Connolly. In responding to 
Connolly’s argument, I want to be alert to the origins and loss of resistance by my 
Evangelicalism. But his vision is one that would ultimately denature Evangelicalism and 
render it as something other than Evangelical. Indeed, he seeks to strip an Evangelical 
ethos from its origins, beliefs, and practices, and redeploy it as a re-assembled useful 
resource within a non-Evangelical imagination and horizon. And all this when he has not 
understood Evangelicalism at all in terms of its origins, visions, and aspirations. Connolly 
seems to have become himself captive to a logic of capitalism, in seeing Evangelicalism 
simply as a resource to be cherry-picked for items that will support his democratic, left-
wing vision. 
Connolly believes Evangelicals like me are “teetering on the brink” of a new 
countermovement. That countermovement for Connolly is one where Evangelicals will 
need to “affirm a world without divine providence, a self-regulating market, or 
consummate capacities of human mastery of the world.”86 This “creed”, as he calls it, will 
“activate positive political energy” for a countermovement.87 I am sure Evangelicals 
might be willing to give up a belief in a self-regulating market and human mastery of the 
world. But I venture that, like me, they are unwilling to accept a world without divine 
providence and the involvement of God in his creation with his people. All those things 
are, I suggest, inimical to Evangelicalism. Ultimately Connolly’s vision is one that wants 
to make use of a Christian ethos, but not the person of Christ. He makes the all too 
common mistake of not understanding how relationship with Christ is central to 
                                                 
85 Ibid., xv. 
86 Ibid., xv. 
87 Ibid., xiv. 
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generating Evangelical beliefs, practice, and ethos.88 Evangelicals are not going to give 
up their belief in a Christ who entered materially and providentially into this world for 
the sake of a new neo-liberal political vision. Or perhaps some already are, by engaging 
in the post-church response I noted anecdotally, and that Milbank has registered.89  
Milbank alerts us further as to why Connolly’s vision is faulty, or at least not one 
many Christians can accept, let alone Evangelicals.90 All of Connolly’s vision can be 
viewed as a claim to commitments within a theological horizon. Milbank does not 
reference Connolly, but he certainly has in mind correlationist accounts such as 
Connolly’s that seek to ‘out-narrate’ a Christian theology, i.e., vision and horizon. For 
Connolly presents what Milbank would call an “idolatrous confinement” where a 
Christian knowledge of God is reduced to a correlation with the ultimate needs of a neo-
liberal vision. Connolly’s vision is exactly the type Milbank warns about, one that is 
reduced to a “sublimity beyond representation,” merely confirming ideas of an 
“autonomous secular realm.”91 Connolly would have me re-embed my Evangelical ethos 
into a neo-liberal vision and horizon. This is impossible, for any attempt to do so leads to 
the loss of any Evangelical ethos. For Connolly’s account is far from neutral, with its own 
traditioned anti-theologies as extra-Scriptural authorities. And, as noted already, 
Connolly has not understood what an Evangelical ethos is really generated by. Connolly 
requires me to ‘update’ my Christianity to conform to his modern social theories and 
imaginations.  
Connolly, like Milbank, has little expectation for the efficacy of his own vision to 
have any traction in the face of the strong deforming forces of capitalist consumption: 
                                                 
88 Even a symposium in response to Connolly, and the subsequent publication of responses, did 
not see Connolly or his critics acknowledge the lack of account and understanding of the Evangelicals 
Connolly has in his sights. See Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity. 
89 There is now something of a post post-church movement, with some realising what they have 
lost in engaging in projects similar to Connolly’s vision and horizon, for example, see Bouma, 
Understand Emerging Church Theology. 
90 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006). 
91 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 1.  
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“would capitalism be transfigured into something else if these activities and movements 
acquired impressive momentum? I am not sure.”92 Connolly’s work does correlate with 
that of Milbank, in so far as they both determine Evangelicalism (of a particular type) to 
be intrinsic to capitalism. Like one trajectory from Milbank, Connolly sees the future of 
thinking Evangelicals as lying outside of Evangelicalism. Again, I am left to ask: is my 
only hope a move out and away from Evangelicalism, into an Anglo-Catholicisation with 
Milbank, or into a post-church, left-wing political countermovement with Connolly? At 
least Milbank offers a vision of an assemblage, so to speak, around the person of Christ 
and His church. Evangelicalism is unable, within the accounts of Milbank and Connolly, 
to respond to the problems of life in late-capitalist market societies because it is the root 
cause of those problems, to be abandoned or mined as resources for something beyond 
recognition. After being offered these two post-Evangelical countermovements, I am led 
to ask: has anyone proposed and/or evidenced an Evangelical countermovement from an 
understanding of Evangelicals by an Evangelical?  
 
1.4 Evangelical Accounts of the Relationship  
I now examine Evangelical accounts of the relationship with capitalism, made by Pete 
Ward, Mathew Guest and Rob Warner. I will show the alternatives they provide to 
Milbank and Connolly, how they confirm the need to make my own account, and how 
they point towards a suitable method for that account. 
 
1.4.1 Liquid Church: Further intensification of the relationship 
Pete Ward, in his work Liquid Church, provides an account that contrasts starkly with 
those of Milbank and Connolly.93 Milbank and Connolly seemingly despise the culture 
                                                 
92 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 145. 
93 Pete Ward, Liquid Church (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2002). 
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of capitalism and Evangelicalism. Ward, on the other hand, berates Evangelicals for not 
having embraced the forces of capitalism, in particular commodification, more readily. 
Ward goes so far as to claim, “I believe that commodification is essential to 
Evangelism.”94 For “rather than condemn the shopper as materialist Liquid Church would 
take shopping seriously as a spiritual exercise.”95 Where the underwriting of 
commodification by ecclesial practice is inherently evil for Milbank, according to Ward, 
it is a theological necessity, and a vital ecclesial practice for the church. Ward is certainly 
critical of the relationship between Christianity and capitalist markets, but his 
countermovement is to embrace and further intensify that which Connolly and Milbank 
delineate as the problem. Now, there are many reasons to take Pete Ward to task, not least 
of which is his overzealous wholesale adoption and extrapolation of Zygmunt Bauman’s 
liquid modernity for the construction of Liquid Church ecclesiology. Bauman is the first 
to warn of the new totalitarianism and wickedness inherent to Liquid modernity, that 
replaces the wicked in the Solid96. That wickedness is then subsumed and smuggled into 
Ward’s Liquid Church thesis. 
Ward’s claim is not that Evangelicals have failed to resist the formational forces of 
modern life such as with capitalism, but rather that they have failed to connect and 
integrate with those forces and mechanisms of modern life.97 Ward would have 
Evangelicals further correlate with the imaginations and relationships of modern life, and 
not try to resist them.98 Furthermore, a theological description of church can and should 
be mapped directly against contemporary “sociological descriptions of contemporary 
economic life”, such that the shape of church should be determined by the socio-logic of 
those forms of contemporary economic life.99 This is what Ward imagines as ‘Liquid 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 63. 
95 Ibid., 75. 
96 Zygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis, Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid 
Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
97 Pete Ward, Liquid Church, 4. 
98 Ibid., 3-4. 
99 Ibid., 11. 
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Church’, whereby it is not that Christianity has conformed too closely to, and set the 
agenda for, contemporary economic life, but rather it is that church has not gone far 
enough in accommodating to the possibilities of our new “network” society.100  
For Ward, there is a “resonance” between church and the “sociological theory of 
consumption” that necessitates church as ‘Liquid Church’ to conform to this social 
theory, such that it “must emerge from a connection to the spiritual desires and 
preferences of those who are so far outside of Church life.”101. For Ward, it is individual 
participations around cultural imaginations that give rise to its collective forms.102 Ward 
pits what he sees as organised church, with congregations and services as being 
“institutional” and directly against ‘Liquid Church’. For Ward, it is the imaginations of 
modern network society that produce participation and emerging social relationships and, 
ultimately, ‘Liquid Church’, and those stand contra the imaginations of the “institutional 
church”, or “institutional box” as he calls it. 103  
This is rather troubling and appears to be a de-ecclesial move by Ward. His 
trajectory is one where ecclesiology is solely about individual relationship to Jesus; that 
then takes any and every form it wants to around imaginations for life in modern culture. 
Ward is not alone in making such de-ecclesial moves. Alan Hirsch and Michael Frost, in 
a book popular with a wide segment of Evangelical church leaders, The Shaping of Things 
to Come, want to place relationship with Christ as prior to any notions of church.104 For 
Hirsch, Frost, and indeed Ward, mission for Christians comes solely from individual 
relationship with Christ, not the church. This approach leads rather tragically to all 
notions of church being subject to the anomic imaginations of isolated consumers, where 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 11-12. 
101 Ibid., 12. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 209. 
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the forms of the church are completely dispensable by individuals.105 There is also an 
epistemic problem that contributes to this issue that “depends upon the epistemological 
priority of the individual thinking self.”  This self sees no place for the existing church as 
a social context to learn the stories and language of Christian faith.106 Can we really 
separate the body of Christ from the person of Christ in social realities in this way? Or 
another way to ask this, is the body of Christ a free for all, with no shape, texture, or 
delineation, save the imaginings of whatever modes of culture give shape to it? Ward tries 
to offer a theological imagination for ‘Liquid Church’ but expresses it as one that needs 
to inhere and map against the contours of modern culture. Here, he also seems to have 
fallen foul of the warning by Milbank concerning how social theory is already a theology, 
and from that, how any imaginations for ecclesiology are already replete with theological 
commitments.107 Why should the body of Christ take its ordering from other social 
realities, rather than take its priority from the person of Christ and the body of Christ, the 
church? 
Ward, Connolly, and Milbank have offered me two polarities for my thesis 
problem. The despising of culture on the one hand, or extreme accommodation to culture 
on the other. Ultimately Pete Ward may be the logical conclusion to, and manifestation 
of, the observed problems of my Evangelical ecclesiology, and an embodiment of 
Milbank’s thesis. Is there something between these accounts? A via media that offers an 
understanding of Evangelical Christianity better nuanced with regard to its relationship 
with capitalist markets? And would such a via media enable me to perceive alternative 
ecclesial practices that neither overly refute the market nor accommodate it, whilst taking 
                                                 
105 I have taken Hirsch and Frost and this position to task in more details in, Jason Clark, 
“Consumer Liturgies and their Corrosive Effects on Christian Identity,” in Church in the Present Tense, 
ed. Kevin Corcoran (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing, 2011), 45. 
106 David Fitch has outlined this problem, see “Missio Alliance,” accessed 10th April 2018, 
http://www.missioalliance.org/missiology-precedes-ecclesiology-the-epistemological-problem/. 
107 For a summary of this thesis by Milbank, see Fergus Keer, “Simplicity Itself: Milbank’s 
Thesis,” New Blackfriars, 73, no. 861 (1992): 307, and Milbank himself, John Milbank, Theology and 
Social Theory, 382. 
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seriously critiques of the church and market? Could such accounts also respond to the 
claims by Milbank, Connolly, and Ward, attending to the issues of commodification, and 
assemblage by Evangelicalism with capitalism, but by continuing to be inherently 
Evangelical? It is to that possibility that I now turn. 
 
1.4.2 Congregational Studies and Historical Accounts 
Pete Ward’s proposal is made without any concrete observations of Evangelical life. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to claim his proposed ecclesial countermovement of Liquid 
Church is an “imaginatory exercise.”108 Milbank and Connolly also have no substantive 
account of lived Evangelical life to warrant their claims. There is a danger in the making 
of such imaginary accounts, to which, ironically, Pete Ward is attentive with his later 
work. A danger where “we are prone to a sleight of hand that appears to make social 
theory appear to be a description of social reality — which of course it is not.”109 Ward 
seems to have fallen prey to this own sleight of hand. Accounts from social theory and/or 
theology must correlate with concrete lived realities if they are to attend to my research 
problem. It will not suffice to propose hydroponic ecclesiologies that are not rooted in 
social reality. Indeed, my intuition, subject to further work in this thesis, is that these 
imaginary ecclesiologies are epiphenomena of the pathogenic mechanism of 
commodification. The generating of more and more fanciful ideas of what church should 
be, is a manifestation of the very pathogenesis I am seeking to address.  
So where have others made accounts — concrete accounts — from observations of 
Evangelical Christianity in its relationship to capitalism? Eve Poole provides an account 
of views by the Anglican church on recent forms of capitalism. Her account is partially 
                                                 
108 Pete Ward, Liquid Church, 3. 
109 Pete Ward, “Introduction,” in Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography, edited by Pete 
Ward (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 4. 
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attentive to the Evangelicalism within Anglicanism.110 Then there are specialist studies, 
such as the work of Stewart Davenport. He concentrates his account on the relationship 
of North American Evangelical Protestant Christians to capitalist markets between 1815 
and 1860.111 There are, in addition, some rather dated works like that of Craig Gay on 
earlier forms of capitalism.112 A more recent work closer to Evangelicalism, but certainly 
not by self-identified Evangelicals, has been written by Peter Block, Walter 
Brueggemann, and John McKnight.113 There are also two Grove Booklets by Peter 
Heslem, one before the 2007 credit crunch and one as a response afterwards.114 The earlier 
of these sets issues of globalisation against an Evangelical biblical story. The latter 
explores faith and enterprise. This small foray is very limited and presages the need for 
more detailed accounts. Indeed, not only can award-winning books on Evangelicalism 
written by academics fail to define Evangelicalism, they can also be written on the 
cultural captivity of Evangelicals with scant reference to the forces of capitalism.115  
It seems that accounts made by Evangelicals intramurally in order to understand 
Evangelicalism in relationship to capitalism, are rather rare. Capitalism may be the water 
that Evangelicals swim in and fail to notice, let alone question. There have been several 
works by those close to Evangelicalism who take Evangelicalism to task. But these works 
                                                 
110 Poole provides an account of Anglican theological assessments of late capitalism. However, 
her sources are useful for our account, in particular in highlighting the work of Peter Sedgwick. See Eve 
Poole, The Church and Capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
111 Stewart Davenport, Friends of the Unrighteous Mammon: Northern Christians and Market 
Capitalism, 1815–1860 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
112 Despite the title of his work, Craig Gay’s account is now somewhat dated and provides only a 
brief historical account of the development of capitalism and Evangelicalism, with a sociological reading 
of North American Evangelicals in their relationship to capitalism through the lens of democratic and 
republican politics, in reaction to the forces of secularisation in the mid-to later-20th century. His account 
is useful for us with regard to the interactions of Evangelicals within secular forces, but is limited by its 
specific US-centric political reading. We are looking for a much broader account of Evangelicals within 
the North Atlantic context and capitalism. See Craig M. Gay, With Liberty and Justice for Whom?: The 
Recent Evangelical Debate Over Capitalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991). 
113 Peter Block, Walter Brueggemann, and John McKnight, An Other Kingdom: Departing 
Consumer Culture (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2016). 
114 Peter S. Heslem, Globalization; Unravelling the New Capitalism (Cambridge: Grove Booklets, 
2002), and Transforming Capitalism: Entrepreneurship and the Renewal of Thrift (Cambridge: Grove 
Booklets, 2010). 
115 Soong-Chan Rah, The Next Evangelicalism, 50. Rah has one sole reference to the forces of 
capitalism in relationship with Evangelicalism. 
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often present a simplistic notion of the modern church being a capitulation to some 
monolithic notion of Christendom, and a call to ecclesiologies formed around social and 
cultural landscapes.116 Despite their claims of how the church has capitulated to culture, 
my intuition, subject to my research here, is that these works are themselves deeply 
flawed as expressions of accommodations to capitalism imaginations. 
Some accounts made of Evangelicalism in its developments within broader cultural 
relationships are closer to my situation. One such account is from Guest, who has made 
a substantive study of Evangelicalism in its relationship to modern culture, including 
capitalism.117 He then built on that work to make a more specific account of 
Evangelicalism’s relationship with capitalism that was in part a rejoinder to Connolly’s 
work.118 In surveying the sources that Guest uses for his account, the lack of references 
to other accounts by Evangelicals of the relationship of capitalism to Evangelicalism is 
striking.119 Guest makes use of nearly 50 sources, none of which are accounts of the 
relationship between Evangelicalism and capitalism. Moreover, where his sources deal 
with the relationship of Christianity to capitalism, they do so from within a broader 
methodology of spirituality (or religion generally), and of cultural formation. Guest has 
one single source to account for the origins and development of the relationship of 
capitalism with Evangelicalism. That source is Weber’s, The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism.120 And that is despite Guest asking us, as I have already observed, 
to note how Connolly relies too heavily on Weber’s account of the Protestant Work 
Ethic.121 Guest’s slightly earlier and more extensive work in providing an account of 
Evangelicalism and its relationship to contemporary culture, makes use of over 260 
                                                 
116 For example, see John Drane, The McDonaldisation of the Church (London: Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 2000) and John Drane, After McDonaldisation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008).  
117 Mathew Guest, Evangelical Identity and Contemporary Culture: A Congregational Study in 
Innovation (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007). 
118 Guest, “Evangelicalism and Capitalism in Transatlantic Context.” 
119 Ibid., 277–279. 
120 Guest, Evangelical Identity and Contemporary Culture, 257. 
121 Guest, “Evangelicalism and Capitalism in Transatlantic Context,” 261. 
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sources.122 These sources demonstrate a similar lack of accounts of how capitalism relates 
to Evangelicalism. Again, Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic is the sole account to 
understanding Evangelicals in relationship to capitalism.123 
Guest makes use of David Bebbington’s historical account of Evangelicalism.124 
He highlights that, whilst Bebbington’s account is expansive and extensive, it does not 
consider the relationship of Evangelicalism as it developed within capitalism. Bebbington 
himself is primarily concerned with Evangelicalism’s interactions with the 
Enlightenment, and goes so far as to dismiss the need to understand how Evangelicalism 
relates to capitalism.125 Guest further claims that a complex and multifaceted exploration 
of the broader “social phenomena” of Evangelicalism is still yet to be made. For example, 
he notes a need for understanding the development of Evangelicalism in relation to the 
social anxieties of the new leisured and middle classes with emerging capitalist 
cultures.126  
 
1.4.3 The Protestant Work Ethic: A continued dependence on Weber 
In searching for additional intramural accounts of Evangelicalism and its relationship to 
various cultural settings, we find that Warner offers a more extensive work.127 Warner’s 
account is very close to the context of my thesis, taking in my own wider Evangelical 
community, and that of my own church denomination. Warner cites over 700 sources for 
his impressive account of Evangelicalism.128 Yet, as with Guest and others, the only 
                                                 
122 Guest undertook a study and survey of two Evangelical congregations within the same Church, 
St Michael-le-Belfrey in York. Guest evidences manifestations similar to my own observations of the 
forces of capitalism at work in the worship life and practices of Evangelicals. See Guest, Evangelical 
Identity and Contemporary Culture. 
123 Ibid., 242-255. 
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explicit account of Protestant Christianity and capitalism within these sources is made 
with Weber. Warner does highlight, as does Guest, some accounts from people outside 
Evangelicalism within methodologies of religion and culture, where the dynamics of 
marketplace and religion feature.  
This lack of accounting is significant. For example, Warner examines how 
Evangelicals have pragmatically used the tools of marketing available in late-capitalist 
market societies, such as Alpha, in response to cultural factors of the Enlightenment and 
existentialism. But he does not explain how Evangelicals ended up making use of 
capitalist practices like marketing. Warner is important because he confirms my 
observations of how Evangelicals have indeed taken up the tools of capitalism for the 
propagation and experience of faith. But we are left needing to understand how and why 
that state of affairs occurred.129 It is in the work of Bebbington that Warner (like Guest) 
finds his understanding of Evangelicalism, and of the cultural factors for understanding 
the nature of its larger social context.130 This reliance on Bebbington may have led to a 
lack of consideration of capitalism.131  
It would seem that those who have surveyed Evangelicalism up close confirm the 
need for my account. My work may be seen in part as an extension and broadening of the 
work begun by Guest and Warner. Having established the need for the making of my own 
account, I now outline the method I will use. I first highlight methodological issues 
integral to this work, before then outlining the structure of the rest of my thesis. 
 
                                                 
129 For a thorough assessment of how Alpha is both a product of capitalist possibilities and 
simultaneously a creative response to them, see Stephen Hunt, The Alpha Enterprise (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2004). For other extensive assessments of Alpha, see, Andrew Brookes, ed., The Alpha Phenomenon: 
Theology, Praxis and Challenges for Mission and Church Today (Peterborough: CTBI Publications, 
2007); and Chris Hand, Falling Short?: The Alpha Course Examined (Epsom: Day One Publications, 
1998).  
130 Whilst Warner sees himself building upon the historical account of Bebbington, he does claim 
to modify Bebbington’s thesis, ibid., 20.  
131 Bebbington is dismissive of the influence of capitalism upon Evangelicalism; see Bebbington, 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 272. We shall return to this when we review Bebbington in detail. 
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1.5 A Contested Tradition: Locating the research method 
…evangelicalism, we contend, is strong not because it is shielded against, but because it is 
— or at least perceives itself to be — embattled with forces that seem to oppose or threaten 
it. Indeed, evangelicalism, we suggest, thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, 
and threat. Without these, evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow 
languid and aimless. 
 
— Christian Smith and Michael Emerson, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving 
 
I established earlier how we might understand the interactions of Evangelical beliefs and 
practices within contextual challenges as being like the immune system of a body 
interacting with environmental factors. I also assume that a contestation of identity within 
changing environmental conditions is the nature of all Christianity. In other words, 
Christianity is always contested, and Evangelicalism is especially so, because it has 
thrived on contestation for its genesis and formation. Christian Smith highlights this 
internal orientation of Evangelicals, as active engagement towards the world.132 
Evangelicals, institutionally and individually, have an innate capacity and ability to re-
negotiate their identity within changing cultural environments. In other words, as Guest 
notes from Smith, “Evangelicals do accommodate their position in response to cultural 
change, but part of this process of accommodation involves a revitalisation of Evangelical 
identity, not least by focusing on new sources of opposition.”133 There are, however, 
others like D. A. Carson who contest strongly for a givenness to Evangelicalism that does 
not allow for any renegotiation of convictions and boundaries.134 Warner has taken claims 
like Carson’s to task.135 Warner has demonstrated how Evangelicalism is indeed a 
contested and renegotiated tradition, such that a recent form of Evangelicalism (the very 
kind D. A. Carson seeks to underwrite as a pure Evangelicalism): 
 
                                                 
132 Christian Smith and Michael Emerson, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 88. 
133 Guest, Evangelical Identity and Contemporary Culture, 16. 
134 Donald A. Carson, “Domesticating the Gospel,” The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 6, 
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has unconsciously assimilated a neoplatonic theism, a Reformation forenso-centric 
soteriology, a Pietist individualism, and enlightenment epistemology and a pre-critical 
tendency to literalism, then Evangelicalism is a complex construct of historical theology, 
formulated through an often unperceived interaction with its cultural setting, rather than … 
a confident and un-reflexive formulation, unadulterated, timeless, and universally 
applicable distillation of the Gospel of Christ.136 
 
Bebbington has provided the most detailed and widely accepted historical account of the 
development of Evangelicalism in Britain to date.137 Even a cursory reading of 
Bebbington reveals the concrete history of Evangelicals as one of cultural 
accommodation, resistance, and revitalisation. 138 There is no pristine form and singular 
Evangelical tradition to transmit unsullied by new and emerging cultures. This leads to 
further methodological considerations that flow from notions of contestation and re-
negotiation. For I am encouraged about the possibility of my own reparative account by 
the observations of Smith, Guest, and Warner that Evangelicalism engages and revitalises 
itself through ‘self-critique’. I locate my method within this Evangelical horizon of ‘self-
critique’, as I reconceptualise in order to revitalise, rather than repudiate, my Evangelical 
tradition.139  
 
1.5.1 Blueprint Ecclesiologies and Reparative Reasoning: Rootlessness versus 
indebtedness 
…theodramatic ecclesiology is not governed by the blueprint criteria of completeness, 
normativity, universal application and systematic coherence. Rather is it judged by how 
well it promotes the church’s practical coherence with the principle laid down by Paul, that 
the church should boast in the cross of Jesus Christ, and only in the Cross of Jesus Christ. 
Its assessment is therefore in terms of how well it fosters the church’s truthful witness and 
its members’ discipleship within this particular context, as well as its practical prophetic 
force and application within a particular scene of the theo-drama. 
 
— Nicholas M. Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology 
 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 35. 
137 Again, for a more recent history that covers the USA, as well as the UK, see the five-volume 
History of Evangelicalism Series, edited by David W. Bebbington and Mark A. Noll. 
138 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain. 
139 Warner, Reinventing English Evangelicalism, 14. 
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Nicholas Healy articulates a theodramatic horizon for ecclesiology as part of his broader 
project of a “practical-prophetic ecclesiology.”140 For Healy’s theodramatic is 
performative, and a method to judge the ecclesial faithfulness of those performances. This 
method of ecclesial assessment attends to the concrete nature of the church, to enable the 
church to make performative responses to such assessments. “Ecclesiology’s main 
function is to help the church respond as best it can to its context.”141 I am making my 
own ecclesial assessment in a similar vein, of the failings of Evangelical ecclesiology in 
the particular context of life in capitalism. I do so in order to make a reparative response, 
i.e., how Evangelicals might live more faithfully to their theological visions and horizons. 
Healy reminds us that ecclesiology all too often becomes something other than a 
performative response, reduced instead to highly systematic and abstract theory “focused 
more upon finding the right things to think about the church rather than oriented to the 
living, rather messy, confused and confusing body that the church actually is. It displays 
a preference for describing the church’s theoretical and essential identity rather than its 
concrete and historical identity.”142 My goal is not to define correct ecclesiological 
method, but to broaden more concrete forms of ecclesiological method and reflection.143 
In order to talk about the concrete church, it is also important to know what that is not. It 
is not the empirical church versus its theological ideal, “an ecclesial equivalent of 
Nestorianism.”144 Neither is it understanding the church as a solely human production 
and activity, which is ecclesial Ebionism.145 In short, it is not about the transmission of 
theories to others, which are, or might one day, be put into practice.146 For the church is 
                                                 
140 Healy draws directly and heavily upon Urs von Balthasar and his ideas of theodramatic theory. 
This theodramatic theory makes possible a theological description of the church that is not abstract, and 
also acknowledges the sinfulness of the church, see Chapter 3, ‘A Theodramatic Horizon’, in Nicholas M. 
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about a distinctive way of life lived around the person of Jesus Christ: “its life takes 
concrete form in the web of social practices accepted and promoted by the community as 
well as in the activities of its individual members.”147 
This can be overlaid with those ecclesial responses that convey vociferous 
commitments to anything other than any previous church way of life, for a post-church 
life as ‘hydroponic ecclesiologies’. Post-church ecclesiologies are in actual fact far from 
rootless, and are deeply embedded in commitments to social, political, and consumer 
imaginations and horizons. One suspicion my thesis will test, is that the root system to 
post-church ecclesiologies is planted deeply in the soil of capitalism, and that a 
celebration of the self, nurtured in previous Evangelical worship environments, has 
continued along a logical trajectory in capitalism into unfettered agency. Those once ‘God 
made’ in their worship now make God in the image they require for the way of life they 
desire, a way of life free from the inconveniences of shared commitments with others. 
The inability to admit and commit to any shared ecclesial horizon of the church in history 
is part of the pathogenesis I am looking to diagnose and respond to. For many post-church 
people, a definition of ecclesiology is not just difficult, it is psychosomatically painful.148 
My thesis will explore if and how consumer culture has trained people into a solipsistic 
existence which leaves them unable to engage in the relational commitments necessary 
for the “miscible” nature of Church life.149 To engage in church with others is to induce 
existential angst about violating the self of consumer agency. Many are unable to describe 
themselves in terms of any identity located in and with others, and are trapped looking in 
the mirror of their own reflection for ecclesial commitments. Percy discerns and 
                                                 
147 By practices, Healy has in mind David Kelsey’s definition of “practice” from To Understand 
God Truly, p.118, that is based upon Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2011), and Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, 5. 
148 Martyn Percy observes how Fresh Expressions have one thing in common; the avoidance of 
the word ‘church’, because “Church is boring, cumbersome, institutional, messy and difficult.” Martyn 
Percy, Shaping the Church, 78.  
149 For an understanding of the phrase “miscible life of church,” see ibid., 78.  
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diagnoses such ecclesial manifestations and phenomena as a kind of “sacralised 
narcissism.”150  
This modern problem of systematised accounts of church, separated from the 
complexities of concrete everyday life, is the construal of blueprint ecclesiologies.151 
Such blueprint ecclesiologies are overly systemised theological construals of the church 
into idealised “supermodels” of ecclesiology.152 The primary concern here is with how 
these accounts are funded by modern modes of thinking and commitments into abstracted 
visions of church. Healy almost certainly does not have in mind in his writing the rank-
and-file of Fresh Expression post-church practitioners in the UK. But the shoe does fit, 
so to speak, with the endless proposals about what church should be, by those incapable 
of performing those idealisations.153 For these idealised visions of “blueprint 
ecclesiologies” can never live up to any concrete and quotidian realities of church life.154 
We saw how Ward’s ecclesial account was self-consciously made as an “imaginatory 
exercise.” Ward’s ‘Liquid Church’ is, in some regards, an exemplar of a “blueprint 
ecclesiology.”  
A contrast to such “blueprint ecclesiologies” might be found with Peter Ochs 
notion of “reparative”. Stephen Kepnes draws on the “reparative” method of Peter Ochs, 
and claims there is a place of respect for our forebears: “Since our times are different, 
there is no reason to assume that our forebears’ solutions will necessarily be ours. At the 
same time, we need not throw everything out and start again but instead, we must adapt, 
change, and ‘repair’ the wisdom of our mothers and fathers so that it works more 
                                                 
150 Percy has in his sights here Fresh Expressions, and makes a similar correlation with Milbank to 
my own, see Percy, Shaping the Church, 76-77. 
151 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, chapter 2, “Blueprint Ecclesiologies.” 
152 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, 32. 
153 See Percy, Shaping the Church, 68–69 for an overview of a tranche of new ecclesial groups 
whose self-narrations fit my categorisation here of ‘hydroponic ecclesiologies’. 
154 This reminds me of a friend, part of a Fresh Expressions in London. When I asked him about 
the progress of their church planting after two years of work by his team, his response was that they were 
closer to an idea of what church should be, and might be ready to try something in the future. 
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appropriately for us.”155 We can assume those forebears sought to respond to their own 
contexts as best they could. We can take their wisdom and make our own responses. In 
other words, we do not need to throw the baby out with the bathwater.156 Ochs’s 
“reparative” method would also have us consider Evangelicalism as a communal process 
of suffering in changed conditions, where beliefs and practices are performed and re-
narrated to provide a healing response to the problems of emerging capitalist society. 
Ochs’s method also invites us to consider how an examination of the habits and practices 
of Evangelicals might provide a “thick” description of identity formation and 
socialisation.157 For Ochs, “thinking properly happens after a group performance of 
thinking and acting to re-describe, organize, and map what just happened.”158 With Healy 
and Ochs, we might understand the development of Evangelicalism as a communal 
process of suffering within changed conditions — particularly that of emerging late 
capitalism — a location where beliefs and practices are performed and re-narrated to 
provide a healing response to problems of faithful living in that context.  
 
1.5.2 Ambiguity, Possibility and Intelligibility: Establishing definitions, terms and 
limitations 
Having established the context, need and the dialogical mode of my project, it is time to 
face the most challenging aspect for my research method, that readers have no doubt 
already been asking. How can I make a meaningful account of such broad domains, i.e., 
Evangelicalism and capitalism? How do I undertake such a task without ‘biting off more 
                                                 
155 Stephen Kepnes distils and summarises Peter Ochs’s method of ‘reparative reasoning’ in Steve 
D. Kepnes, “Peter Ochs: Philosophy in the Service of God and the World,” Modern Theology 24, no. 3 
(2008): 499–503, 499. Ochs is a Jewish Pragmatist theologian whose work is hard to categorise, but 
straddles the fields of theology, philosophy, and ethics. 
156 Many consider this methodology of Ochs to be too conservative, too unwilling to repudiate 
things that ought to be repudiated. For example, James K. A. Smith takes Ochs to task for failing to 
repudiate and critique modernity. See James K. A. Smith, “How Religious Practices Matter: Peter Ochs’s 
‘Alternative Nurturance’ of Philosophy of Religion,” Modern Theology 24, no. 3 (2008): 469–478. 
157 Smith demonstrates how Ochs’s reparative method can be used for such descriptions and 
accounts of communities. See Smith, “How Religious Practices Matter,” 472–473. 
158 Ibid. 
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than I can chew,’ so to speak? How can I talk intelligibly about these two territories, 
without absurd reductions and inappropriate extrapolations from the broadly general to 
the specific? This challenge is not unique to my work; others have faced it with their 
research. 
For example, in practical theology it is common to undertake a study of one or two 
congregations, then to extrapolate from that across all of Evangelicalism.159 Guest 
undertook his PhD work with such a study of one church community. Of course, it is 
impossible to extrapolate from one congregational study against all of Evangelicalism, to 
move from the specific to the general so readily. But it does not make the attempt invalid 
or unwarranted, or unhelpful. In a similar vein, Warner completed his historical account 
as his ‘case study’ of Evangelicalism.160 Warner’s ‘case history’ spans a very particular 
period of time, with a particular focus on a recent transformation of British 
Evangelicalism. Even with Warner’s focus on the period of 1966-2001 and English 
Evangelicals, he comes in for immediate criticism for not paying attention to 
Evangelicalism in its wider nature and instantiations. There is a necessary paucity to his 
historical account, something I suspect Warner would be the first to admit.161 One is left 
wondering how to speak about Evangelicalism if one must ‘boot up’ a complete history 
and account of Evangelicals, let alone then bring Evangelicalism into contact with any 
particular domains for examination. Those expert in congregational studies like those of 
Guest, and mixed method accounts like those of Warner’s, are mindful of the potential 
                                                 
159 Guest is a key example of this method, see Guest, Evangelical Identity and Contemporary 
culture. 
160 Warner’s successful PhD details this historical method in “Fissured Resurgence, 
Developments in English Resurgence Pan-Evangelicalism 1966-2001” (PhD Thesis, Kings College 
London, 2007). This PhD thesis was later edited into the book Reinventing English Evangelicalism. 
161 For example, see Christopher Cocksworth, review of Rob Warner, Reinventing English Evan-
gelicalism 1966–2001: A Theological and Sociological Study (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007); Guest, 
Evangelical Identity and Contemporary Culture, 222–224. 
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and limits of their methods.162 If they have been able to do so, it cannot be beyond the 
reach of my project to do likewise. 
David Martin is helpful here, in facing head-on these methodological constraints I 
face. For Martin claims that in trying to present any accounts of “modern ecclesiologies”, 
we are always forced into ambiguous usages of conceptions and deployments. However, 
such ambiguity often reveals the “actual situation” in which church communities interact 
with other social bodies and forces.163 My account will by necessity incorporate such 
ambiguity when seeking to describe Evangelicalism in relation to capitalism, just as all 
other robust accounts have to. Martin would say the ambiguity of my account carries with 
it the possibility of revealing something that overly focussed accounts cannot make.  
 
1.6 Map Making: Research and thesis design 
“That’s another thing we’ve learned from your Nation,” said Mein Herr, “map-making. But 
we’ve carried it much further than you. What do you consider the largest map that would be 
really useful?” 
“About six inches to the mile.” 
“Only six inches!” exclaimed Mein Herr. “We very soon got to six yards to the mile. Then 
we tried a hundred yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually 
made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!” 
“Have you used it much?” I enquired. 
“It has never been spread out, yet,” said Mein Herr: “the farmers objected: they said it 
would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, 
as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well.” 
 
— Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded: Fully Illustrated Edition 
 
I am building an eclectic method to identify the pathogenesis of Evangelicalism within 
capitalism. The rest of this thesis chapter now explains and justifies that method and 
research design. If I am to find a resistance gene within Evangelicalism, then I will need 
to make a map. Map-making is the over-arching concept for my thesis method as a whole, 
in terms of its nature, aims, and limitations. For, “a map always manages the reality it is 
                                                 
162 For example, see Martyn Percy, Engaging with Contemporary Culture, 106–109, for 
delineation of the potential of congregational studies. 
163 David Martin, Reflections on Sociology and Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997),127. 
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trying to convey. No map perfectly captures the territory it surveys; there is always too 
much to see; too much to weigh and discern; too much to be interpreted and then refracted 
back. All maps are partial interpretations of reality.”164 The map is never the territory. 
Any mapping of any territory is flawed, for it is an abstraction of the reality of a territory. 
In other words, the description of the thing is never the thing itself. An ideal map in 
acknowledgement of this would contain a map of the map of the map, etc., in endless 
self-reflexiveness. Whilst any map is an abstraction, the reality is we cannot navigate a 
territory without abstraction. Luis Borges took the above story from Lewis Carroll and 
made it into his own single-paragraph short story.165 Baudrillard, following Borges, 
suggested that map-making is now impossible, because the map that once covered over 
reality has ceased to exist even as a map, along with the disappearance of the reality it 
once covered.166 The territory of Evangelicalism is in an immense landscape with many 
extensive archipelagos, subterranean outposts, and outlying trading stations, all within 
the extended socio-political geography of capitalism. There is a danger in trying to speak 
meaningfully of Evangelicalism in its relationship to capitalism that I fall into the trap 
Lewis Carroll and Borges alerts us to, of needing a map that is on the scale of one mile 
to one mile.167 
My account will be a necessary abstraction, not just in terms of its scale, but in 
terms of what territory it details, and the legend provided for its navigation. As already 
noted from Martin, ambiguity and abstraction do not dictate a lack of meaning. Ambiguity 
                                                 
164 Martyn Percy, The Wisdom of the Spirit: Gospel, Church, and Culture (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2014), 31. 
165 Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, translated by Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin, 
1998), 325. Written in the form of a literary forgery, “The Borges story,” credited fictionally as a 
quotation from "Suárez Miranda, Viajes de varones prudentes, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lérida, 1658", 
imagines an empire in which cartography has become so precise, that maps are made to the same scale of 
the empire itself. The story was first published in Los Anales de Buenos Aires, año 1, no. 3, as part of a 
piece called "Museo" under the name B. Lynch Davis, a joint pseudonym of Borges and Adolfo Bioy 
Casare, see “1946,” Borges Centre, accessed 26th May 2018, http://www.borges.pitt.edu/ node/130. 
166 Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations,” in Selected Writings, edited by Mark Poster 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 166–184. 
167 Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded: Fully Illustrated Edition (Altenmünster: Jazzybee 
Verlag, 2015), 73. 
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and abstraction are required for meaning-making of complex situations. A measure of my 
map’s accuracy will be whether its reductions cause it to lose the very things it sought to 
navigate, rather than the things it did not seek to explore. Maps also require interpretation, 
a process that gives rise to major errors. My map will come with my own theological 
interpretation and its own risks of error. My own assessment of my interpretation will be 
made by seeking to return and navigate the current state of affairs that gave rise to my 
research, i.e., am I able to better navigate my current situation as a result of my thesis? 
Like the map-maker this will be a work that attempts “… to render sociological or 
historical content more intelligible than it was in the experience of those who lived it ... a 
reconstruction that aspires to confer intelligibility on human existence.”168 The map-
making method of my thesis functions as a kind of heuristic concept map, able to trace 
correspondence between church acts and beliefs in order to allow for instruction, 
construction and evaluation of the context of Evangelicalism within its relationship to 
capitalism 169 This heurism is also strategic, in order that the thesis findings might be 
deployed by other Evangelicals as a map for their own contexts.  
I will be making five maps for my account, in five chapters, that aspire to a 
conference of intelligibility. I will superimpose each map one upon the other. For map 
makers have for some time engaged in the process of ‘map overlaying’, superimposing 
multiple thematic maps to reveal optimal locations. In ‘map overlaying’ physiographic 
factors are given a tone — the darkness of the tone denoting perhaps the cost values for 
those locations. Then social values perhaps are given a darker tone. The overlaying of 
these maps produces a map where combined tonal values contrast with areas of lesser 
                                                 
168 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 1: Montequieu, Comte, Marx, 
Tocqueville, The Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848 (New York: Basic Books, 1965), 270. 
169 Here, I have in mind the methodology of ‘concept maps’ by Joseph D. Novak, Learning, 
Creating, and Using Knowledge: Concept Maps as Facilitative Tools in Schools and Corporations, 2nd 
ed. (London: Routledge, 2009).  
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overlay or no tone at all.170 I create my maps, and then overlay my maps to identify 
optimal locations for my construction of reality. 
 
1.6.1 Binoculars, Mongrels and Theological Politics: Grosstopicality of theology 
and social science 
 
Ul Qoman man and Bes maid, meeting in the middle of Copula Hall, returning to their 
homes to realise that they live, grosstopically, next door to each other, spending their lives 
faithful and alone, rising at the same time, walking crosshatched streets close like a couple, 
each in their own city, never breaching, never quite touching, never speaking a word across 
the border. There were folktales of renegades who breach and avoid Breach to live between 
the cities, not exiles but in-siles, evading justice and retribution by consummate 
ignorability. 
 
— China Miéville, The City & The City 
 
My map-making is also, to use the neologism of China Miéville, “grosstopical”. Besźel 
and Ul Qoma – two fictitious cities occupy one spatial area. They are constructed and 
operate distinctly in their own rights, the same spaces simultaneously existing as both 
cities. The Besźel/Ul Qoma divide is generated and perpetuated psychologically, such 
that the distinction is subconsciously made and then preserved by social training in 
‘unseeing’ and ‘unsensing’. Any act of breaking out from the dichotomy is the crime of 
‘breaching’. My thesis method seeks a ‘breaching’ and grosstopicality of social theory 
and theology, as a contextual theology, to offer some “kind of attempt to confer 
intelligibility”.171 This ‘breaching’ is akin to the ‘interactionist’ method of David Tracy, 
where key sociological accounts are brought into overlay with theological understandings 
of reality.172 My ‘breaching’ is also indebted to Jacques Ellul’s dialectical method, which 
is primarily about the ‘historical’, i.e., the dialectic of social reality and facts, and 
secondarily, the ‘theological’. This account of reality and the theological are then 
                                                 
170 See “Penn State College of Earth and Mineral Sciences,” accessed 19th October 2017, https:// 
www.e-education.psu.edu/natureofgeoinfo/c9_p6.html. 
171 Percy, “Response to Part I”, 59. 
172 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroads Publishing, 1981), 24. 
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combined to create a dialectical hermeneutic, an agonistic that describes a style of life 
and action.173 My thesis overlays accounts of reality from social theory with the 
theological to produce such a third dialectical view. There is an “intellectual journey” 
my thesis makes in order to take on “the character of a living dialogue”, in order to get 
close to the concrete ecclesial life of church.174 In this, I seek to represent a totality larger 
than the account I have made.175 The nature of my map-making means I will be using 
many sources. At times, I will provide extensive engagement around sources, but at 
others, I will borrow sources constructively.  
My ‘breaching’ also has warrant from the tools and resources of political theology. 
i.e., the historical, sociological, philosophical, political, economic, and theological. 
Indeed, political theology, whilst existing in many forms through history, has only 
recently, in the last few decades, established itself as a defined discipline, its mixed 
method nature gaining more purist credibility perhaps.176 I am not making a political 
theology per se, but rather more a ‘theological politics’. For I do not seek to theologise 
over a politics that already exists, being alerted to the problems of this by Milbank at the 
start of this chapter. By that, I mean I do not want my theological mapping and 
interpretation to be the handmaiden of a socio-political that already exists within the 
relationship of Evangelicalism and capitalism. My justification for this is taken from Arne 
Rasmussen. Rasmussen juxtaposes political theology with a theological politics. He 
compares political theology where theologians like Jürgen Moltmann want to theologise 
                                                 
173 Jacques Ellul, “On Dialectic”. Also see Daniel B. Clendenin, “Introduction”, in Jacques Ellul, 
The Presence of the Kingdom, translated by Olive Wyon (Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 
1989), xxviii. 
174 For explanation of Ellul’s method and warrant for my location in his dialectic, see D. J. 
Wennemann, “An Interpretation of Jacques Ellul’s Dialectical Method” in Paul T. Durbin ed., Broad and 
Narrow Interpretations of Philosophy of Technology: Volume 7 (Philosophy and Technology) (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990),182. 
175 Ibid. 
176 There are recent texts that now confirm the origins, nature and methods of political theology; 
for example, see Elizabeth Phillips, Political Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: T & T 
Clark, 2012). 
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over a politics that already exists, with the theological politics of Stanley Hauerwas.177 A 
theological politics might ask “what kind of community do you need to understand how 
these claims should be embodied?”, in contrast to a political theology which might ask 
“what kind of theology explains how these people are already embodied?”178 This is 
precisely the mode of my work, not a theological diagnosis abstracted from concrete 
reality, but of an understanding of the type of Evangelical community that embodies its 
beliefs and practices in real life. 
But I am similarly alert, as described earlier in my chapter, to a problem with 
Milbank’s method, of trying to out-narrate the social context I am examining with my 
theological interpretations. The standing back and trying to ‘out-narrate’ all other 
accounts of social reality à la Milbank “becomes a kind of compelling form of intolerance 
that reasserts Christian ‘mastery’ over all narratives and culture.”179 So whilst paying 
heed to Milbank, I will ensure I do not simply theologise over a social reality narrated by 
social sciences; I am unwilling to fall prey to not being informed by the social sciences. 
In short I am not trying to “re-order the world and the church by out-narrating its existing 
meta-narratives”180 Percy explains, in a critique of Milbank’s method, the dangers of this 
method for my research, “Put another way, a theology that is uninformed by the social 
sciences may turn out to be very clever and erudite in some sense, but it may also be 
ultimately ‘unreal’.”181 There are many other problems with Milbank’s demonising of the 
social sciences, but it is Milbank’s ecclesial method that is most problematic to my thesis 
aims. For Milbank, 
 
                                                 
177 Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as 
Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995). 
178 Stanley Hauerwas explicates Rasmussen’s explanation of a theological politics in relationship 
to his own work in an interview about Homiletics. “Homiletics Online,” accessed 7th October 2017, 
https://www. homileticsonline.com/subscriber/ interviews/hauerwas.asp. 
179 Percy, Engaging with Contemporary Culture, 66. 
180 Ibid., 68. 
181 Ibid., 67. 
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treats the church as given construct — the City of God. In contrast I take the view that there 
is no version of Christianity that is without local accent. No-one can speak, or has ever 
spoken, of ‘pure’ Christianity or a ‘pure’ theology. The dialect is always particular: Rome, 
Geneva, Canterbury, Atlanta — Christianity speaks in tongues that are tinged and tilthed in 
a local accent.182  
 
Evangelicalism, as I will show in my work, is particularly prone to taking on local accents 
and dialects, within its ecclesial mode of being.   
My research design here also has further warrant and underpinning from 
methodological recommendations by Percy. In particular, how reading theology with 
social science allows for the kind of reading of concrete ecclesial life I seek. For the 
textures and shapes revealed in social science are a kind of theology.183 Percy explains 
how readings of theology with social science act as a ‘binocular method’ that eschews 
“pedigree” and “purist” approaches. This then allows “breeding and blending that 
produces a certain kind of interpretative individuality”.184 My project is similarly and 
deliberately “mongrel” and eclectic in its method.185 This ‘binocular’ distils all my 
methodological considerations for my research, and provides the method for how the five 
maps/chapters of my thesis are constructed. One lens of my binoculars will be focused 
on an account of Evangelicalism and capitalism, via Bebbington, Weber, and Polanyi. 
These are my second, third and fourth chapters, which produce a richer theological 
account by making use of non-theological methods.186 Within this, I will make use of an 
additional stereoscopic, an ‘Ideal Type’ account from Weber and a ‘materialist account’ 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 68. 
183 Percy not only takes Milbank to task for over-privileging Christian narratives and demonising 
those of social sciences; he reminds us that social sciences are not replete with anti-theologies, but rather, 
there are necessary theological readings within social sciences that are required to make any intelligible 
account of the world, and for any possible engagement with the concrete of everyday life. See Percy, 
Engaging with Contemporary Culture, 67–68. 
184 Martyn Percy, “Confessions: Tone and Content in a Reasonable Radical – A Self-Critical 
Retrospect,” in Reasonable Radical, 333–334. 
185 Percy, “Confessions”, 334. Percy explains how “pedigree” and “purist” methods contrast with 
the possibilities of “mongrel” methods, which cross-breed to produce very different and needed accounts 
and interpretations. Furthermore, Percy calls for a blended theological-social science approach, for, à la 
Peter Berger’s notion of the heretical imperative, “no single theological method on its own is ever sound 
of sufficient,” see ibid., 335, and Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative (Glasgow: William Collins & 
Son, 1979). 
186 Again, for warrant for this method of overlaying social theory and theology, see ibid., 8. See 
also David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 24. 
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from Polanyi. Both are diachronic and, when overlaid, provided a unique view of the 
development of Evangelicalism within capitalism. I then bring this implicit theological 
rendering into an explicit theological examination in chapters four and five, as the other 
lens to my binocular method. This lens is explicitly theological, bringing into overlay and 
contact, neo-Augustinian theological resources to explicitly theologise my account. These 
neo-Augustinian sources are, first, the theological tools of those most critical of 
Evangelicalism, such as Milbank and Connolly, and second, they problematise the 
relationship of Christianity with capitalism. This explicit theological reading provides a 
diagnostic for my diachronic that is deployable against my Evangelical context.  
At the outset of my research, I was inspired by Bonhoeffer’s own method, that I 
now see as a type of binocular, and by his impossible task of producing a theological 
sociology, or sociological theology, of the church.187 Theologians could not see value in 
Bonhoeffer’s’ work due to the sociology, and sociologists were as blind to his work, due 
to the theology in it. Little has changed today between theologians and sociologists. 
Bonhoeffer’s work is certainly “difficult, and overloaded, though it is in many respects 
unclear and youthful in style” – he was only twenty-one when he produced it. But his 
work brought me closer to understanding the church, and did something many academic 
texts do not – it invigorated me and fuelled my desire to understand the church in its 
concrete reality. 
 
1.6.2 Personal Pronouns and Opening Out: Final methodological considerations  
I now make some final methodological comments, drawing further attention to the macro 
structure of my thesis and how it will be made. I have made reflexive use of the first 
person to explain the ministry context that was the impetus for this thesis. That reflexive 
first person will fade into the background for most of my work. However, I will continue 
                                                 
187 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio (London and New York: Collins, 1960). 
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to use the first-person for ongoing academic reasons. I do so to convey how my stance, 
my judgements, and my involvement to the research are not peripheral to the content of 
the research. I use ‘I’ to foreground what I, the researcher, have done, and for discursive 
moments about my capacity and method as researcher, which are distinct from the 
personal. I want to engage my reader in a shared exploration and show my subjectivity 
and my evaluations as I go through my research. I want to create a link between the reader 
and the writer, and conjure the territory of my research in an engaging manner. I reject 
the faulty perception that the default of the pronoun ‘I’ is equal to a non-academic voice. 
I have situated my use of the first person in recent humanities research on the personal in 
presenting research.188 Most of all, I do not presume a ‘We’ where there is none, being a 
sleight of hand where the researcher is nowhere and everywhere.189 Nor do I use the third 
person presuming agreement by my reader. Of course, I make use of the third person 
when there is a ‘We’ in reflection and discourse.190  
I have also taken an ‘opening out’ model for my thesis structure.191 Here, my 
introduction serves as the specification of my research problem, with an initial 
conversation to locate the validity of my problem, and the method for addressing my 
thesis. My literature review takes place throughout my thesis as a whole. My key research 
findings occur through each of the chapters which follow. My analysis tracks back and 
forth across what has been discovered in the thesis, connecting it up with previous 
                                                 
188 See, for example, Ken Hyland, Disciplinary Discourses, Michigan Classics Ed.: Social 
Interactions in Academic Writing (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004), and Ken Hyland, 
"Options of Identity in Academic Writing," ELT Journal, 6.4 (2002): 351–358, and Pat Sikes, 
Autoethnography (Sage Benchmarks in Social Research Methods) (Los Angeles: SAGE, Los Angeles 
2013). Whilst Sikes’s example justifies the use of the first person, I make no attempt at producing an 
autoethnography. 
189 This is what Donna Haraway describes as ‘The God Trick’. See Donna Haraway, "Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," Feminist 
Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575–99. 
190 There are significant examples of the use of the first person for theological accounts, such as 
Stanley Hauerwas, the warrant and impact of which is explained in Herman Paul, “Stanley Hauerwas: 
Against Secularization in the Church,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie, 29.2 (2013):12–13. Here, 
the use of the first person is the hic et nunc, that ensures a commitment to the particularities of the time 
and place of the research being made. 
191 See Patrick Dunleavy, Authoring a PhD: How to Plan, Draft, Write, and Finish a Doctoral 
Thesis or Dissertation, Palgrave Study Guides (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 59. 
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research and literature. My thesis ‘opens out’ into discussions of the themes and 
implications from my research. My final chapter runs my thesis recursively back against 
the original conditions that gave rise to my research to test its validity and serviceability 
for my problem. 
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Chapter 2 
Evangelical Anxiety: From Assurance to Providence 
…symptoms of discontinuity in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of conservative Protestantism 
should not be seen in isolation from each other. They are bound together by an underlying 
factor, a shift in the received doctrine of assurance with all that it entailed. Those who 
pursued the High Church quest for holiness with single-minded devotion frequently felt a 
nagging doubt. For all their self-discipline, were they to be numbered among those finally 
saved? Their efforts gave them no certainty; sometimes their failures heightened their 
anxiety. So the novel assurance they discovered in Evangelicalism was greeted with relief. 
Again continental Protestantism exercised its most decisive influence on the origins of 
Evangelicalism not in the sphere of practice but in that of doctrine. 
 
— David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain 
 
This chapter maps these forces and processes of Evangelicalism, as a kind of 
physiographic of the development of the doctrine of assurance around anxiety. My 
mapping will trace and suggest how assurance migrates into providence under the 
anxieties of life in capitalism. This route from assurance into providence is part of the 
pathogenesis between Evangelicalism and capitalism that my thesis diagnoses. My map 
in this chapter overlays my first chapter, looking for resonant assemblages, the resonant 
arrangements with beliefs and practice by Evangelicalism with capitalism. I am looking 
for those moments of intensification in the relationship between Evangelicals and 
capitalism, and resultant loss of resistance to the deforming forces of capitalism, so that I 
might identify resources to then counter this loss of resistance. 
I begin this chapter by defining the terms Evangelical and capitalism and explaining 
my use of them. I then establish how anxiety and assurance is a pathway that opens up 
and extends the resonant relationship of capitalism with Evangelicalism. I will situate this 
claim within a broader examination of the anxieties of life in capitalism for Evangelicals, 
of the route assurance takes into providence as Evangelicals seek to assuage the anxieties 
of life in capitalism. Ultimately, I modulate Bebbington’s thesis about the doctrine of 
assurance. We will see how the Puritan inner anxiety assuaged by the doctrine of 
assurance migrated into new anxieties within the context of emerging capitalism, and how 
that assurance then relocated to the doctrine of providence for calming those new 
anxieties.  
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2.1 Capitalism: Technical critique or social arrangements? 
Capitalism is one of those terms that people readily use without necessarily being able to 
explain its technical meaning. This knowing but not being able to explain is what Michael 
Polanyi calls “tacit knowing”, where everyone knows “more than we can tell” or fully 
codify, about certain kinds of knowledge.1 For example, we can recognise a face among 
a million others, but we cannot tell how we recognise that face.2 Most people in the west 
are aware that they live in a capitalist society and would likely recognise a society that 
was not capitalist, but they might find it hard to explain in detail what capitalism is and 
what it is not. 
Many of the accounts interacted with in my previous chapter seem to suffer from a 
similar mode of ‘tacit knowing’ in their use of the term capitalism. As we have seen, 
Milbank and Connolly use the term with a particular abandon, and lack of definition. 
Indeed, the term capitalism is rather fecund, generating all sorts of possibilities. But I 
need to carefully consider how I understand and deploy that term for my account and the 
diagnosis I seek. And especially so, as I am not objecting to Milbank’s and Connolly’s 
assertions, and accept their premise of a problematic relationship between Evangelicalism 
and capitalism. Where ‘tacit knowing’ is a mode of the implicit, I will also need to be 
explicit about my understanding and use of the term capitalism. Eve Poole provides a 
helpful delineation to navigate this state of affairs. For Poole suggests that 
methodologically, we can focus on capitalism as either a concept that attracts a technical 
critique of ownership and property laws, or as an examination of the arrangements and 
relationships of capitalism as they occur in the real world.3. The latter is most serviceable 
for my account. For it is the relationship between Evangelicalism and capitalism, its 
                                                 
1 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1967), 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Poole, The Church and Capitalism, 4. For an example of such a technical account, see Donald 
Andrew Hay, A Christian Critique of Capitalism (Bramcote: Grove Books, 1975). 
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‘arrangements’, in particular social and embodied organisations, that I wish to explore. 
Rather than provide a technical theological account of economic systems, for important 
as that might be, it is not the focus of my work. It is Evangelicalism in its social 
arrangements; its habits, dispositions, and practices within capitalism that are the focus 
of my account. Furthermore, Poole also reminds us that such an examination of capitalism 
through the overly technical, often reveals “a level of nuance and complexity that 
militates against precise critique.”4 Here, Poole provides support for a general use of the 
term ‘capitalism’ in my account. Using the term capitalism represents the multifaceted 
nature of various capitalisms, whilst it avoids collapse into overly technical arguments. 
However, it seems important to define what capitalism actually is within any such 
technical or social arrangements. For Eve Poole, whilst delineating capitalism in terms of 
social or technical arrangements, does not provide a working definition of capitalism 
itself within those categories. Even the recent Theology and Economics edited by Jeremy 
Kidwell, sees Michael Pollitt stating that he “will use the terms ‘markets,’ and 
‘capitalism,’ and ‘modern economics somewhat interchangeabl[y]’”, without any attempt 
to define what those three terms are.5 However, later in this text, Nicholas Townsend 
offers a definition of Capitalism: “the meaning of capitalism is given precisely by 
reference to capital, the financial resources invested in a business and the assets they 
purchase. In that strict or literal sense, ‘capitalism’ names a form of business in which the 
objective of making return on capital overrides others and so determines what the 
business does.”6  For the purposes of my thesis I may refer to capitalism as meaning the 
broader arrangements of capitalism as it occurs in relation to the areas with which I am 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 Jeremy Kidwell, Theology and Economics: A Christian Vision of the Common Good, 1st ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 28. 
6 Nicholas Townsend, “Transcending the Long Twentieth Century” in Kidwell, Theology and 
Economics, 204.  For the purpose of my work, and given my use of Kidwell’s text, I adopt this definition 
here.  There are of course, a myriad of definitions of and types of capitalism, for example Martyn Percy 
examines ‘open market capitalism’, see Martyn Percy, “Christianity and Social Flourishing” in Kidwell, 
Theology and Economics, 231. 
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concerned. A certain ‘slipperiness’ around the term is warranted by my method and is 
inherent in the necessary ambiguity surrounding accounts of ecclesiology as established 
with Martin in my previous chapter.  Of course, where the capitalism I am examining 
needs elucidating more specifically I will do so, with consideration to its various forms. 
In order to understand what these relational forms entail, we must first consider the nature 
of Evangelicalism. 
 
2.2 What is Evangelicalism? Bebbington’s quadrilateral 
Which evangelicalism and which evangelicals?...Evangelicalism that word most basic to 
Christian faith, seems elusive in both meaning and application. 
 
— Bill J. Leonard, “Evangelism and Contemporary American Life” 
 
Evangelicalism is widely understood to be a major development of modern Protestantism 
that emerged in the early 1730s in the United Kingdom.7 Bebbington asserts that there is 
something uniquely different about Evangelicalism to the forms of Protestantism, most 
specifically the Puritan Christianity, that preceded it.8 His thesis is that this emerging 
Evangelicalism has four key characteristics: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to 
be changed; activism, the expression of the Gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard 
for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on 
the cross. Together they form a quadrilateral of priorities that is the basis of 
Evangelicalism.”9 Whilst previous forms of Christianity may have exhibited some of 
these characteristics, it is Evangelicalism that has uniquely exhibited all four. Puritanism 
in the seventeenth century may have manifested some aspects of conversionism, 
                                                 
7 There are many summary texts that date the origins of Evangelicalism to the 1730s. One recent 
text, for example, is Brian Stiller et al.,, eds, Evangelicals around the World: a global handbook for the 
21st century, (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2015), 26. Beyond definitions of Evangelicalism, there are 
comprehensive surveys of the extant nature and plurality of Evangelicals around the world, see Donald 
M. Lewis and Richard V. Pierard, eds., Global Evangelicalism: Theology, History and Culture in 
Regional Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014). 
8 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 2. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
53 
 
Biblicism, and crucicentrism, and thereby a continuity with Evangelicalism in the 
eighteenth century.10 But Bebbington asserts there is a break with Puritanism, seen in the 
unparalleled activism of Evangelicals, and activism untypical of Puritanism.11 It is the 
contextual interaction of the Christian faith with the Enlightenment that gave rise to a 
development in the doctrine of assurance, leading, in turn, to a new confidence of faith 
which found its natural outworking in overt activism.12 McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb 
similarly describe a belief within modernity of “progress” and a “better” future that the 
Enlightenment fostered.13 We can understand the Evangelical activism that Bebbington 
identifies as located within that Enlightenment “confidence”.  
Noll declares Bebbington’s quadrilateral of priorities to be “one of the most 
effective” descriptions of Evangelicalism and locates his account of the origins of 
Evangelicals within the same time period.14 Whilst Noll is indebted to Bebbington, he 
sees more continuities with the Puritans than Bebbington does. Whilst generally agreeing 
with Bebbington’s thesis on the relationship with the Enlightenment, Noll provides a 
more comprehensive overview of other contextual factors.15 For Noll, Evangelicalism is 
best seen as a revival of Puritan heart religion without a determinate social form.16  
In The Advent of Evangelicalism, Michael Haykin and Kenneth Stewart bring 
several scholars together to critique Bebbington’s thesis, and dispute his assertions of the 
origins of Evangelicalism in the eighteenth century.17 They generally locate Evangelicals 
within Puritanism and both question how great a role the Enlightenment played in the 
development of Evangelical activism and the formulation of the doctrine of assurance 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 34. 
11 Ibid., 35. 
12 Ibid., 42, 48. 
13 Neil McKendrick, The Birth of a Consumer Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1985), 316. 
14 Mark A. Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, Whitefield and the Wesleys. A 
History of Evangelicalism (Nottingham: IVP, 2004), 16. 
15 See Chapter 18, “Explanations,” ibid., 127–144. 
16 Ibid., 48–54. 
17 Michael A. G. Haykin, Kenneth J. Stewart, and Timothy George, The Advent of 
Evangelicalism: Exploring Historical Continuities (Nashville, TN: B & H Academic, 2008). 
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that Bebbington claims. Bebbington is willing to concede, in a response at the end of this 
work, that Evangelicalism may have originated slightly earlier than he originally 
specified, and that the doctrine of assurance as described in relationship to the 
Enlightenment is more complex than he had presented it.18 However, his quadrilateral of 
priorities, the influence of cultural context, and the lack of attention to polity remain for 
Bebbington undiminished in their influence on the emergence and development of 
Evangelicalism.19 Bebbington, by way of explanation for the modification of his thesis, 
turns to the relationship of Evangelicals with the market and economics, stating that the 
doctrine of assurance must be explored more completely within this relationship.20 He 
does not, however, provide such a description – a lacuna my work will address. 
It is worth noting again that Bebbington has previously been very dismissive of the 
influence of capitalism upon Evangelicalism, claiming that “the cultural context, not 
economics or politics, does most to explain the shape of Evangelical religion.”21 In 
contradiction to this, Bebbington has more recently described how most developments of 
Evangelicalism “were possible because of the commercial growth of the eighteenth 
century.”22 Leading early Evangelical leaders themselves noted that their faith propagated 
fastest and best where capitalist markets were developing. For example, Thomas Taylor 
(1738–1816), appointed by John Wesley in 1761 (and having an itinerant career longer 
than Wesley’s), shared his Evangelical faith over several decades throughout Wales, 
Scotland, and England (with twenty-two circuits in England alone).23 In his extensive 
travels, Taylor observed Evangelical faith in relationship to many and varied cultural 
                                                 
18 Bebbington, ‘Response’, ibid., 417–432. 
19 Ibid., 425. An attempt to explore the divisions of self-definition by Evangelicals offers what are 
labelled fundamentalist, confessional, generic, and post-conservative definitions – and this differentiation 
is just amongst Baptist Evangelicals. But underneath these delineations is a reliance on Bebbington for 
what they have in common; see Kevin T. Bauder et al., Four Views on the Spectrum of Evangelicalism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011). 
20 Bebbington, ‘Response’, 421. 
21 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 272. 
22 Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of Evangelicalism, 419. 
  23 Donald M. Lewis, The Blackwell Dictionary of Evangelical Biography: 1730–1860 (Oxford: 
Blackwell Reference, 1995), 1087.  
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situations – physical locations, political environments, the emerging psychological world, 
various ecclesiologies, the emerging middle classes, and market society. Taylor’s 
assessment was that in relationship to all and any environments, “evangelical religion 
spread best where trade was growing.”24 Thomas Taylor was the embodiment of the new 
possibilities that capitalism and market societies offered. From his confident transmission 
of faith, to freedom of travel, to independent learning, and self-expression through new 
media and markets, Taylor was able to observe not only the beginnings of the Evangelical 
tradition, but also its relationship to the rise and development of the market society in 
capitalism. Weber wanted to know what lay under this observation and phenomena, of 
the growth of Protestant Christianity within the rapid development of capitalism. 
Noll has identified a similar lack of accounting for the connections between 
“Protestants and money.”25 He suggests that this may be due to an inability to see religion 
as “a primary motivator for human action or to believe that religious speech can be 
anything but a screen for social and economic motives.” Furthermore, historians who 
assume a religious outline to history often cannot conceive of anything other than 
“providential models” for history, which discourages research accounts.26 This lack in 
accounts has led to the state of affairs where “even basic questions about the economic 
dimensions of the Protestant churches and voluntary societies remain unanswered.”27 
Whilst Noll and Bebbington are comprehensive in their accounts, details of capitalism’s 
relationship to Evangelicalism are in the background, so to speak, as contextual textures 
and events, which I will surface, make explicit, and bring to the fore. 
Despite a delineation of Evangelicalism that differs markedly from that of 
Bebbington, Boyd Hilton like many others also considers Bebbington’s work to be the 
                                                 
  24 Mark A. Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism, 276. 
25 Mark A. Noll, God and Mammon: Protestants, Money, and the Market, 1790–1860 (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Noll seeks to address this situation in his work, God and Mammon, with an account of the 
antebellum period of Protestant Evangelicalism in the USA. This work provides a set of identified 
categories and domains of market relationships, in a very narrow period of time. Ibid., 6–7. 
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‘best introduction’ to Evangelicalism, whilst Mark Noll declares it to be “the most 
serviceable definition.”28 Bebbington certainly helps explain the observation by others of 
how, despite such wide diversity, Evangelicals were able to unite in action around core 
doctrines and practices.29 Warner, like so many, draws upon Bebbington’s work to define 
Evangelicalism. However, Warner modifies and modulates Bebbington’s thesis by 
claiming that there has been a recent bifurcation between activist-conversionists acting as 
‘entrepreneurs’ within late modernity, and biblicist-crucicentrists turning to a form of 
fundamentalism.30 Because of his focus on Bebbington, Warner explores this bifurcation 
as a response to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment epistemic issues31. As I have 
suggested, an understanding of the forces of capitalist markets is lacking in Bebbington’s 
thesis, and similarly in Warner’s work.  
In all this, there is an important connection and potential for my account. The 
activism-conversionism ‘entrepreneurial’ strand of Evangelicalism that developed in the 
UK in the late twentieth century owes much to its entrepreneurial possibilities because of 
its situation within developing capitalist markets. William Kay evidences how the very 
streams of ‘entrepreneurial’ Evangelicalism that Warner so thoroughly surveys, including 
those of my own church denomination, are successful because of their embrace and use 
of the artefacts of popular culture and market forces.32 I have previously noted and quoted 
where Warner similarly highlights that “evangelicalism is a complex construct of 
historical theology, formulated through an often-unperceived interaction with its cultural 
                                                 
28 See Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People?: England 1783–1846. New Oxford 
History of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 176 and 691. See also Mark A. Noll, America’s 
God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5. The 
effectiveness of Bebbington’s thesis is something even his most ardent critics accept. See Timothy 
Larsen, “The Reception Given EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN Since Publication,” in 
Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of Evangelicalism, 21–36. 
29 For a description of this phenomenon, see Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family 
Fortunes, rev. ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 74. 
30 Warner, Reinventing English Evangelicalism, 15. 
31 Ibid., 10–11. 
32 William K. Kay, Apostolic Networks of Britain, 169–170. 
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settings.”33 Yet Warner sees market forces having no primacy for Evangelical 
development, where instead it is the forces of secularisation that generated and retarded 
Evangelical growth.34 Warner would have us see the ‘entrepreneurial’ activist-
conversionist Evangelicals of late modernity as stimulated to growth by secular forces, 
while at the same time biblicist-crucicentrist Evangelicals are being stifled in a 
straitjacket of secularity.35  
Warner is somewhat aware of capitalism and does ask “whether evangelicalism 
may have become a quasi-established, structurally differentiated religion, baptizing 
materialism and the American Way.”36 We can additionally understand how voluntarism 
within late-capitalist society made the expansion of this ‘entrepreneurial’ stream possible 
and logical.37 Warner also posits that Stark’s free-market thesis, in combination with 
Hammond’s analysis of the construction around personal autonomies, “identify a zeitgeist 
that has been conducive to the commodification of evangelical religion.”38 That claim is 
rather multi-layered and overly accretive, as is most of Warner’s thesis. That zeitgeist of 
market forces and its influence has far more impact, and a primacy to which we now turn. 
 
2.3 Protestant Anxiety and Discontinuities: Generating Evangelical activism 
Bebbington himself, in response to critiques of his work Evangelicalism in Modern 
Britain, notes that the nature of assurance is more complicated than he had proposed.39 
There is a complexity to the doctrine of assurance, centred in the doubt and anxiety for 
                                                 
33 Warner, Reinventing English Evangelicalism, 13–14. 
34 Ibid., 22–24. 
35 Ibid., 22–24. 
36 Ibid., 2. 
37 Warner himself suggests that this ‘entrepreneurial’ spirit had a passing affinity with the 
Thatcherism of the 1980s. See ibid., 26. 
38 Warner, Reinventing English Evangelicalism, 27. Stark’s free-market thesis is detailed in 
Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult 
Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and Hammond’s analysis is found in Phillip 
E. Hammond, Religion and Personal Autonomy: The Third Disestablishment in America (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1992). 
39 Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of Evangelicalism, 421 
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the Protestant reformers that can be understood through an examination of Weber. This 
Protestant doubt and anxiety 
 
was so arresting as to persuade the pioneer sociologist Max Weber about the habitual self-
questioning of Protestants. Their doubts about salvation drove them, according to Weber, to 
demonstrate their faith by works, not least the qualities that gave rise to capitalism. 
Assurance was therefore a more complex matter than Evangelicalism in Modern Britain 
allows.40 
Protestant reformers, having left behind doctrines of assurance, suffered resultant 
anxieties about their personal salvation. If the church was no longer able to dispense an 
assurance of salvation, how did someone know they were saved? There was a paucity to 
life before the industrial revolution, where salvation was a compensation for the 
sufferings of life. That assurance was now removed. We might understand that Protestants 
now stood on their own as a kind of ‘naked self’, determining their own salvation before 
God with much ‘fear and trembling’. For Bebbington it was this new anxiety, and focus 
on the doctrine of assurance, that generated the activism that was distinct to Evangelicals. 
 
2.3.1 Novelty and Complexity: Assurance and conversion 
Bebbington gives us warrant and reason to understand how the doctrine of assurance is 
the epicentre of the forces creating Evangelicalism. Bebbington has a focus and claim 
about those forces as being primarily about enlightenment epistemology. But the nature 
of assurance is more complex than this, as Bebbington now acknowledges. A detailed 
examination of the validity of his claims will help establish to what extent the forces of 
emerging capitalism fulminate around the doctrine of assurance, and how I might 
modulate his thesis as necessary. If Bebbington remains broadly correct in postulating 
that an emerging doctrine of assurance is central to understanding Evangelicalism, am I 
                                                 
40 Bebbington, “Response,” in ibid., 421. 
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able to locate the moments of intensification of Evangelicalism with developing 
capitalism? 
In order to address these questions, I will examine three key claims by Bebbington. 
First, that the Evangelical doctrine of assurance is the process through which individuals, 
having received the gifts of salvation, become aware of what they possessed within that 
salvation.41 Second, that there is a novelty within Evangelicalism of how it claimed 
assurance should accompany such conversion. This novelty of assurance generates the 
activism of Evangelicals in their extensive concrete mission.42 Third, that this novelty for 
assurance takes shape around the influence of the Enlightenment epistemology. The new 
anxieties about assurance of faith migrate towards, and find relief in, Enlightenment 
epistemology, where direct witness of the individual becomes the new mode of 
assurance.43 It is this thesis for which Bebbington is most criticised. For example, Gary 
Williams prefers to see something else at work, whereby Evangelicals renew a Puritan 
focus on assurance. It is a cautious view of assurance, rather than any new Enlightenment 
epistemological confidence, that leads to Evangelical activism.44 Williams would have us 
understand how many Protestant Christians found that the Enlightenment’s “direct 
witness” for faith through reason was far from comforting.45  
Bebbington, in response to critiques like this, and as I have already noted, has 
admitted that the doctrine of assurance is more complex than he originally proposed.46 
The location of this complexity is perhaps found in Weber’s diagnosis of how Puritan 
Protestants demonstrate their salvation by works due to their constant self-questioning of 
faith.47 If Puritans were focused on assurance, it was a lack of assurance that drove them 
                                                 
41 Bebbington, 6–7. 
42 Ibid., 7. 
43 Ibid., 50. 
44 Gary Williams, “Enlightenment Epistemology,” in Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of 
Evangelicalism, 369. 
45 Ibid., 369. 
46 Bebbington, ‘Response’, in ibid., 421. 
47 Ibid. 
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into ways of working, through their doubts. Whether the focus on the doctrine of 
assurance was due to a new confidence caused by Enlightenment epistemology, or an 
ongoing lack of confidence in assurance, one proposition/argument does seem common 
to Bebbington and his critics’ accounts: the doctrine of assurance is central to Protestant 
Evangelical faith and its development and renewal by Evangelicals. 
It is worth dwelling a little further on the nature of assurance and what was taking 
place with individuals. This analysis is necessary first to better understand the complexity 
to which these critiques of Bebbington alert us, and second, in order to ensure I do not 
stumble into what looks like an open door to examine the economic forces around 
assurance, but rather to ensure my focus here is really warranted. 
 
2.3.2 The Doctrine of Assurance and the Interiority of the Self 
Society changed considerably between the time of sixteenth-century Puritans and the 
Evangelicals of the eighteenth century, especially with regard to the nature of private and 
public life. For “the sixteenth century’s division between an individual’s self-fashioned 
public role and the privacy of his interior life before God had greatly diminished by the 
eighteenth.”48 Noll claims that any gap between the public and private was closed by, 
first, Wesley’s recovery of affective Puritan assurance and, second, the effects of 
Enlightenment epistemology on assurance as Bebbington has demonstrated.49 These 
accounts by Null, Noll, and Bebbington locate the development of assurance as being in 
the hands of leaders of the Evangelical movement. This does not sufficiently explain what 
was taking place in the individuals who were forming this doctrine in their daily beliefs 
and practice. Fortunately, the interior life of individuals, and the development of that 
interiority, is available to us with a little excavation of additional sources. To talk of 
                                                 
48 Ashley Null examines this in detail in “Thomas Cranmer and Tudor Evangelicalism,” in 
Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of Evangelicalism, 250. 
49 Ibid., 251. 
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assurance and providence requires an explanation of those doctrines. My use of assurance 
and providence takes its lead from the historical sources I deploy for the rest of this 
chapter. The development of these doctrines in their theological nature will be picked up 
in my later chapters.  
It seems that initially, assurance and the personal experience of assurance for 
conversion within Puritanism was restricted to the elite of Christian society. For example, 
Thomas Cranmer, whilst able to reveal to friends (who confided these revelations to 
Elizabeth I) his most personal emotions around his experience of faith, was unable to 
bring this identity into his public life and persona.50 He was, however, able to bring his 
convictions around justification by faith, and the need for assurance in conversion, to bear 
on his writings of “The Bishops’ Book” and, ultimately, the Book of Common Prayer.51 
Subsequently, Puritans who sought the ongoing catechism of the English population, to 
“secure the Reformation” in the face of Catholic liturgical formation, took the Puritan 
faith of the heart to the masses with Cranmer’s catechism.52 It suited emerging Protestant 
countries to allow this form of Christian formation, because of its anti-Catholic nature, 
or, at least, they allowed it for the production of Christians within Protestant states. 
Puritan faith of the heart was taken to the masses for Protestant catechism in an attempt 
to wrest Christian identity away from Catholic political ecclesial influences. In reaction 
to the political and ecclesial issues of conformity and anti-Catholicism, the Puritan 
Richard Baxter “peels back” the nature of Christian commitments to reach “the innermost 
sense of conversion, the conversion of the heart.”53  
This move of assurance into the interiority of the individual is key to what took 
place next. For the inner dialogue of conversion that was beyond the control of the state 
moved into public view theologically. Just a few decades later, Wesley and Edwards were 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 225–226. 
51 Ibid., 224. 
52 John Coffey, “Puritanism, Evangelicalism,” in Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of 
Evangelicalism, 267. 
53 D. Bruce Hindmarsh, “Antecedents of Evangelical Conversion Narrative,” in ibid., 343. 
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able, through the new freedoms of trade routes, publicity (print media), and 
communication, to bring this inner world to life for the masses. Evangelicalism was thus 
able to bring resources to the psychological and social needs of people who found 
themselves in a rapidly changing world of broad dissenting thought, and, in particular, 
the renegotiations of Puritan church-state relationships.54 Through the freedoms of the 
new capitalist markets, the inner experience of Thomas Cranmer was now the domain of 
public life and identity.55 Where St Augustine’s autobiography revealed the necessity of 
the inner life in conversion, the need for such inner experience remained largely silent in 
Christian literature, with significant exceptions, until the arrival of the journals of 
Jonathan Edwards in the early eighteenth-century.56 Of course, that autobiography is 
merely one form of evidence for the encouragement of inward experience in conversion, 
with prayer being an immediate example, not to mention various contemplative lives. 
Personal narratives of the autobiographical, and stories of the inner life now held sway 
for emerging Evangelicals. Those who had experienced this inner assurance were able to 
communicate those stories throughout new emerging capitalist market opportunities by 
speaking, travelling, and publicising amongst other activities. In this, we begin to see the 
extent to which Christian identity around the doctrine of assurance and the relationship 
of Christian faith with the market became intrinsic to each other. The leaders of the 
Evangelical movement were those who were able to express their experience of this inner 
assurance and to do so supremely through the opportunities of the market. Their methods 
for transmission about assurance took hold and resonated not just with new market forces 
and opportunities, but with the priority of the interiority of the individual that had already 
taken place with English Protestantism. This new priority and opportunity saw that the 
“young men who preached the sermons, founded the magazines, established the local 
                                                 
54 Noll, Rise of Evangelicalism, 142. 
55 Ashley Null, “Thomas Cranmer and Tudor Evangelicalism,” 228. 
56 D. Bruce Hindmarsh details the gulf of autobiography that is concerned with self-agency from 
the time of Augustine until Evangelicals in his “Antecedents of Evangelical Conversion Narrative,”  332. 
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classes, built the connections and wrote the books, pamphlets and articles were social 
actors of unusual force.”57  
This developing interiority of individuals, the development of self-agency and its 
effects on society in general, along with the impact on Evangelicals, has been examined 
in detail by Breen and Hall. They highlight that the preaching of revivalists “did 
powerfully hold out to ordinary people the prospect of personal liberation, of creative 
agency, of exciting self-fashioning – unintended concomitants of the Whitefieldian 
experience of ‘new birth’.”58 Mark Noll presses into a similar focus on the need to 
understand this emerging self-agency, and exhorts that a “full explanation must not back 
away from this agency.”59 Whilst Noll suggests the necessity of such an account, he does 
not provide one. He does hint at the interconnection that might be found in such an 
account that would reveal “human responsibility to realms of theological principle, 
religious conviction or social tectonics.”60 This is precisely the realm I am looking to map. 
For now, I place a marker on my map, noting that this is as a location to return for a 
theological mapping in my later chapters.  
 
2.3.3 The Doctrine of Assurance and the Wider “Revival of the Heart” 
Evangelicalism was an answer to accelerating economic and demographic change. As such, 
it offered a solution to structural religious crisis. It represented also a religious response to 
the new mental world of the Enlightenment. And it presented internal, psychological 
resources to meet the external, social challenges of the century. 
 
— Mark A. Noll, Rise of Evangelicalism 
Evangelicalism was not just a response to the trials and challenges of economic migration, 
but was also a response to the wider changes in how human beings understood the world 
conceptually, and their place within it. The metaphysical upheavals taking place required 
                                                 
57 Noll, Rise of Evangelicalism, 132. 
58 T. H. Breen and Timothy Hall, “Structuring Provincial Imagination: The Rhetoric and 
Experience of Social Change in Eighteenth-Century New England,” The American Historical Review 
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59 Noll, Rise of Evangelicalism, 132. 
60 Ibid. 
64 
 
a response by the church, which the doctrine of assurance allowed to take place. Yet this 
interior move was not limited to just Protestantism, instead deeply affecting all peoples. 
For example, Mark Noll details how this “revival of the heart” was seen amongst 
Catholics and Hasidic Jews, and not just Protestants.61 We might discern from this the 
nature of the move from interior experience to public expression that the market was 
imposing on all religious movements at this time. Furthermore, Noll has shown how this 
revival of Puritanism was a movement that revived the Puritan “heart religion” without 
any concomitant social movement.62 In other words, there was something about this 
“revival of the heart” that was common to all peoples, and that did not require a church-
mediated social environment. Here we see the emerging nature of the social arrangements 
of capitalism, superseding and overriding the social arrangements of any and all religious 
actors. In short, I suspect that the “revival of the heart” taking place, had found a social 
expression in capitalist market social practices. This is a dramatic change from how the 
“heart religion” of the Puritans had previously been manifest socially. 
Indeed the “heart religion” of the Puritans had been deeply rooted in a desire for 
social change that had been discredited owing to its association with political revolution.63 
The dissenting Puritans, as a result of this, pursued their “heart religion” more as a 
subculture of voluntary religion, in prayer, fasting, and Bible study.64 I suggest that the 
Puritan “heart religion” that Evangelicals went on to renew, having divested itself of any 
determinate social structure owing to previous failings in social and political change, 
found a new place for resonance. The inner “heart religion” of the Puritans perceived 
emerging capitalist markets to be places in which it could flourish without fear of 
persecution. In other words, the emergence of markets as places and spaces away from 
the identity of church and state needed a form of Christian faith that would act as a 
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resource to Christian identity, whilst at the same time being free of the ecclesiological 
structures of the religion it was seeking to escape.  
The inner assurance of the Puritans not only enabled the confident formation of 
identity in a changing world but found its formation and sustainability in having no social 
form, flowing freely into market locations.65 And the effects of this on the shape of public 
and private life are immense. This Puritan inner assurance was at the heart of the 
Evangelical revival of all denominations and the simultaneous development of the later 
middle classes.66 Davidoff and Hall trace how this Puritan antecedent results in a 
relocation and separation of work from home, and the establishment of bounded public 
and private “spheres”.67 A radical transformation then takes place within capitalist 
markets, where the location of consumption and identity formation move from public to 
private, and then into the home. Evangelical revival through tracts and language made the 
home the central location for its activities and “imagined communities”, becoming 
captive to the logic and relationships of leisure and family.68 Assurance moves from its 
inner experience into the outward expression of self-creation by the external providence 
of the market manifested in the life of the believer. Assurance becomes a matter of being 
self-made and of outward provision by God, which are both ultimately ceded to the 
market. This outward demarcation of the self-made, underwritten by the providence of 
God, arrives at particular forms of a public self, for example where “A new claim was 
asserted, that salvation was the mark of gentility.”69 The market quickly becomes the sign 
of God’s providence for his assurance as the market takes on the ontological values and 
aseity once ascribed to God.70 We can see one example of this nature of aseity where 
Elaine May suggests the push to consumerism was able to be presented as a moral issue 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 254. 
66 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, 20–22. 
67 Ibid., xv. 
68 Ibid., xviii. 
69 Ibid., 79. 
70 P. H. Sedgwick, The Market Economy and Christian Ethics: New Studies in Christian Ethics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7–8.  
66 
 
– to be a true American in the Cold War was to be a committed consumer, guarding the 
home, etc.71 Even more recently after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, US President George 
W. Bush presented the moral response to terrorism, in part, as a call to continue shopping 
and “get down to Disney World”.72 Some see this moral fuelling of consumption as being 
at the root of the recent global credit crunch.73 
This contrasts greatly and again with previous Protestant and early Evangelical 
approaches that saw consumerism as crass, unrestrained avarice, and a threat to morality. 
Evangelicals took a view of salvation that involved debt and obligations, where 
“individuals stood in a commercial relationship with God, whose ultimate merchandise 
was heaven.”74 Within this ‘economy of salvation’, providence becomes an obvious 
location for the manifestation of faith and the outworking of a relationship with God. We 
see evidence of this view of salvation modulation in later time periods. Dominic Erdozain 
demonstrates how Christianity initially resisted leisure as vice, with attention to 
recreation as part of ecclesial duties.75 Early Evangelicals believed that the emerging 
leisure society was a competition for affections. Yet this moral resistance soon gave way 
to beliefs that supported “the active pursuit of commerce”.76 These concerns seem to have 
some basis for legitimacy, given the recent diagnosis of leisure as the collapse of 
individual needs within the economic.77 People located themselves in what they 
consumed, such that “people recognise themselves in their commodities; they find their 
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soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment.”78 Here I begin to 
delve into the post-war cultural realities formed by intentional government policy in the 
west – especially in the USA, but spilling over elsewhere.79   
 
2.3.4 Markets and Migration: Islands of social care 
If Evangelicals, with their focus on Gospel as doctrine, did have the disregard for social 
and political theory that Bebbington claims, it is little wonder that they turned to the 
capitalist markets for their understanding of social relationships.80 Bebbington suggests 
that it was a lack of alternatives between adherents and dissent that gave rise to a lack of 
concern for polity.81 It was this lack of concern for polity within which the market 
provided a tertium quid between the public realm of the state, and the private realm of the 
home. The nineteenth-century commentator Robert William Dale observes this lack of 
attention to polity: “Although its leaders insisted very earnestly on the obligation of 
individual Christian men to live a devout and godly life, they had very little to say about 
the relations of the individual question to the general order of human society, or about the 
realisation of the Kingdom of God and all the various regions of human activity.”82 
Authority for belief and practice had moved from external tradition to personal 
experience, and the Bible in private interpretation. Disillusionment with forms of state-
church relations, and the empowerment of individuals to respond before God despite the 
failures of church, drove the development of the Evangelical church. Noll describes this 
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process as one where we see that “bourgeois evangelicalism represented the 
Methodisation, not just of the church, but of life as a whole.”83 Evangelicalism began as 
a movement seeking to revive inherited churches, but quickly became a movement that 
replaced them with new forms of church.84 
But within Evangelical history, the opposite often took place: Evangelicals often 
did give attention to determinate social forms as they sought to provide a response to 
social stresses produced by capitalism. I have been intentionally offering broad 
statements covering large time periods. While assurance became personal for 
Evangelicals in history, it would later face the threat of commodification itself. For 
example, a more recent analogue and continuation of the relationship of Evangelicalism 
to capitalist markets can be seen in the growth of Pentecostalism in the developing world. 
Martin has traced and analysed this growth both in Latin America, and more recently, 
within a global framework.85 Martin reveals how Christians under new economic 
migrations and emerging conditions of capitalist markets have seen Pentecostalism as a 
cohesive force, able to provide “islands of social care” within the ravages and dislocations 
of capitalism: “It takes those marooned and confined in the secular reality by fate and 
fortune, and offers them a protected enclave in which to explore the gifts of the Spirit, 
such as perseverance, peaceableness, discipline, trustworthiness, and mutual acceptance 
among the Brethren and in the family.”86 Martin, referencing his own work in a preface 
for Guest, suggests that there is a “dialectic of incorporation and resistance” by 
Evangelicalism in its relationship to cultural contexts.87 This dialectic has been detailed 
by others. For example, Stewart Davenport’s account of Evangelicals in relation to 
capitalist markets in North America between 1815 and 1860 is made through contrasting 
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Evangelicals, who were accommodating to new markets with those who resisted, but then 
capitulated, to market forces.88 Historians often portray Evangelical Protestantism as 
either a top-down means of social control or a bottom-up process that created passive 
workers (e.g., through the Protestant Work Ethic). William Sutton, in contrast, provides 
evidence that popular Evangelicals, employees and employers alike, in antebellum North 
America worked together to create capitalist environments whilst simultaneously 
resisting the pathologies that arose in that relationship through trade unions, Sunday 
schools, and temperance movements.89  
Amos Young, in his extensive survey of Pentecostal communities, and drawing on 
the work of Martin, suggests there is a response to economic manifestations in which 
“Pentecostalism creates communities that provide new networks of social and economic 
services for uprooted populations.”90 Within this, Pentecostalism functions as an 
alternative system of economics by restructuring kinship relationships within new 
economic environments.91 This enables believers to connect with their new context whilst 
freeing them from their previous obligations to their place of origin. I propose that this 
restructuring process has continued, whereby late-capitalist markets provide migrations 
within new economic flows that have dis-embedded Christians, not just from their 
biological families, but from their Christian communities and traditions. 
Martin explains this process in practical terms by describing how conceptions of 
religious fraternity, to maintain distinct identities in relation to the larger society, often 
become “systematically blunted and even reversed.”92 One example of this process can 
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be seen in the way the concept of interiority was used in the Protestant Reformation to 
define Christian practice and fraternity. Secular revolution and the emergence of secular 
space could take place around that interiority, where Christianity “contains repertoires of 
images and aspirations which are in various ways at odds with social requirements” that 
cannot be realised.93 Christian Smith, in a similar vein, demonstrates how Evangelicals 
employ subcultural codes with great conviction, yet those codes are strategically deficient 
and inadequate for the social transformations within which they arise.94 Within this, we 
might see how individualism and voluntarism, whilst potentially powerful as ways of 
responding to the social forces of capitalism, are often co-opted by those very forces and 
freedoms. Here we begin to see the ongoing process of resistance and agonistic response 
to late-capitalist markets, that carries within itself the possibility of conceding Christian 
social practices to the socio-logic of the market.  
McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb declare the idea that the Industrial Revolution was 
a time of extreme suffering to be a pre-lapsarian myth, yet their account does provide 
details of the vicissitudes and extreme risks people faced during the birth of capitalist 
markets.95 The associations that emerge in response to these social challenges of capitalist 
markets can be seen as coterminous to Martin’s suggestion of the need for “islands of 
social care.” Martin demonstrates how Pentecostalism responds to the social disarray of 
capitalist markets, whether enabling men to save their wages and stay sober, or 
empowering women to escape from caste-based polygamy.96 Pentecostalism is “creative 
and active, a seizing of opportunities [ … ] of social change.”97 In Martin’s account, we 
see a similar duality that was at work within early Evangelicalism. Christians used the 
resources and opportunities of capitalism, whilst offering a simultaneous countermove 
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that seeks to limit the effects of the market, and to reinsert the social in the face of 
commodification and the dissolution of agency. 
Within this, we can see that Evangelicalism ‘suffers’ as a competing sociality to 
the agonistic interactions that it faces with the new socialities of late-capitalist markets. 
Guest highlights this process of resistance and resonance, pointing out that Connolly’s 
claim to articulate the resonance between Christianity and capitalism is nothing new. 
Evangelicals have been aware of this resonance problem for some time. In particular, 
Evangelical Anglicans within a social justice tradition have previously resisted such 
‘resonance’.98 Whilst Connolly calls upon religious groups to partner him in conversation 
about these issues, he misses the fact that many Evangelicals have already been active in 
resisting the forces of capitalism. 
It is not just in the developing world where we see this mechanism at work, but 
also where migrant communities move from developing worlds into developed 
countries.99 Globalisation means populations increasingly flow where capital flows, 
prompting the rise of migrant churches.100 Where people migrate around work we see 
religious identity as parasitic to that economic migration.101 Churches are habituated in 
the realities of that new economic location, whilst at the same time seeking to enable 
people to construct forms of life and support for each other within that reality. Methodism 
does much the same within urban London, such that we might consider that 
“Pentecostalism is an extension of Methodism and the Evangelical Revivals (or 
Awakenings) accompanying Anglo-American modernisation.”102  
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In globalised society, we see this double dynamic of resistance and resonance at 
work. There are new emerging forms of economic life and social arrangements of 
capitalism within current globalisation. We may view the most recent changes in late-
capitalist markets within a globalised economy as constituting a new sociality to which 
Evangelicalism, along with other forms of Christianity, agnostically seeks to respond, and 
with which it seeks to compete. Within this, we might perceive new forms of emerging 
church ecclesiology and post-ecclesial moments as an attempt to help Christians hold 
onto identity amidst new pressures of social dissolution, whilst at the same time being 
captive to the logic of the market opportunities and resources used by those forms.103 
Additionally, we may see within Martin’s thesis that Evangelicals seek, in the post-
ecclesial moment, to carry within them an imagination of the Christian self, ‘in the world 
but not of it’, so to speak, that cannot be realised. For this imagination contains the genesis 
of a self, a self created by market imaginations, that is in isolation from others. 
Recent research has highlighted how mobility and unsettlement remain key factors 
in understanding identity construction. Identities are now plural for people, and affective 
rather than instrumental, such that it is how people ‘feel’ about community that is most 
important to them.104 Whilst there is the complexity of identity within a globalised 
context, people are simultaneously collapsing their identities into ‘village communities’, 
seen most clearly in resentments to the removal of schools, church buildings, and youth 
clubs, that they may never visit or take part in physically.105 
Contemporary social-scientific accounts like Martin’s show how religious identity 
can be parasitic to economic migration, whilst at the same time seeking to provide care, 
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and the deepening of agency and resistance to those economic forces. Martin’s work 
provides us with an analogue and paradigm through which to filter eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century historical accounts for an interpretive framework. For example, we 
can perceive Evangelicalism to be using the rhetoric of neo-liberalism, whilst also seeking 
to respond to the problems capitalism produces with social cohesion. This double 
dynamic is where Evangelicalism, like Pentecostalism, “finds itself in serious tension 
with a central thrust of consumer capitalism.”106  
 
2.3.5 A Mixed Bag: A creature of and a response to capitalism 
Evangelicalism was about being in the world, even whilst it tried not to be; this is its 
double dynamic. Personal faith as a way of fleeing the world led, in fact, to a way of 
living in the world. Previous “patrician” and “plebeian” modes of construction of 
Christian faith inevitably gave way to “bourgeois” constructions of the leisured classes 
of the emerging market.107 This was manifest and seen most readily in the rise of voluntary 
societies and organisations, on “a wave of voluntarism.”108 That voluntarist behaviour 
would carry the Evangelical church to its current location. Ironically it was a ‘higher’ 
view of church that led to a lower commitment to church.109 Authentic personal 
experience took precedence for Evangelicals over church structure. Whilst being centred 
around a new self-agency, this did lead to enormous social change, at least in the inception 
of Evangelicalism.110 The relationship of Evangelicalism to capitalism was indeed a 
‘mixed bag’, as all forms of ecclesiology always are, being both captive to the worst of 
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market forces, and yet at the same time, being able to transmit themselves through the 
market, effecting enormous change in resistance to those forces. 
Within the resonant relationship of Evangelicalism with capitalism there was, as 
Noll writes: “no one Protestant approach to money. Neither did there exist any grand 
system of economic practice that systematically governed the behaviour, the speaking, or 
the life assumptions of the churches and church people. Single cause explanations simply 
do not work as a satisfying covering explanation for religious–economic connections.”111 
At times in this ‘mixed bag’, spiritual renewal of Evangelicalism sometimes took its form 
in the market in ways that did not interrupt the market. Katharyn Long sees this as a 
“revivalism without social reform” that was part of the make-up of Evangelicalism.112 Yet 
this is not how Evangelicals saw themselves, with the Wesleyan, Samuel Chadwick, 
suggesting that “conversions not only bring prosperity to the church, they solve the social 
problem.”113 Additionally, Erdozain draws our attention to how, unlike any other 
movements, Evangelicalism created “schools, nurseries, communes, colleges, ecological 
housing associations, subsistence farming centres, criminal resettlement houses, women’s 
refuges, practical anti-racism projects and urban renewal programmes.”114 We can see a 
fascinating double dynamic here. Evangelicalism in its global form becomes 
disembedded from local context, but on the other hand there is evidence of the contrary, 
its embeddedness in response to contextual features.115 Evangelicalism within my 
accounts so far is seen as both a creature of capitalism, and a way of responding to 
capitalism. Initially for Evangelicals, and dominant for them, was the desire for inner 
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spiritual renewal of the self around an identity in Christ. Yet that social imagination for 
the self eventually atrophies and becomes a market imagination within capitalism. We 
can see that a lack of attention to the form of church by Evangelicals led to its taking a 
form captive to the logic of market imaginations. The Evangelical focus of salvation 
outside the church, results in the relocation of salvation into the home, which 
simultaneously becomes the location for the privatisation of life around the demands of 
capitalist markets and leisure. 116 
Evangelicalism capitulated to the socio-logic of the world in which it had once been 
most affective. It was then unable to continue to fund a stable imagination of the self 
within further developments of capitalism. What markets did to people and communities 
in practice is now my main concern, such that: 
 
The new market world, by contrast, featured mobility, efficiency, individual self-exertion, 
specialisation, productivity, expanding consumption, and a way of life that disrupted 
communities, uprooted relationships, and commodified family connections. Within this 
narrative, religion has been important, primarily for its role in either retarding or 
exhilarating return to markets… In more general terms, religion was useful if it resisted the 
spread of the market but retrograde if it facilitated the transition to modern capitalism.117 
I have reached the point where I need to provide focused attention to how life in 
developing capitalist markets interacted with the beliefs and practices of Evangelicals in 
assurance, to supplant a Christian imagination for life with a market imagination. If 
anxiety about assurance of salvation was the doorway and then pathway- the catalyst to 
Evangelicals taking action in the new emerging world of the capitalist market- how did 
market imaginations subsequently colonise and dominate those original imaginations of 
Evangelical Christians in the way we see today? Such understanding will allow for the 
retrieval of resistance in my Evangelical tradition. A possible point of resistance is the 
local and contextual in mission, in the face of globalised ‘sameness’. If so, a reduction or 
                                                 
116 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, 83. 
117 Noll, God and Mammon, 16. 
76 
 
increase of contextual mission could be a gauge for measuring and assessing 
Evangelicalism’s resistance to the negative forces of capitalism. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
We are at a crucial juncture in my mapping of Evangelicalism, one where we see how, 
despite doctrinal claims, inner assurance for Protestants often required evidence of assur-
ance to be visible, in good works, despite beliefs about salvation by faith alone, that then 
also manifest in the providence of God as a sign and validation of that assurance.118 We 
might now see how Protestant self-questioning over assurance led to a work ethic that 
demanded external signs of providence for that assurance.119 Here we are at a boundary 
on my mapping, with signposts into Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic. I have surfaced many 
elements that are presaged by Weber’s work.120 Many of the accounts and sources I have 
interacted with are based upon and, at times, as I have shown, solely underpinned by the 
use of Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic. And as already noted, Bebbington indicates that 
Weber provides an account and explanation of how the Protestant doctrine of assurance 
combined with the nature of emerging capitalist markets.121 We therefore now enter the 
domain and territory of the ascetics of capitalism, where Weber is our principal guide.
 
  
                                                 
118 As already noted in this chapter, Bebbington evidences how for Protestants there was great 
anxiety around assurance, that led to a reliance on good works as remedy to that anxiety. Evangelicalism 
provided great relief to this anxiety with its belief and experiences of assurance by faith. See Bebbington, 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 44. My chapter here has shown how this new Evangelical inner 
assurance led to a migration and focus around providence. For historical example, Scottish Puritan 
dissenters celebrated the providence of God on market days. These days were combined with extended 
periods of worship and revival around Christian identity. See Haykin, Stewart, and George, The Advent of 
Evangelicalism, 295–296.   
119 Bebbington, “Response”, 421. Here Bebbington claims again how anxiety around assurance 
led to reliance in some way on providence, as evidence for assurance. 
120 Bebbington confirms this boundary, and of Weber’s concern with how these good works and 
the ‘worldly asceticism’ it resulted in may have generated the development of capitalism, see Bebbington, 
“Response”, 44-45. 
121 Weber and Parsons, The Protestant Ethic. Pete Ward has also indicated that it is in Weber that 
an understanding of how Evangelicalism became enmeshed with capitalist markets may be found, Ward, 
Selling Worship, 11. 
77 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Assurance, Anxiety and The Protestant Work Ethic 
 
Invoking Weber brings me into contact with a thesis with a long history of intense dispute 
and methodological debate, as well as wide acceptance. A recent survey considers We-
ber’s Protestant thesis to be “the focus of the longest running debate in modern social 
science”, such that it is almost “impossible to pull Weber out of the bag without the bag-
gage of a century’s worth of critics.”1 Like Jacob and Kadane, I might well ask: “Given 
its thorniness, why invoke Weber's thesis yet again?”2 Yet my previous chapter has led 
us to the need for this invocation. 
For my interrogation and deployment of Weber, I undertake a few tasks in this 
chapter. First, I distil from Weber and related works a summary of the Protestant Work 
Ethic thesis for my own orientation to that thesis. Second, I locate Weber’s account within 
a summary of the long-standing debate about his method and thesis, drawing attention to 
the possibilities and limits of his thesis for the purpose of my work. This then allows me 
to make my third move, of modulating and then deploying Weber, to bring him into fur-
ther contact with the issues of assurance and providence my thesis needs to make. In 
particular, I will run my modulation of Weber against a specific concrete example from 
Evangelical history, to test the validity of my work so far. That analysis leads to the pro-
posal that Evangelical identity is propagated and mutated through a particular ascetic 
mechanism of capitalism.  
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3.1 In a Nutshell: The Protestant Work Ethic thesis 
Weber’s basic Protestant Work Ethic thesis is simple to state, and gives us some 
understanding as to its durability and utilisation by others:3 “Weber’s main emphasis is 
upon the role of religious ideas as they generated an attitude of ascetic discipline. These 
religious ideas, exemplified in Protestantism, worked to create a set of economic attitudes, 
which aided the rise of capitalism.”4 Weber’s Protestant thesis arose in response to the 
question of why modern capitalism has emerged with the pursuit of profit and had not 
done so previously. After all, the impulse of greed and gain has been present throughout 
history. Weber asks what is unique about the capitalist enterprise, what are the conditions 
that allow for the first time in history the rational, protected pursuit of profit by all?5 
Weber defines “capitalist economic action as one which rests on the expectation of profit 
by the utilization of opportunities for exchange.”6 He provides us with a brief materialist 
economic history as to the resistance of societies to capitalism, but he finds economic, 
legal, and scientific rationalisations insufficient to explain the emergence of capitalism: 
 
For though the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational 
technique and law, it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to 
adopt certain types of practical rational conduct. When these types have been obstructed by 
spiritual obstacles, the development of rational economic conduct has also met serious 
inner resistance. The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duty based upon 
them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on 
conduct.7 
Here, Weber reveals something of his Ideal Type methodology, the idea that humans 
cannot be best understood within their social worlds through the methods of the physical 
sciences.8 In a way, Weber prefigures Milbank’s thesis, exposing the bias and traditions 
                                                 
3 My thesis is primary focused on the Evangelicalism of the UK and North America, and Weber 
has been extensively dealt with in English across disciplines, such that, for the purposes of my thesis, I 
have not engaged directly with sources in German. 
4 Richard L. Means, “Weber’s Thesis of the Protestant Ethic: The Ambiguities of Received 
Doctrine,” The Journal of Religion, 45, no. 1 (1965): 6. 
5 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 17. 
6 Ibid., 17–18; Weber provides an extended explanation of his understanding of capitalism. 
7 Ibid., 17–27. 
8 Alex Callinicos, Social Theory: A Historical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 
153; Callinicos explains the emergence of the European anti-naturalist school of thought in sociology, 
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of sociology that lead to inadequate socio-economic explanations of human behaviour.9 
Weber was adamant that scientific methods may be objective, but that they worked 
“within an inherently subjective framework.”10 For materialist rational and scientific 
analyses of culture are embedded within “value-inscriptions,” which “are subject to no 
rational adjudication.”11  
Weber moves the understanding of capitalism from materialist Marxist accounts of 
“production” to one of “consumption”.12 It is the rational actor and consumer, their wants 
and needs, that determine market economic constructions. Weber forces us to look behind 
the relationships of the phenomena of market exchange, so that capitalist markets must 
be understood as a social phenomenon and “the intended consequence of individual 
actions.”13 This method explains capitalism as a process of rationalisation by individuals 
around an ethic of “acquisition as the ultimate purpose of life.”14  
Weber calls this ethic and rationalisation the “Spirit of Capitalism”, and describes 
this spirit as a form of asceticism.15 There is an inner-worldly asceticism to capitalism, 
the orientation and discipline of life around the material pursuit of wealth. This ascetic of 
the “Spirit of Capitalism” has “had to fight its way to supremacy against a whole world 
of hostile forces.”16 It is in religion that Weber discerns the stimulus and impetus to 
overcome these forces. For, whilst it was religion that provided the greatest resistance to 
capitalism, it was the character and inner ascetic of Protestantism that gave rise to the 
                                                 
with its reaction to the evolutionism and empiricism of intellectual culture, after Darwin, and Weber’s 
location to that. 
9 Milbank exposes the bias and traditioned contexts of social theory, and demonstrates how, 
contrary to the Marxist priority of the economic over the ideological, “there is no socio-economic reality 
which is more basic than the reality of religion.” See Keer, “Simplicity Itself,” 306. 
10 Callinicos, Social Theory, 156. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Marx’s critique of political economy has a long history and tradition of use. For an overview of 
the recent renewal of interest in this critique, see Alex Callinicos, The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2006). 
13 Ibid., 159; Callinicos expands on the “marginalist economic” model that underlies Weber’s 
Ideal Type methodology. 
14 Ibid., 161. 
15 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 47–78. 
16 Ibid., 56. 
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new ethic of moneymaking.17 Whilst, for Marx, “human beings’ social relations with each 
other are the outcome of economic relations,” Weber explored the inverse, or, how social 
relationships generate the nature of economic life.18 Weber also makes use of the 
“historical interpretative” tool and concept of “elective affinity” to describe the 
relationship between capitalism and Protestantism. This is where two social forms are 
functionally compatible without the need to claim the ‘causal primacy’ of any one form: 
“Thus there is an elective affinity between the Protestant ethic and the capitalist spirit, 
both of which are forms of inner-worldly asceticism. Similarly, capitalism and 
bureaucracy, two types of instrumentally rational social organisations, are bound together 
by an elective affinity for one another.”19 Having claimed this ascetic relationship, Weber 
then provides an argument to justify this thesis and relationship which can be summarised 
as follows.  
Luther introduced the Protestant idea of ‘calling’ (in German, Beruf). Luther, in 
effect, brought ordinary life and worldly affairs within the realm of moral duty, such that 
the life of ordinary people had to excel the morality of monastic asceticism. This broke 
with the Catholic division of ethical life into praecepta and consilia.20 This focus and 
attention on the station and calling of life of the individual, drew out a new emphasis on 
providence. For Luther, ‘calling’ was about how worldly duties were no longer 
subordinate to monastic ascetics, but at the same time, this attention to calling took place 
in “obedience to authority and the acceptance of things as they were.”21 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 73; Weber cites pre-Reformation doctrine and its resistance to the Spirit of Capitalism. 
The work of Noonan also provides one of the most comprehensive explanations of the pre-Reformation 
understanding of usury, and examines how Calvin, free from Canon law, explored the uses of money to 
benefit others, but within strong limits of social relationships. See John T. Noonan, The Scholastic 
Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
18 Callinicos, Social Theory, 171. 
19 Ibid., 163. 
20 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 79–80. Kemper Fullerton also provides a more 
detailed overview of Luther’s conception of calling in relation to praecepta evangelica and consilia 
evangelica in “Calvinism and Capitalism”, in Bryan S. Turner, Max Weber: Critical Responses (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 101–103. 
21 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 86. 
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Luther may have promulgated early European labour divisions, wherein a 
‘vocation’ from God was no longer the special domain of the clergy or church, but was 
now applied to any occupation or trade. Yet his formulation of calling was still within a 
traditionalist framework, alongside what was, for Luther, the suspicion of any “tendency 
to ascetic self-discipline in leading to salvation.”22 For the notion of calling, in the 
Lutheran sense, “is at best of questionable importance for the problems in which we are 
interested.”23 This is because Weber saw the fulfilment of the Protestant ethic, not in 
Lutheranism, but within Calvinistic forms of Christianity.24 
It is in Calvinism that Weber locates the individual within Christianity as inhabiting 
a place where God laid all of their lives, in every detail, bare for assessment.25 Here we 
see where Weber has misunderstood Calvin, for Calvin (like Luther and Melanchthon) 
included assurance of one’s salvation as part of saving faith.26 Weber may misunderstand 
Calvin, but it is Weber’s understanding and subsequent use of Calvin that is my main 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 For an extended theological critique of the Reformers’ understanding of vocation, see Miroslav 
Volf, Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 105–110. Volf 
argues that the Reformers’ understanding of work as vocation can lead to injustice as it reinforces the 
status quo, which might then include forced, dangerous, and exploited labour. 
25 It is worth making a note here, again, on my method and use of sources. My thesis does not 
seek to completely and solely critique the Protestant Work Ethic, for if it did, it would examine Calvin 
directly and extensively here. Instead, my critique constructively points to sources and requirements that 
such an excavation of Weber would require. 
26 For example, see John Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the 
Thessalonians, trans by Ross Mackenzie, ed by David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1960), 116.  Here Calvin’s exegesis of Romans 5 affirms the 
assurance of salvation that a believer might experience from justification by faith. Rom 5:1 reads 
(NRSV), “Therefore, since we are justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus 
Christ.” Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin in their commentary on this opening verse of Romans 5 claim 
that there is a status and experience within justification by faith, that provides for peace and assurance by 
the believer, see Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol 25: Lectures on Romans, ed by Hilton C. Oswald, 
trans by Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia, 1972), 285, and LW. Philip Melanchthon, Commentary 
on Romans, trans by Fred Kramer (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1992), 122, and John Calvin, The Epistles 
of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the Thessalonians, trans by Ross Mackenzie, ed. by David W. 
Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1960), 104. 
Calvin, 104. Whilst there are many commonalities between Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin on 
assurance, there are many significant differences. Calvinists did not allow for assurance of one’s salvation 
as part of saving faith but even they agreed that one can have assurance of salvation. The full scope and 
assessment of Calvin’s assurance of faith is beyond my thesis, but for a detailed and comprehensive 
overview see Anthony N.S. Lane, “Calvin’s Doctrine of Assurance Revisited,” in D.W. Hall (ed.), 
Tributes to John Calvin: A Celebration of his Quincentenary (Phillipsburg (NJ): P&R, 2010), 270-313.  
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concern. So, for Weber, with Calvin no sacrament or any aspect of the church could 
provide assurance of salvation, for even within the church were the ‘doomed’ to be 
located.27 And whilst Christ has died, salvation was for the elect, of which no one could 
lay claim and guarantee of ownership, with the result that “for salvation, the Calvinist’s 
intercourse with his God was carried on in deep isolation.”28 The daily life of Christians, 
especially their labour, becomes the sole activity for the glory of God, with attention to 
hard work and prosperity as signs of Christian assurance being established. In the face of 
the doctrine of predestination and the psychological pressures of accountability over the 
use of one’s life within this doctrine, good works are “the technical means, not of 
purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation…In practice this means 
that God helps those who help themselves.”29  
Alongside this new ‘work ethic’ ran a Protestant aesthetic of desire, in which an 
ascetic of the material life of the cloistered monk was aspired to.30 The more strongly this 
Calvinist asceticism was practised, the more it resulted in an individual being driven 
further away from the material world. Andre Biéler calls this combination of work ethic 
and ascetic “Protestant occupational asceticism”.31 Biéler describes how this ethic 
stimulates production, whilst the ascetic stops consumption, such that the capitalist spirit 
is to produce much and consume little.32 
With restrictions upon Christians on giving to churches through anything that 
appeared to support religious and mystical icons, and as giving money to the poor was 
seen as undermining the drive to work and encouraging begging, these Protestants were 
left to invest their money, and nascent capitalism was born.33 Weber then traces the 
                                                 
27 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 104. 
28 Ibid., 107. 
29 Ibid., 115. 
30 Ibid., 121. 
31 André Biéler, Edward Dommen, and James Greig, Calvin’s Economic and Social Thought 
(Geneva: World Alliance of Reformed Churches, World Council of Churches, 2006), 434. 
32 Ibid., 435. 
33 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 177–178. However, Weber is more nuanced about this 
claim, something missed by many critics (see footnote 55). 
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development of this Protestant Work Ethic and ascetic through pietism, Methodism, and 
other sects, such as Baptists.34 Weber’s diagnosis terminates with the birth of Methodism, 
and notes an injunction of John Wesley’s embodying his Protestant Work Ethic thesis. 
Weber correlates his argument with a direct quote from John Wesley: “we must exhort 
all Christians to gain all they can, and save all they can; that is, in effect to grow rich”.35  
Weber understands Wesley here providing a proof of  a work ethic thesis and of how 
Wesley was charging Christians to “give all they can, so that they will grow in grace and 
lay up a treasure in heaven”.36  Now Wesley did indeed make this statement, but Weber 
has misinterpreted Wesley, something that is easily evidenced by looking at the wider 
quote from Wesley, where in fact Wesley claims how “frugality” and “industry” in terms 
of a work ethic lead to riches, but that such riches lead to “pride, anger and the love of 
the world”.37  In other words, Wesley’s well known dictum is indeed a description of a 
work ethic, but a warning of the results of such an ethic, something Weber has missed. 
In summary, Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic thesis consists of the relationship 
between four key ideas: 
 
1) Calvinist doctrine and beliefs of predestination induced ‘salvation anxiety’ in be-
lievers. Throughout their lives, work became an issue of calling, where God now 
assessed the individual in that location. 
2) Believers within Calvinist worship unable to turn to sacraments, or to the church, 
for comfort and assurance, see providence in ordered lives as evidence of being 
one of the ‘elect’. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 95–154 (chapter IV, “The Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism”). Whilst Weber 
might have used the term ‘sect’ to describe Methodists and Baptists, theologically they are not normally 
described as such. 
35 Ibid., 175. 
36 Ibid., 176. 
37 Wesley’s statement is from one of his sermons, see John Wesley, Sermon 116, paragraph 8, 
http://www.wbbm.org/john-wesley-sermons/serm-116.htm, accessed 18th September 2018. 
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3) The ordering of ordinary life and labour around a monastic ascetic and its ideals 
as the means for fulfilling one’s calling leads to a Protestant and occupational 
ascetic. 
4) This ascetic combines with a Puritan aesthetic that results in the rational mastery 
of economic life and the “Spirit of Capitalism”, in which much is produced, little 
is consumed, and the pursuit of profit is established as a morally good issue. 38 
In his conclusion, Weber describes the terminus of the bourgeois ethic, and the bourgeois 
businessman, wherein “the power of the religious asceticism provided him in addition 
with sober, conscientious, and unusually industrious workmen, who clung to their work 
as to a life purpose willed by God.”39 Weber does not describe how we arrive at the 
transformation of his Protestant ethic into the bourgeois businessman. But he does 
observe and note at the end of his work that the religious underpinning of capitalism that 
he had diagnosed was mostly gone from society, such that “today the spirit of religious 
asceticism – whether finally, who knows? – has escaped from the cage.”40 Weber 
concludes his work with an observation of the transformation of the Puritan work ethic 
into something else, which he leaves others to describe and diagnose: 
 
The Puritan wanted to work in calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was 
carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it 
did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is 
now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today 
determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those 
directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so 
determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.41 
                                                 
38 I have ‘filled out’ and developed the suggestion of four key ideas summarised by Gianfranco 
Poggi. See “Historical Viability, Sociological Significance, and Personal Judgment,” in Hartmut 
Lehmann and Guenther Roth’s, Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts. Publications of 
the German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 295–296. 
39 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 177. 
40 Ibid., 181. 
41 Ibid. 
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This mechanised nature of capitalist production in relation to the “the rosy blush of its 
laughing heir, the Enlightenment,” left the notion of calling and duty to one’s vocation as 
a “ghost of dead religious beliefs.”42  
 
3.2 Ghost in the Machine: The wider debate 
Having made this summary of Weber’s method and Protestant Work Ethic thesis, I now 
locate that thesis within the wider debate and criticisms of his work. This will allow me 
to then propose how his thesis, with modifications, may be useful to my project. In order 
to explore the critiques surrounding Weber’s thesis, I have grouped them into three key 
areas: methodological issues within social theory, historical issues and criticisms, and 
theological concerns. 
 
3.2.1 Weber’s ‘Ideal Type’ Methodology 
Weber deploys his Ideal Type method to produce an account of the Protestant Work Ethic, 
seeking to “establish a more differentiated dialectical relation between religion, lifestyle, 
and emotion.”43 Weber took the epiphenomena of religious beliefs seriously, and refused 
to deploy methods that reduced the action of actors in any realm, including the religious, 
to mere social or historical factors.44 It was not that Weber was opposed to these other 
methods for a “multi-dimensional analysis”. Rather, Weber sought to take a specific 
religious factor (Protestantism) and to then analyse that within a complex relationship 
(Capitalism), for which he found his Ideal Type methodology more suitable.45 Yet even 
within this, Weber saw himself as something of an economic historian.46 MacKinnon has 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 182. 
43 Thomas Nipperdey, “Max Weber, Protestantism, and the Debate around 1900,” in Lehmann 
and Roth, eds., Protestant Ethic, 79. 
44 A process explained by Nipperdey in ibid., 78. 
45 Lehmann and Roth, Protestant Ethic, 79. 
46 Ibid. 
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claimed that critics who see Weber as having no materialist grasp overlook the fact that 
Weber accepted material preconditions as necessary for his ‘Ideal Type’ dialectic.47 
An ‘Ideal Type’ is not a moral ideal, nor an average of the instances of something. 
It is, rather, a heuristic description, not of reality, but as a means of expression which 
point towards descriptions of reality.48 Ideal Types were, for Weber, a means to make 
sense of the “chaos of infinitely differentiated and highly contradictory complexes of 
ideas and feelings.”49 These then provide guidance for “understanding the unique 
individual character of cultural phenomena.”50 In short, Weber’s Ideal Types allow for 
investigation between collective phenomena, to locate similarities and differences in 
concrete realities. We can, and do, speak about Protestants knowing that this is an 
accentuation of a collective ideal, and that there is a likelihood that individuals will 
behave in the expected social ways to which Protestants are prone. All the collective types 
we, like Weber, use, are never the full account and embodiment of what they label, be 
that Protestant, Evangelical, etc. But Ideal Types allow for the construction of theses, that 
link those types, and explain the real-world conditions that gave rise to phenomena 
between them. Ideal Types are therefore approximations for us to then correlate cause 
and effect between those types.  
I write of Evangelicals as an ideal type to get closer to their concrete actions.51 My 
description of Evangelicals then allows me to consider variations in actions by 
                                                 
47 Malcolm H. MacKinnon, “The Longevity of the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics,” in Lehmann 
and Roth, eds., Protestant Ethic, 211. 
48 For a detailed and recent explanation and assessment of Weber’s Ideal Type method, see 
Hilliard Aronovitch, “Interpreting Weber’s Ideal-Types,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 42, 
Issue 3 (2012), 356–369. 
49 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited and translated by E. A. Shills and 
H. A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), 96. 
50 Ibid., 101. 
51 When any social scientist attempts to explain terms like capitalism or Protestantism, they often 
subsume those terms under general concepts of economics or religion. But to do so elides the most 
important distinctives of those domains. When, on the other hand, a social scientist makes use of 
historical methods and particularises the phenomenon being reviewed, often the result is that there is no 
room left to compare related phenomena between domains. Weber’s Ideal Type method sought to escape 
this dilemma. 
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Evangelicals to my approximations and abstractions. As Julien Freund puts it, "Being 
unreal, the ideal type has the merit of offering us a conceptual device with which we can 
measure real development and clarify the most important elements of empirical reality."52 
Weber had three distinct levels of abstraction to Ideal Types. First, there are Ideal Types 
of historical particularities, such as ‘the Protestant Ethic’, or ‘capitalism’ which are 
phenomena from specific historical periods manifest within particular cultural contexts. 
Then, second, there are Ideal Types as abstractions of elements from social reality found 
in a variety of historical and cultural contexts, such as ‘bureaucracy’. Third, and finally, 
there is an ideal type that describes a common and particular behaviour for all cultures 
and contexts. For Weber, this was the realm of economic theory, which often generates 
categories of describing people in economic terms, with economic motives.53 
Of course, Weber’s Ideal Type theory is greatly contested.54 But it remains in 
significant use within social sciences as a method for understanding how agents act and 
interpret their experiences. However provisional understanding of agents has to be, it does 
at the same time provide causal explanations of those agents.55 Despite Weber’s claims to 
be somewhat of an economic historian, and to be attentive to material conditions, he is 
often seen as lacking attention to the material in his accounts. Social scientists like Harvey 
Goldman see a dialectic between the materialist accounts of Marx and the rationalistic 
account of Weber.56 Within this placement, some social scientists further discern Weber 
as being between two interpretative poles, one of “a fruitful battle with historical 
                                                 
52 Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 69. 
53 This summary is taken from Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in 
Historical and Social Context (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2003), 223–224. 
54 For examples of recent critiques and updating of Weber’s Ideal Type method see Hilliard 
Aronovitch, and Juan Manuel Forte, “Religion and Capitalism: Weber, Marx and the Materialist 
Controversy,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34, no. 4 (2008): 427–48; K. P. R. Bartels, “The Disregard 
for Weber’s herrschaft the Relevance of Weber’s Ideal Type of Bureaucracy for the Modern Study of 
Public Administration,” Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 31, no. 4 (2009): 447–478; and Thomas 
W. Segady, “The Utility of Weber’s Ideal Type: Verstehen and the Theory of Critical Mass,” 
Sociological Spectrum 34, no.4 (2014): 354–61. 
55 Weber, Methodology, 43. 
56 Harvey S. Goldman, “Weber’s Ascetic Practices of the Self,” in Lehmann and Roth, Protestant 
Ethic, 161–162. 
88 
 
materialism” and the other side where Weber “fit[s] perfectly into Marx’s system.”57 
Weber, in his own context of struggles for German national identity, was seeking an 
empowered self, one able to master the rationalised world and “generate selves with 
power.”58 This does raise the question of how we might understand the way a “self is 
shaped by relations of power in institutions and social practices.”59 Here we reach a 
boundary and limit to Weber’s thesis; we then need to pay attention to the non-rational 
and the material. My next chapter attends to material accounts. In the interim, and related 
to any deficit of method for material accounting, is the need for historical accuracy, in 
particular the issue of economics history, to which we now turn. 
 
3.2.2 Historical Issues in Weber’s Analysis 
It is the accuracy of Weber’s historical data that has drawn some of the sharpest criticisms. 
Richard L. Means provides a summary of many of these historical criticisms.60  
First, it was not Calvin who introduced usury (the taking of interest) to Geneva, but 
rather the Catholic Bishop Fabri 150 years before Calvin.61 Whilst Weber insists on the 
centrality of usury to the Protestant Work Ethic within Calvinism and later Puritanism, 
he seems to have made the mistake common to other sociologists of not examining the 
writings and work of Calvin on usury. Andre Biéler has carried out one of the most 
extensive examinations of Calvin on economic thought, in relation to usury, and 
concludes that Calvin was one of the most outspoken critics of usury.62 Biéler also 
highlights how Weber failed to account for the change in Calvin’s thinking and 
                                                 
57 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: RSC, 
1991), p. 65. See also J. A. Schupeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1976), p. 11.  
58 Harvey S. Goldman, “Weber’s Ascetic Practices of the Self,” 164. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 3–6. Means draws on the work of Herbert Luethy for his summary 
of Weber’s historical deficiencies. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
62 Biéler, Dommen, and Greig, Social Thought, 145-148. 
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transformation over time by later Puritans: “That relationship has been hybridized by so 
many historical influences and sociological factors that one would have to make a far 
deeper and more meticulous analysis than Weber’s … in order to discover the real thread 
that runs through from one to the other.”63 Yet with regard to Weber’s claims over 
Calvin’s ascetics, Biéler admits that an ascetic did exist. That ascetic was, as Weber 
claims, centred on providence, and an accounting for the use of the life to which God had 
called individuals. But this ascetic was about the fair sharing of wealth, and not about 
justification of poverty, as Weber claims.64 However - and one does wonder how 
historians have missed this - Weber is at pains to point out that Calvin is misquoted as 
justifying poverty.65 Weber goes into enough historical detail to remind us that Puritans 
subsequent to Calvin made begging illegal, because “the Protestant sects and the strict 
Puritan communities actually did not know any begging in their midst.”66 As noted earlier, 
Weber does seem to claim that the Protestant Work Ethic had negative implications for 
how people saw the poor, but he distinguishes this as a later development after Calvin, 
and as a bourgeois and secular misappropriation of the Protestant ethic.67 
Another area of historical concern is Weber’s lack of exploration of the effects of 
social class, in particular the relationship between the middle classes and Protestantism.68 
Whereas Weber sees Protestantism as causal to the development of the middle classes, 
the development of the middle classes may have given rise to Protestantism. R. H. 
Tawney argues just this as having taken place, perceiving later “Puritanism” as being 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 437. 
64 Ibid., 439. 
65 Indeed, Weber sees this justification of poverty as something that progressed over time, and 
manifested only in late-bourgeois capitalism. See Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 176–177. 
66 Ibid., 178. For a detailed examination of Calvin’s understanding of poverty, see Bonnie L. 
Pattison, Poverty in the Theology of John Calvin (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2006). Pattison 
explains how with Calvin, poverty can become a means of grace, an opportunity to gain knowledge of 
God in a way that is unseen when poverty and hardship are absent.  
67 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 177. 
68 Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 4. 
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changed by the emerging middle classes.69 Tawney’s thesis argues that the passing of the 
aristocracy and the rise of the new middle classes led to these new rulers of society being 
predominantly and necessarily Protestant.70 
In the midst of this historical debate over the relationship between the middle 
classes and the Puritan revolution, I believe we can see two factors at play. There is a 
religious movement, the Weberian thesis of how religious beliefs work with religious 
actors in shaping and organising society. Then there is another ‘movement’, the Marxist 
materialist account of how economic forces and social structures give rise to the shape of 
religious beliefs and values. I suggest these movements are not mutually exclusive to each 
other, but work together as an explanation of resonance and relationship between 
Evangelicalism and capitalism. This points me again towards the need to provide a 
materialist account of the relationship between religion and economics.  
 
3.2.3 Theological Considerations of Weber’s Protestant Ethic 
Weber’s Theological Sources 
In later years, Weber repeatedly emphasized that for him the most important participants in 
the debate over The Protestant Ethic were the ‘experts’ in religious matters, the 
theologians. From them alone he expected a “fruitful and instructive critique.” 
 
— Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics” 
Weber explicitly invited critique from the theological sphere, stating that he expected this 
critique, and he had many reasons to expect it “to be the most competent.”71 There were 
his strong personal relationships with Protestant theologians, in particular his closest 
friend Ernst Troeltsch, then his personal wrestlings with the church and Christian faith, 
                                                 
69 R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1947), 197–211. 
70 For a summary of Tawney’s thesis, see Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 5. 
71 Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics,” in 
Lehmann and Roth, eds., Protestant Ethic, 27. See also Max Weber, “Kritische Beiträge zu den 
vorstehenden ‘Kritischen Beiträgen’,” in Die Protestantische Ethik Ii, 5th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann 
(Tübingen: Gütersloh, 1987), 31. 
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and, most obviously, the use he made of theological sources to justify his Protestant Ethic 
thesis.72 Indeed, Weber incorporated so many resources from cultural fields, including the 
theological, that The Protestant Ethic demonstrates that Weber was, of any sociologist of 
the nineteenth century, the most involved in theological discourse.73 We cannot 
understand Weber’s Protestant Ethic without being involved in the specialist theological 
discourses which he used in his research. After publishing his Protestant Ethic as a two-
part essay early in his career, Weber returned near the end of his life to his work and 
revised it in light of some of the criticisms he received, integrating much of his later work 
into the wider relationship between religion and economics.74 
With regard to his theological sources and methods, it was the German liberal 
Protestant tradition that informed Weber, with “more than 40 percent of the modern 
literature that Weber used in The Protestant Ethic derived from German theologians of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”75 Dominating his attention was not only the 
historical material from those sources, but also contemporary discussion about the nature 
of Protestantism and modern culture, in particular the legitimacy of the German empire.76 
It was from this theological milieu that Weber proceeded with the existing concept that 
religion was not a consequence and function of other values and systems, but was an 
autonomous realm, where “German-speaking Protestant theologians of the nineteenth 
century mostly followed a psychological classification that allowed not only for the 
independence of religion, but also for the instructive power of religious ideas.”77 
It was this that shaped Weber’s Ideal Type method and understanding of human 
agency, set against the backdrop of the forces of the German empire and materialist 
                                                 
72 Graf provides a biographical sketch of these factors in Graf, “Theological Sources,” 27–30. 
73 Ibid., 48–49. 
74 Kaelber provides a historical sketch of the publication life of Weber’s Protestant Ethic; Lutz 
Kaelber, “Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic in the 21st Century,” International Journal of Politics, Culture 
and Society, 16, no. 1 (2002): 133. 
75 Graf, “Theological Sources,” 30. 
76 Ibid. 
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debates. Weber’s desire was to see people as free agents, able to structure actions around 
beliefs in resistance to the forces of political authorities. It seems likely that this was one 
of the reasons that Weber was so quick to dismiss Luther in his Protestant Work Ethic, 
wherein Weber saw Luther as being responsible for a political passivity that was unable 
to respond to the authoritarian political culture of the German Wilhelmine Empire.78 
Weber’s dismissal of Luther also made him unable to recognise “the potential Lutheran 
contribution to the modern economy.”79 
I suggest it is in his relationship and discussion with Troeltsch that we find the 
theological centrepiece to Weber’s Protestant Ethic, a centrepiece that gives rise to the 
most important theological concerns.80 It is in a publication by Troeltsch about the nature 
of Reformed Protestantism in England, and how the “doctrine of predestination” gave 
rise to a “mercantile impulse,” that is redolent of theological elements in Weber’s thesis.81 
However, Troeltsch held a different view (at least at the time of his publication) to Weber, 
that it was the certainty of salvation and related asceticism that led to the spirit of 
capitalism. With an understanding of the context and limitations to Weber’s theological 
sources, like Graf we might conclude: “How can a level of knowledge about the theology 
and religiosity of ascetic pietism be expected from Weber that even the experts, the 
                                                 
78 Weber is able at a stroke to dispense with Luther’s theology of calling, as one where “the only 
ethical result was negative…obedience to authority and the acceptance of things as they were preached.” 
See Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 86. For a more detailed review of the relationship of Calvin 
and Luther within Weber’s work, see Kathryn D. Blanchard, The Protestant Ethic or the Spirit of 
Capitalism: Christians, Freedom, and Free Market (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010). 
79 Weber can be understood as providing a counter-thesis to Albrecht Ritschl, who read Luther as 
providing a piety that was the main principle for cultural progress and Christian freedom, and that later 
pietism was a re-Catholicisation of the Church by later Protestants. For a detailed discussion of this 
theological discourse and its relationship to Weber’s thesis, see Graf, “Theological Sources,” 41–48. 
80 For an outline of this relationship, and the publications by Troeltsch that relate to Weber’s 
work, see ibid., 32–33. Graf notes that the major intersections between Weber and Troeltsch are to be 
found in their critiques of Ritschl; see ibid., 42. Graf engages with several sources to show Troeltsch’s 
and Weber’s claimed independence of each other, demonstrating how, as two friends, their exchange over 
shared questions and selection of literature produced strong similarities between them. See Ibid., 33. 
81 Graf highlights how this observation is made by Weber, with Weber quoting from Ernst 
Troeltsch, Real-encyklopädie für protestantische theologie und kirche, (1891), s.v. “Art. ‘Moralisten, 
Englische’,” 436–46; see Graf, 33. 
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German theologians, did not possess?”82 Yet, it is my task to consider the key theological 
limitations of Weber’s thesis that later scholarship provides, to which I now turn. 
 
Weber’s Use of the Doctrine of Predestination 
 
Weber’s thesis relates Protestantism theologically to capitalism through a formulation of 
Calvin’s doctrine of calling and predestination, which he aligns with a Protestant ascetic 
constructed from a synthesis of ascetics gleaned from Puritans to Baptists and Methodists 
that ends with the example of Benjamin Franklin.83 It is this understanding of the nature 
and place of the doctrine of predestination, and the ascetic of Protestant Christianity, that 
is most questionable theologically. 
André Biéler asks whether Weber’s dependence upon a construal of Calvin and 
predestination is misplaced: 
 
…is it correct to describe Calvin’s own Calvinism in terms of this dogma, which has only a 
secondary place in the Reformer’s teaching? Did not Weber himself recall that Calvin 
elaborated on this teaching only at the end of his career, in the final edition of the Institutes, 
because of the Polemics it had aroused? No one could deny that this dogma was important 
in the Reformer’s thought, but to say that it set its seal on the whole of the religious and 
secular life of the original Calvinist communities, to the point of triggering specific 
professional reflexes in their members, is a considerable exaggeration – strongly 
contradicted by the facts of that age, which show us Calvinists who were not very greatly 
disposed to capitalist practices. On this first point we have no right to identity Calvin’s own 
Calvinism with later Puritanism.84 
Not only is it incorrect to describe Calvin in terms of this dogma, but there were also 
many other groups, captured within Weber’s historical net, that did not hold to this 
doctrine, and were directly opposed to the anti-predestination theologies, and the anti-
election doctrines of Arminianism.85 It would seem that The Protestant Ethic makes no 
account for this, and shows no understanding of it. 
                                                 
82 Graf, “Theological Sources,” 49. 
83 Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 7. 
84 Biéler, Dommen, and Greig, Social Thought, 438. 
85 Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 7. 
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MacKinnon, in his rebuttal of Weber’s thesis, suggests that it was the issue of 
“providence” that replaced “predestination” as an explanatory ethos for Protestant 
ascetics.86 Yet MacKinnon accepts that Calvin’s doctrine of predestination makes 
assurance difficult to experience.87 Greyerz refutes MacKinnon’s work and broadly 
supports Weber’s thesis, but he is willing to affirm the merits of MacKinnon’s work in 
highlighting the issue of providence rather than predestination.88 It was the shortness of 
life, along with the belief of special providence and the involvement of God intervening 
in their daily lives, that led to the spiritual ‘bookkeeping’ and journaling that saw people 
measuring their use of time and what they gave their desires to.89 
If the doctrine of predestination did not hold the centrality that Weber claims, does 
his thesis immediately fail? Ironically, “Weber may be right about a connection between 
the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of Capitalism in spite of or even because of his possible 
misreading of theological doctrines.”90 Guy Oakes similarly suggests that Weber’s thesis 
does not collapse in light of this theological critique, for Weber was correct in suggesting 
a link between a Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, whilst being wrong about 
the doctrinal premise behind that ethic and its relationship to Calvinism as a theological 
doctrine.91 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 Guenther Roth, “Introduction” to Lehmann and Roth, eds., Protestant Ethic, 13. 
87 MacKinnon, “Longevity”, 219. Here, MacKinnon summarises how it is almost impossible for 
the believer to psychologically understand and experience this predestination. All means of knowing and 
understanding, be they work, reflection or perception, are excluded and God alone knows who is saved. 
Sola fide, justification by persevering faith alone, is the only hope for believers.  I however note again 
how Weber misunderstood how included assurance of one’s salvation as part of saving faith, see footnote 
26. Calvin. 
88 Kaspar von Greyerz, “Predestination, Covenant, and Special Providence”, in Lehmann and 
Roth, eds., Protestant Ethic, 276. 
89 Ibid., 276–277. 
90 Roth, “Introduction,” 13. 
91 Guy Oakes, “The Thing That Would Not Die: Notes on Refutation,” in Lehmann and Roth, 
eds., Protestant Ethic, 293. 
95 
 
Weber’s Protestant Ascetic 
 
As I have outlined, in his thesis Weber sees a response to the material world take shape 
with a Protestant ascetic and aesthetic. The need to marshal the resources of life with an 
ascetic, to demonstrate the involvement of God in ordinary life and work, coupled with a 
monastic aesthetic of avoiding the material world, leads to the hard-working Protestant 
who produces much and consumes little. This is the combination of work ethic and ascetic 
that Biéler delineates as “Protestant occupational asceticism”.92 
An immediate critique of Weber’s Protestant ascetic is that he offers scant 
methodological explanation for it.93 Whilst he describes capitalism as rational, organised, 
and calculated, he does not provide a definition of capitalism within economic history. 
Simultaneously, Weber provides descriptions of Protestant ascetics, which he locates 
within the capitalist spirit, such as “wasting time,” the “ascetic compulsion to save,” and 
“sober industrial workmen.”94 Means demonstrates that Weber does not show how these 
concepts are operationalised within any sociological method. I would further suggest that, 
although Weber claims that the concepts arise in response to a theologically motivating 
force, he fails to explicate and operationalise his Protestant ascetic ‘theologically’. 
What is the theological nature of this ascetic in the daily and ethical life of 
Protestant Christians? The primary example Weber offers for his Puritan ascetic in 
practice is from Benjamin Franklin, who is shoehorned into the role of exemplar for a 
Protestant ascetic and ethic. It would seem that Weber misreads Franklin’s context, 
unable to see where Franklin was theologically deistic with an orientation towards money 
that was politically motivated, and set within a eudemonistic ethic alongside a use of 
humour in talking about money – humour which was lost on Weber (and his larger 
                                                 
92 Biéler, Dommen, and Greig, Social Thought, 434. 
93 Means, “Weber’s Thesis,” 7. 
94 Ibid.; Means surveys the adjectives Weber uses to describe the Protestant Ethic ascetic. 
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German audience) linguistically.95 Apparently, Weber is in need of a better ‘Christian’ 
and Protestant example for his ascetic, within a theological operationalism, the possibility 
of which will be explored in the next section as I modulate Weber’s thesis. 
With regard to his ascetic method, Weber is criticised for bringing a secular notion 
of personhood, an ascetically ‘fortified self’ able to respond to the pressures of German 
culture and rationalisation, and wrapping it within a construction of the Puritan self.96 
Puritans provide Weber with a “contemporary discipline of the self”. But more than this, 
Weber’s work reveals the larger dialectic that lies within all modern ‘practices of the self’, 
between the obligations and restrictions of institutions and the innovation and sources of 
the self in resistance to these.97 One reading of Weber is that his Protestant Ethic is an 
attempt to recover Christian sources of the self in the face of a society that has abandoned 
those sources, for “by the late nineteenth century ... the new techniques and practices that 
had aided in shaping and equipping bourgeois individuals for lives and roles in national 
culture, and class, were seriously weakened and persistently challenged by the pressures 
of a rapidly developing capitalist society.”98 Whilst Weber saw the Protestant ethic as 
adaptable and responsive to the rationalised world, he “rejected the possibility that the 
non-ascetic modes of self-fashioning could adequately empower the modern self for 
mastery and innovation.”99 For Weber, only with individuals acting around a “higher 
cause” could innovation take place, with no social movement or association able to 
empower action.100 It is in the “self-fashioning” of the Protestant self that Weber sees the 
“self-fashioning” of capitalism. 
                                                 
95 Roth provides an examination of these factors, and establishes Weber’s misreading of Franklin, 
in Roth, “Introduction,” 16–20. 
96 We have already highlighted the contextual issues of agency for Weber within his Wilhelmine 
nationalism. Goldman outlines this critique of Weber’s ascetic, in Goldman, “Ascetic Practices,” 161–
177. 
97 Ibid., 163. 
98 Ibid., 162.  
99 Ibid., 175.  
100 Ibid., 176. 
97 
 
But it is not just that Weber is unable to consider a non-ascetic mode of “self-
fashioning”, he is also unable to consider any ascetic other than his Protestant Ethic. 
Weber’s context also includes the discussion and practice of alternative ascetics around 
gender and lifestyle, within the emerging Freudian understanding of personality.101 
Weber’s nervous illness, and the disposition of many of his friends towards 
“overthrowing the repressive character of capitalism,” shed light on his work as an 
attempt to recover the religious roots of capitalism in vocation, and a rejection of this 
emerging erotic inner aesthetic.102 This leads me (again) to ask whether there was more 
than one ascetic at work within capitalism, and if so, how it was related to Christianity. 
Would an exploration of this reveal the loss of religious sources of the self that Weber 
laments, and which seems most prevalent to our late-capitalist context within our thesis 
problem? Weber was willing to explore one type of Puritan ascetic but not to consider 
another ascetic of religion, of a turning into the retreat of the “private experience of the 
extraordinary with erotic intimacy and with subjective enjoyment.”103 Weber had a 
“preference for action as a central sociological notion over inner experience” because he 
was looking to avoid the political indifference, the inability to take public action that 
resulted from “getting lost in the labyrinth of ‘inner experiences’”.104 
Yet Weber did seek to integrate this “aesthetic-expressive” modernism within his 
theories of rationalisation, and anticipates the “break between modernism and modernity 
that Daniel Bell later described as a cultural contradiction of Capitalism.”105 This leaves 
me to ask what the relationship is between that hedonistic, expressive culture, and the 
“institutional core of modern society” that still rests on the Protestant ethic.106 I am left to 
enquire whether there was another Protestant ethic, or emerging post-Protestant ethic, 
                                                 
101 Klaus Lichtblau, “The Protestant Ethic versus the ‘New Ethic’,” in Lehmann and Roth, 
Protestant Ethic, 179–180. 
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which was also in a dialectical relationship to later capitalism, that would explain the 
demise of religious and Christian sources for the self and illuminate my thesis problem. 
And would such exploration make sense of the above critiques of Weber, in particular the 
suggestion that it was providence and not predestination that was the doctrinal locus and 
motive for any Protestant ascetic? For I have suggested in my previous chapter how 
providence leaves more room for activism than does predestination.107 
Not only did Weber invite ongoing theological critique, he concludes (literally) his 
Protestant Ethic with a request that examinations of his ascetic be made:  
 
It would also be further necessary to investigate how Protestant Asceticism was in turn 
influenced in its development and its character by the totality of social conditions, 
especially economic. The modern man is in general, even with the best will, unable to give 
religious ideas a significance for culture and national character which they deserve. But it 
is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided 
spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history. Each is equally possible, but each, 
if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, 
accomplishes equally little in the interests of historical truth.108 
 
3.3 Modulating Weber 
I have established a broad account of Weber’s thesis, highlighted the main critiques of 
his work, and suggested where they might lead me for further investigations. I now move 
on to modulate his thesis within its wider critical and supportive resources. This 
modulation is then the impetus for my next chapter and account. By way of method for 
this modulation of his thesis, I now examine how the doctrine of assurance migrated into 
a focus on the doctrine of providence to provide an alternative ascetic to that proposed by 
Weber. This is the ascetic that I believe generated the greatest resonance by 
Evangelicalism with capitalism. In order to establish this, I will draw on the work of Peter 
                                                 
107 I have noted how Warner’s understanding of Evangelical activism, as demonstrated in Warner, 
Reinventing English Evangelicalism, modulated from Bebbington’s Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 
relies on the epistemic issue of assurance, and has missed the role of providence in generating the 
activism of modern Evangelicalism. 
108 Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 183. 
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Sedgwick.109 I will also bring my work from my previous chapter into direct contact with 
a sustained critique of Weber. Ultimately, I am trying to demonstrate how Protestants 
relocated assurance into providence as they simultaneously moved from lifestyles of 
Protestant production to Evangelical consumption. I will conclude by running my 
modulation of Weber against an ethnographic account of the life of Joseph Ryder.110 From 
this, I make a proposal for how Evangelical identity was constructed through the ascetic 
mechanisms of print capitalism. This allows me to test the validity of my thesis claims 
and work so far, as well as signpost the work for my next chapter. 
 
3.3.1 Loss of Resistance by Religion: Consumer identities 
In his work The Market Economy and Christian Ethics, Sedgwick, writing within the 
domains of theological anthropology and ethics, suggests that “the market world has 
created the modern society in which our lives are lived.”111 Human identity is made 
through the consumptive processes provided by the market, and those processes 
determine human relationships. Religious faith, or even the implications of faith, such as 
the Protestant Work Ethic, has increasingly less to do with identity formation and human 
relationship within market forces.112 Sedgwick establishes his thesis by extending the 
work of Habermas, and notes the centrality of Weber’s work to Habermas.113 His account 
of Habermas is set alongside an exploration of how the aesthetics of the Romantic 
Movement transitioned capitalism and the market from production to consumption.  
Sedgwick claims that Habermas’s work first demonstrates the instrumentalism and 
rationality of the market that excludes social values, and second, that there is an interplay 
                                                 
109 Sedgwick, Market Economy. 
110 Jacob and Kadane, “Weber’s Protestant Capitalist”. 
111 Sedgwick, Market Economy, 1. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 2, 14; Sedgwick makes clear that Habermas does not, however, provide a theological 
understanding of the market relationship to human identity. He draws our attention to how Habermas uses 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic as the way into discussing human identity, although he believes Weber was 
wrong in his understanding. 
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between this “sociality” of the market and the patterns of thought of contemporary 
culture. The result is a “colonization of the life world”, with something other than 
religious values.114 In terms of method, and in order to attend to the lack of theological 
description by Habermas, Sedgwick argues that it is in the development of the Romantic 
Movement and its aesthetic that we can see the transformation of the Protestant Work 
Ethic into an ethic of consumption. He draws heavily upon Colin Campbell’s work, The 
Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism, in making this suggestion. 
Sedgwick provides a diagnosis of the ascetic and aesthetic of capitalism, examining 
how the transition from production to consumption took place. For he determines this 
move from production to consumption as a development of Weber’s thesis. Sedgwick is 
mindful of the limits of his thesis. As he reminds us: “The task of relating the Christian 
faith to the world of the shopping-mall, and the hi-tech industrial and service sector, 
within the constraints of a global market-driven culture, is one that can only be begun in 
this book.”115 For diagnosis is one thing, response is something more substantive and 
challenging. Sedgwick’s takes us through a complex methodology commensurate to his 
aims. He seeks the possibility of social relationships that are able to “nourish human 
identity and yet recognize the reality of holding together a market economy.”116 I have 
similar aims; I do not seek the undoing of market economies per se, but rather how 
Evangelical identity might be nourished within market economies. Sedgwick traverses 
the theological, sociological, anthropological, and psychological and produces a “fully 
orbed” account of human identity formation within the market. In his account, Sedgwick 
maps the relationship of that formation with the resources of Christianity, in particular to 
the Protestant Work Ethic. I now highlight two aspects of this. First, a social-theory 
account of human identity and the market, and, second, a doctrinal progression through 
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Romanticism to the post-Protestant Work Ethic and resultant dialectic.117 These two 
accounts provide for a modulation of Weber’s Protestant Ethic.118 This modulation allows 
me to make my own modulation, as I bring Weber and Bebbington together to show the 
move from assurance to providence.  
 
3.3.2 Modernity, The Market, and Human Identity 
Sedgwick explains that, in an ever more secure and stable global marketplace, there is an 
increasingly complex “search for identity.”119 Given current economic instabilities at the 
time of my research, we may question whether this has indeed held true since his work, 
and if, rather, economic instability goes hand in hand with identity creation.120 Sedgwick 
articulates human agency as a process where self is formed by the ascetics and aesthetics 
of the market. I will later show that it is a dialectic of these social relationships with the 
market that is key to understanding the shortcomings of Weber’s thesis. It is also key to 
a diagnosis of the entrenchment of Evangelicalism within late capitalism, and, I believe, 
to an understanding of the instability of our current economic climate. 
Sedgwick describes Habermas’s response to Weber as one in which Habermas is 
able to affirm the rationalisation of society described by Weber, whilst at the same time 
aiming to reconceptualise it.121 The ascetic of religion was able to link the rationalism of 
the market with that of working life and, simultaneously, with the rationalisation of 
cultural processes and the technological revolution. Weber highlights the relationship of 
religion to this rationalisation, whereas Habermas is concerned with the change in the 
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rational and cognitive structures of religious world views.122 The secularisation of 
Thomist thought sees the move from a consciousness located in a world of the mythical 
where the universe is comprehended through anger, blessing, sickness, and prosperity to 
a Newtonian and post-Kantian secular world in which “the centre has disappeared.”123 In 
this de-centred world of modernity, differentiations of the spheres of public, private, and 
social society emerge with competing claims for validity.124  
Thus, whilst modernity presents “an enormous unfolding of possibilities for human 
flourishing,” the rationality of these competing spheres, and the mode of claiming 
validity, result in a dissolving of such hopes for human flourishing. Weber diagnoses 
social rationalisation as caused by, and necessary to, the Protestant ethic. Habermas 
perceives a combination of this process with the “differentiation of spheres” of modernity, 
as better explaining the nature of the relationship between capitalism and all identity.125 It 
is in this combination that Habermas observes that the values and beliefs of social groups 
“are no longer shaped to a decisive extent by the institutions which individuals may 
belong to.”126 Habermas’s response to Weber is with a materialist account, using the work 
of Karl Marx, whilst attending to shortcomings in Marx’s account. Habermas describes 
the relationship between capitalism and society as the emergence of a complex separation 
of public and private that is more than “class conflict”.127 In short, he places Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic within a wider materialist context. Sedgwick concludes his work on 
Habermas by highlighting how Habermas has failed to provide a crucial theological 
diagnosis of consumerism and its relationship to Weber’s Protestant Ethic. It is a 
theological reappraisal of Weber’s ethic that Sedgwick turns to next, and that we now 
examine. 
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3.3.3 Doctrinal and Ascetic Modulation: Providence and Arminian pietism 
Sedgwick, with reference to McKendrick and J. H. Plumb, outlines consumerism as a 
feature of the late eighteenth century, and describes how present consumerism has arisen 
in such a short period of time.128 Sedgwick suggests that “consumerism is a product of the 
romantic ethic” and describes how, through the work of Colin Campbell, we can trace 
this emergence of consumerism from a reaction to the sixteenth-century Calvinism of 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic.129  
Whilst Weber’s Protestant Ethic can account for the disciplined life of industrial 
production, it cannot account for the development of consumption that Puritanism 
condemned.130 Sedgwick discerns a parallel development of an alternative Protestant 
ethic, beginning with Arminianism, that then combines with Cambridge Platonism for 
approval of the emotional behaviour necessary to the development of consumerism.131 In 
effect, an ethic of feeling and sentimentalism replaced Calvinist Protestantism. We can 
sketch this shift as follows. Calvinism with its monastic aesthetic led to feelings of pity 
and benevolence gaining value. A way was opened for beliefs to connect to other feelings, 
as developed within Arminianism and Cambridge Platonism.132 Sedgwick does not 
delineate his understanding of Arminianism, simply declaring it “the Arminian reaction 
to Calvinism.”133 The Arminian nature of Methodism is important to understanding how 
Methodists consumed the products of their industrial Calvinist predecessors, as I will 
show later. Sedgwick does, however, explain three emphases of Cambridge Platonism. 
First, that the image of God in humanity is the goodness and love of God for humanity. 
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Second, this goodness sprang from feelings, and these feelings were divine in quality. 
Third, and most importantly, there was inherent pleasure in taking action around those 
emotions.134 This is the ground in which an alternative Protestant ethic grew, and which 
justified consumerism.135 Sedgwick determines that Weber’s Protestant ethic does not 
account for the full extent of industrialisation in England and that there is more than one 
ethic at work. Instead, there are two Protestant ethics that work together, against each 
other, with this Arminian version eventually eclipsing Weber’s ethic.  
In this alternative Protestant ethic, ethics and aesthetics become “almost 
interchangeable,” with virtuous behaviour becoming a matter of “taste.”136 A reliance on 
the inner self emerges, one with a responsive emotional life, where the imagination 
“becomes paramount” to that inner self, and the fusing of aesthetic and ethic is seen as 
indispensable to consumer behaviour.137 Sentimentalism then transforms into 
Romanticism.138 Campbell explains how the middle classes, in reading texts and novels, 
indulge the romantic self and develop “modern autonomous imaginative hedonism.”139 
Using the work of Thorstein Veblen, Sedgwick then demonstrates how consumerism is 
coherent with this claim. 140 The centres of the imagination for construction of the self-
move from the sources of religion to the consumption of the artefacts of capitalism.141 
Sedgwick cautions us that, before we condemn this as a “degenerate” search for the self, 
we must understand the need of people to find identity in the complex problems of 
modern capitalism, and we must suggest an alternative Christian anthropology that does 
not condemn this “search for identity out of hand.”142 I have similarly suggested that, in 
order to understand Evangelicalism within late capitalism, we must read it as a move to 
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help people find identity in hostile economic locations and provide ‘islands of social 
care’.  
For Veblen, consumerism assumes a neo-Darwinian materialist description of 
natural selection as the basis for how humans consume resources within an imagined life 
of competition.143 Campbell provides an extensive rebuttal to Veblen, showing how 
consumption is “modern autonomous imaginative hedonism”, and that emotions are the 
basis for Romanticism and this new self.144 But what if something else is taking place, 
where these accounts of Veblen and Campbell function together, in the mode of the 
double movement I have suggested? In this mode, Evangelicalism is the product of 
material forces and, at the same time, the result of agents acting around beliefs in response 
to a rapidly changing economic world. 
If we accept Sedgwick’s description of consumerism, we must view it as a cultural 
product made from the fusion of feelings and aesthetics within the creativity of individual 
imaginations. Sentimentalism and Romanticism are therefore the failure of individuals to 
take action, with a “lack of imagination” that resulted in that inaction.145 Today we see 
that “there is within consumerism a failure all too often to engage with political and social 
change, as well as a pervasive individualism and concern with recreation.”146 The ascetic 
and aesthetic of consumption, caught up within the imaginations of things other than the 
content of religion, is unable to do anything other than consume. This is a moment of 
intensity, resonance, and loss of resistance that I have been looking for. A theological 
analysis of this intersection between belief and practice, of religious actors and 
consumption, needs to be made. Sedgwick lays the foundations and outlines for one 
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whereby; 1) the economy is seen as immutable, with any conceptions of God collapsed 
into it; 2) the domination of capital in that economy takes place alongside deformed 
notions of God; 3) the pervasive individualism of economic life becomes grounded in a 
subjective view of God; and 4) scarcity becomes fundamental to the economy. The market 
takes on the coercive divine attributes once given to God; where once there was unlimited 
political power but restricted economic power, this dynamic has now been reversed.147 
Sedgwick then explores the implications of this for the Protestant ethic.148 A 
Protestant ethic once disciplined its workers and led to the production of capitalism, 
before “spheres of life” then opened up. These “spheres of life” offered new potential for 
human flourishing, leading to a change in an understanding of environments for work. 
Work ultimately becomes alienating and isolating with new global pressures on social 
relationships, and the Protestant ethic changes according to an understanding of vocation 
in order to help people form identity in the new locations of late capitalism. The 
imaginations for identity in this move centre less on the resources of faith and more 
around the consumption in capitalist markets.149 Here, Sedgwick echoes and supports the 
findings of my work so far, of how Christianity seeks to aid identity and social 
relationships in the context of the challenges of a new world order, but at the same time, 
becomes captive to the socio-logic of the processes of capitalism.  
Campbell suggests that the modern world can be viewed as a tension between 
Puritan and Romantic ethics.150 Campbell further suggests that there are two ‘beings’ 
inside the middle-class individual: a “purito-romantic” bohemian youth, which is then 
followed by bourgeois middle age.151 This arises because parents raise their children as 
Puritans, teaching them delayed gratification, with the result that the children internalise 
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and dream about repressed passions and develop a romantic personality.152 Puritanism and 
Romanticism have psychological links that reflect historical ones, and our current 
situation reveals the interplay between Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Sedgwick’s post-
Protestant Romantic ethic. How ascetics are ordered around desire and the material is the 
question to which Sedgwick and Weber lead us, but do not answer. This is where we see 
the overlay of my map-making reveal the potential theological contours for further 
examination in my later chapters. 
 
3.3.4 The Post-Protestant Work Ethic and the Doctrine of Assurance 
The analysis in this chapter has enabled me to demonstrate a few key findings. The 
Protestant Ethic explains the influence that Protestants had in the development of 
capitalist production. Weber’s Ethic however, as I have established, would possibly be 
better centred on the migration of assurance into the doctrine of providence. It is possible 
to combine this with my previous chapter’s analysis of Bebbington, to show how 
assurance migrates to providence, as follows. 
Separate from Catholics, Puritan Protestants may have been concerned with an 
ascetic of production for assurance. But later, when the resultant capitalism from that 
Protestant Work Ethic became extant, i.e., everyone became functionally a capitalist, 
there was an internal turn by Evangelical Christians, that was part of the genesis of 
Evangelicalism. For we saw with Sedgwick and Campbell how individuals were isolated 
within the new capitalist world, not just physically, but in the new spheres of public, 
private, and civic life. At the same time, we know from Bebbington there was great 
anxiety about assurance by Protestants to increasing prosperity in industrial England.153 
There was a move by Evangelicals to provide identity and ‘islands of social care’ within 
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a fast-developing capitalist world, with pressures of social mobility, long life, and the 
problem of the accumulation of wealth. As a result, the Protestant ethic bifurcates and 
makes an internal turn into a Romantic ethic. It is at this point that we can trace the 
explosion and activism of Evangelicalism, in particular Methodism. Whilst there was a 
functional environment in which everyone had become a Protestant within the capitalist 
matrix, there was a rising concomitant tide of Arminian pietistic Methodists who moved 
the location of assurance from the external to the internal for the initiation into authentic 
Christian life. In other words, if everyone now lived like a capitalist, how did one know 
one was saved? Assurance now had an inner pathway around feelings and consumption 
that it eagerly pursued. 
The ongoing measure of whether this inner assurance was valid was now located 
and anchored in the doctrine of providence. The confirmation of inner feelings about 
assurance were to be seen in providence operating in the daily life of individuals. The 
provision of the material world became the domain of the social imaginations of 
individuals, and manifestation of their inner feelings. Whilst Evangelicalism had sought 
to respond to the challenges of a new world order, and did so through an emerging 
Romantic ethic, it became captive to the socio-logic of consumption. Pleasure and 
happiness became the ethical domains of the Christian life as a response to the ravages of 
late capitalism. We now run my findings and proposals here against a case study from 
Evangelical history.  
 
3.4 Joseph Ryder: A case study of anxiety, assurance and Providence 
Weber is much criticised for offering Benjamin Franklin as an embodiment of the 
Protestant ethic. In response to this, diaries have been uncovered by Margaret C. Jacob 
and Matthew Kadane of Joseph Ryder, a man liminal to the pre-industrial and industrial 
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worlds.154  I suggest the journals of Ryder also give credence to Campbell’s claims of the 
tension between Puritan and Romantic ethics. Ryder’s journals, as we will see, also 
support my own claims about the nature of assurance and providence within these two 
ethics. These journals ensure my findings continue to be tested against concrete realities 
of lived experience. 
Kadane and Jacob, whilst suggesting that Ryder’s diaries are more suitable as an 
example of Weber’s Protestant Ethic, also point out that his diaries call Weber to account 
on two grounds.155 The first is doctrinal and suggests that it is the doctrine of providence 
and not predestination that was more of concern to Ryder. Indeed, Ryder exhibits the 
tendencies of anxiety about assurance and concerns with providence that Bebbington and 
Weber claim. Ryder’s anxieties develop and change, from assurance to providence, 
evidence for my modulations of Weber and Bebbington. We can unpack this from Ryder 
in several steps. 
First, Weber missed the context of radical dissenting from which people such as 
Ryder had emerged.156 This was “kinder and gentler, where assurance was more available 
to believers”.157 Second, Kadane and Jacob set out how Weber’s thesis misses the agony 
that prosperity brings to individuals within capitalism: “The dark side of capitalism lay 
not in its inequities. They could be explained by reference to the “inequality” of 
providence.”158 Ryder seldom queries the poverty he saw: 
 
Rather than simple destitution, the life of the market had the potential to ensure eternal 
damnation. Questing for riches, prosperity, even comfort for the things of this world 
required a certain kind of courage as well as the ability to beg and humble oneself in the 
quest for grace. Ryder sought to be prosperous in this world, but simultaneously he could 
never be sure of his godliness.159 
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As I have suggested, the anxiety of more people living longer led to the need for a new 
ascetic and aesthetic to help people make sense of this emerging new economic world. 
One way that anxiety over providence is resolved is in the collapse of aseity from God 
into the market itself.160 Jacob and Kadane state that we have naturalised capitalism so 
much that we have become blind to the anxieties that emerging capitalism evoked in those 
within its environs.161 Moreover, it was Weber who saw clearly this anxiety as he sought 
to explain the religious dimension of its relationship to capitalism. However, as 
demonstrated, his theological diagnosis of that relationship may be wrong. Evangelicals 
moved to respond to the anxieties of people like Ryder with their flexible ecclesiologies, 
by preaching assurance through the media of new capitalist economies. 
An ascetic able to respond to the new material wealth was required and evidenced 
in the life of Ryder, and in Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic. The self-examination required 
within this Protestant Ethic is evidenced in the extensive journals kept by Ryder. Indeed, 
this mode of extensive journaling is the review of assurance that began with Puritan 
anxieties about assurance and continued into Calvinist Protestantism.162 No wonder, then, 
that the act of journaling could be redirected within the media of capitalist markets to 
provide examples of successful identity construction that dealt with these anxieties, as we 
see with Jonathan Edwards’s “faithful narrative”. Edwards had previously written a 
bestselling biography from the journals of a young missionary David Brainerd (Brainerd 
died aged twenty-nine of tuberculosis), who was seen as a martyr, and inspired many into 
mission. This publication provided an “intimate spiritual diary,” with insight into the 
experience of personal faith for Evangelicals.163  
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Edwards undertook to prepare a longer account, published in 1737 and entitled A 
Faithful Narrative, which became an instant bestseller.164 Edwards’s narrative of revival, 
made possible by the market in printing and the international distribution of books, “fired” 
up Evangelical imaginations.165 We see here the beginnings of the social imaginations 
that the market was able to transmit within Evangelicalism. Imagination for construction 
of the self moves from the sources of religion to the consumption of the artefacts of 
capitalism. Market and media led to the recapitulation of these Evangelical stories, with 
new experiences re-enacted in other market locations and the production of more stories 
that were then re-transmitted. But this begs a theological question: how did desire and 
market imaginations take over Evangelicals’ imaginations for Christian living? In order 
to answer that question, and to establish the work of my next chapters, I finish this chapter 
with a proposal for how we might understand social imaginations, and the nature of 
market practices around those. This also extends my proposal in this chapter back into 
direct contact with more explicit considerations of the nature of capitalism. 
 
3.5 Imagined Communities 
Ryder’s journals provide insight into how the religious resources of Protestant and 
Evangelical life were used to construct identity. This prompts us to pause to consider 
further how beliefs and practices combine for identity-making. At some point, we want 
to move from the descriptive to the diagnostic. We can see the where and the how a little 
better, the pathways of anxiety, assurance, and providence. But why? What takes place 
in the nature of human beings such that they follow these pathways? This is the mode of 
the explicit, to which we now turn. 
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One key conceptual framework for better understanding the use of religious 
resources for identity construction like Ryder, is to be found in Benedict Anderson’s 
‘Imagined Community’ thesis.166 Whilst Anderson’s thesis centres on the nature of 
English national identity formation, he does evince how this identity is established as a 
cultural project, with an affinity to religion.167 Anderson’s concern is for how “imagined” 
political communities are culturally constructed, rather than about the validity of any such 
emerging identities. He suggests that people are able to see themselves as part of a shared 
community, imagined through the advent of print media, within an “imagined 
community”.168 It is “print-capitalism” where the standardisation of language, time zones, 
calendars - even the reading of daily newspapers - gave people the ability to imagine 
themselves, outside of an immediate location, belonging with people they have never 
met.169 “Print-capitalism” allows for the transplanting of experiences across nations, for 
identity.170 McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb coin the phrase “intellectual technology” to 
describe how, with printings and the alphabet, a process of self-education and self-
construction of identity began that had been previously impossible without those 
technologies.171 Tom Beaudoin describes the process of young people’s identity 
construction in late capitalism through the consumption of media as “consumer media 
capitalism”.172 Indeed Beaudoin further suggests that we can talk about the fusion of 
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identity construction through the ascetics and practices of the market as being one where 
we are to consider late capitalism as “theocapitalism”.173  
Anderson’s thesis is contiguous to my observations from Martin of how Christians 
in migration seek to provide islands of social care. The use of mass media and mass 
migration for social care within these new locations and market possibilities is cause for 
new “imagined communities”.174 Identities were and are “built out of the raw materials 
provided by pre-existing religious communities.”175 Religion gives people something to 
take hold of, to fund and resource their identities in the face of huge economic and social 
change. Hall and Davidoff note this process as one which “offered individuals an identity 
and community to which they could attach themselves in a society which was changing 
rapidly.”176 
Despite establishing the connection between cultural identity construction and the 
nature of religious identity, Anderson leaves religion behind in the eighteenth century and 
sees the forces of secularism behind “imagined communities”.177 It seems an inability to 
see the dimension of religious actors in history is common to many. For Anderson, it is 
the decline of religion that leads to the imagining of new identities, whereas my account 
suggests it is the obverse.178 For Anderson, it was the loss of beliefs, of life around 
monarchs, creation myths, and religious script languages that allowed for the creation of 
“imagined communities through the narratives of ‘print-capitalism’.”179 I contend instead, 
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that it was the use of religious resources “and vast outpouring of evangelical 
publications,” that allowed an unprecedented explosion of new imagined communities.180 
Anderson misses that religion was most vital in identity construction at this time. Where 
Anderson is ‘blind’ to religion, seeing a “divergence of nation and religion,” my account 
has shown that there is an “ongoing and inextricable” connection between them.181 
Anderson is able to see how Martin Luther might be able to become a “best-selling 
author” making use of the new vernacular print market, enabling the propagation of a 
Protestant identity beyond his own location.182 Yet, he is unable to see how Evangelical 
Christians continue in this process. Also, his thesis of the nature of national identities is 
contested, and more recently, national identity has been seen as less important and far 
from normative for people today.183 But his thesis does help us understand how 
Evangelicals formed communities and identities within the emerging capitalist market. 
National and religious identities were established within each other’s terms, removing 
“the wedge between cosmology and history” that Anderson thought was in place.184 
Anderson’s thesis does situate my account of the use of the resources of religion for 
identity formation within the emergence of new capitalist markets.185 Indeed, we can see 
how “Protestantism acted as a stimulus to national consciousness only to the extent that 
the development of capitalism had provided it with the framework to do so.”186 Then, 
there is Neil Davidson, who is concerned that Anderson is not materialist enough and 
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fails to explore “print-capitalism” as intrinsic to capitalism.187 Where Anderson sees 
capitalist markets as merely fortuitous for technology and communications to manifest in 
“imagined communities”, Davidson sees capitalism as inherently necessary to “print-
capitalism”.188 Davidson draws attention to how capitalism gives rise to new structures 
of urban life, and psychological needs, that people collectively sought to respond to. This 
further supports my suggestion of how Evangelicals on the one hand sought to use the 
resources of capitalist markets to respond to the ravages of capitalism, whilst becoming 
captive to the nature of the use of those resources. 
Giorgio Shani draws on Anderson’s work to give an account of the nature of 
globalisation and capitalist markets.189 Religions have made use of opportunities within 
the context of globalisation to articulate transglobal identity. Globalisation has allowed 
people to renew, even if just culturally, Christian identity, with faith being more 
significant, not less.190 For Shani, religion can be universal in a fragmented world and 
practiced anywhere.191 With Anderson’s “print-capitalism”, current technology gives rise 
to the formation of “transnational religious communities”, where transnational religious 
identities are shaped by ongoing developments of “print language”.192 Frank Lambert 
theorises that the Great Awakening was an “invention”, the stringing together of isolated 
revivals into a colonial (prior to US national identity) and transatlantic renaissance.193 
Within this, we might therefore return to, and better understand, Jonathan Edwards’s 
Faithful Narrative as a “revivalist script”, allowing the reconstruction of revivals in other 
locations to one that generated the original script. For Lambert these ‘scripts’ and 
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reconstructions worked within Anderson’s “imagined community” thesis.194 It was 
“through published work, such as newspaper reports, revival narratives, a revival 
magazine, revival sermons, revivalists’ diaries and journals, [that] persons separated by 
great distances were drawn together into a revivalist ‘imagined community’ by reading 
about events in remote places that sounded very similar to ones at home.”195 A further 
concrete example of “print-capitalism”, and the process of “revivalist scripts” can be 
found in the Tractarian movement. Frank Turner has provided an account of how the 
Tractarian movement sought to establish a restructuring of the identity of the Church of 
England, from within Protestantism, and in reaction to dissenting Evangelicals.196 
Within all this, we see how Evangelicalism was able to transmit itself through the 
media of new markets and re-narrate its stories and experiences. Others, in similar market 
locations, were able to reconstruct and inhabit those stories in their own new locations. 
From this, I posit that people in ongoing economic diasporas, looking for a Christian 
“social imaginary”, found one in these scripts and stories.197 These narratives then became 
commodities and resources to be traded by the new middle classes, who were able to read, 
and had the income to purchase these accounts.198 A most specific example that 
demonstrates Anderson’s thesis with regard to Evangelicals and the market is found in 
fashion. As I have already noted, McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb assert that it was print 
media that enabled people to view what was in fashion and to imagine themselves wearing 
these clothes.199 In shopping, women found a new embodied life that greatly altered the 
make-up of their identity formation, and relationship to social space.200 My suggestion 
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finds support in the work of Weber, who claimed that the Puritan standardisation of 
clothing led to a ‘spirituality’ and categorisation of the person by clothing, or aesthetic.201 
The arrival of print media extended the logic of an aesthetic with unforeseen 
consequences. 
The annual budgets of agencies such as the American Bible Society equalled the 
yearly turnover of large business firms.202 Yet Evangelicals “imagined their work to be 
in the market but not of it, for they believed that ultimately their business was not books 
at all” and that they were eagerly embracing capitalism whilst resisting the rise of 
commercial society.203 For Evangelicals, modern business methods and technologies 
became allies of publishers, but “commercial culture was the enemy”.204 Evangelicals 
were at home in using mediated forms to express and transmit theological convictions, 
but often were unaware of how the media they chose shaped and mutated those 
expressions. Pete Ward suggests the Reformation, and its use of newly invented printing 
techniques, enabled the transmission of so much of the content of the Reformation, but 
in that process, favoured printed work above other communication media.205 Ward has 
made an extended account of this issue, of how the use of media changes the nature and 
content of what is being communicated206. Warner provides extensive contemporary 
examples of the continuation of this process, of the use of media within market locations, 
for the transmission of developing Evangelical faith. For example, the use of Alpha 
courses combines with entrepreneurial forces and capitalist market possibilities, and 
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Warner argues that “Alpha can therefore be summed up as a Bash camp rationalistic 
conservatism combined with a Wimberist charismatic expressivism operating within the 
milieu of late twentieth century marketing.”207 Having identified the media and narrative 
intersection for the transmission of faith in capitalist markets, we can now understand 
how Evangelicals sought to inhabit an imagination true to their Evangelical identity, but 
also how that became captive to other socio-logics within capitalism. A spiritual 
discipline of journaling combines with the possibilities of mass marketing and 
distribution as a response to the anxieties of those very market possibilities. In this also, 
we can perhaps see how Calvinist industrialists sold goods to Arminian pietists, who were 
desperately trying to form identities in the same situations in which they saw their 
industrialist betters making identities for themselves. 
Thus, in the life of Joseph Ryder, we see a move from the experience of short lives 
and concern with predestination to longer lives, wealth, and the relocation of concerns to 
providence and assurance. However, where Ryder keeps his Christian identity, Benjamin 
Franklin becomes a Deist.208 Franklin’s move can be seen as the secular move of capitalist 
identity formation, alongside the Evangelical Protestant move that maintains Christian 
identity in late capitalism. Both are responses to the challenges that Ryder faced. 
Moreover, for Ryder, material success might be a sign of election, but too much material 
wealth was the path to destruction. Knowing how to navigate that line was the source of 
Ryder’s ongoing anxiety.209 One way to resolve that tension is to remove it and to see the 
providence of God as no longer an issue for anxiety, such that the more materially 
successful we are, the more we can see how God has provided.210 
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Ryder wanted to balance the spiritual world and the new moneymaking world, with 
time management as one way of attempting that project. For Ryder’s journals describe a 
life that was measured by the calendar of religious life, and the tensions of the business 
calendar.211 Ryder was a self-made man who never sold his own labour and who used 
discipline to cope with his dilemmas: “[He] exhibited many of the characteristics of a late 
eighteenth-century capitalist and suffered the despair endured by the rigid predestinarians 
who lived in the century and a half before his birth. Yet he was never fully possessed by 
the spirit of capitalism nor did he completely tailor his theology to his economic needs.”212 
Contemporary Methodists “evinced none of the agony” seen in the life of Ryder.213 We 
do not know how many other Joseph Ryders there were, having little surviving evidence 
from the personal writing of his contemporaries.214 Ryder’s journals also detail the impact 
and the variety of sermons he heard each week, and how they were directed at the very 
issues of worldly success, to which he found himself relating.215 Here we see a further 
link to my findings in Chapter Two on how imagined communities are formed with the 
resources of the Christian tradition through sermons, and their transmission through print 
media. In Ryder’s account, we see both Tawney’s view that it was capitalism which 
produced Protestantism and also that Protestantism shaped capitalism à la Weber.216 
Whilst Ryder’s journal provides evidence of a Weberian ascetic and self-control, 
it also demonstrates my modification of Weber, to explain how the Godly who made 
money suffered in their prosperity: 
                                                 
211 Ibid., 42. 
212 Ibid., 43. 
213 For example, David Whitehead, a Methodist Minister, as revealed in his journals: David 
Whitehead, The Autobiography of David Whitehead of Rawtenstall (1790–1865): Cotton Spinner and 
Merchant, edited by Stanley D. Chapman (Helmshore: Helmshore Local History Society, 2001). 
Moreover, we may see in that historical account that Methodism is in many ways the response to the 
anxieties of a population full of Joseph Ryders. That is a supposition requiring further justification, and 
thus, points towards an interesting avenue for additional research. 
214 Jacob and Kadane, “Weber’s Protestant Capitalist,” 45. 
215 Ibid., 46. 
216 R. H. Tawney, Rise of Capitalism. 
120 
 
The secularism of the Enlightenment may have been the coward’s way out of the 
conundrum that governed the lives of the multitude of Joseph Ryders. They populated the 
burgeoning cities of England and America, traded and watched the market and the weather 
for signs of instability, for the awesome pleasure or censure of the deity. But for those 
reluctant capitalists who did not take Franklin’s way out, for those who fretted over their 
spiritual progress or lack thereof and prayed in the darkness that damnation—the fate of the 
greedy and the sinful—might not overtake them, the tensions between this and the other 
world gave rise to a lifetime of struggle. Nowhere have we seen that struggle more 
painfully expressed than in Ryder's diary. If Ryder’s agonized ambivalence was less unique 
than the historical artefact he unwittingly produced, then the story of how the capitalist 
spirit settled into the lives of those driving economic change on the eve of Britain’s 
industrialization needs to be retold.217 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
…rapid transformation destroys old coping mechanisms, old safety nets, while it creates 
new sets of demands, before new coping mechanisms are developed. 
 
— Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Foreword” to Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation 
In this chapter, we have determined that Protestant, and then later Evangelical Christians, 
sought to resist these deforming forces of capitalism, creating new modes of coping with 
‘islands of social care’. Evangelicalism was both a creature of, and generator to, aspects 
of capitalism. Within this capitalism was on the one hand a product of Protestant work 
ethics, whilst on the other, the forces of capitalism simultaneously produced and 
modulated Protestantism into forms of Evangelicalism. Evangelicalism emerges via a 
rational Protestant Work Ethic, in which the ascetics of that ethic increasingly resonate 
and intertwine with a Romantic ethic around the ethos and practices of capitalism. If 
Evangelicals sought to resist the deforming forces of capitalism, those forces were not 
just of the material, but also the psychological and internal. Evangelicalism can therefore 
be seen as an ecclesial countermovement to rapidly changing market conditions, a 
countermovement that becomes simultaneously captive to the socio-logic of those 
conditions.  
Life in the new Protestant world generated anxiety about assurance of faith. That 
anxiety was attended to with a relocation of assurance into providence. But the terms and 
                                                 
217 Jacob and Kadane, “Weber’s Protestant Capitalist”, 49. 
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limits of providence became increasingly set by market imaginations, rather than the 
original Evangelical horizons of faithful Christian living in the material world. What was 
initially resistance collapses into collusion and intensification. The resistance evinced in 
the Protestant Work Ethic resisted the deforming forces of capitalism, and quickly gave 
way to new and emerging work ethics that were intertwined with non-religious 
imaginations for life. The rational beliefs of the Evangelical life collapse into, and become 
a rationale for, market imaginations. It is to an examination of the nature of those market 
imaginations, through the kind of materialist accounts this chapter has signposted, that 
we now turn. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Great Disembedding: The Search for Identity Within the Market 
The focus of my mappings so far has placed Evangelicalism in the foreground, whilst 
noting background interactions with capitalism. For the map and overlay of this chapter, 
I shift the balance to prioritise an account of the development of capitalism that traces 
moments of religious actors within it, such as Evangelicalism. I make two particular 
moves in this chapter for my mapping. The first is the production of a historical materialist 
account via the work of Karl Polanyi. This considers the forces at work in economic 
history, and the actions of human beings as actors in response to those forces. Ultimately, 
this allows me to explore how Evangelicals have acted in response to the forces at work 
within the development of Capitalism in terms of co-creation, co-option, and resistance. 
Second, I then show how the Weberian religious agency from my previous chapter and 
such a materialist account may work together as “imagined communities”, within which 
Evangelicalism found itself. Within this, I show how the providence of God becomes 
located in market imaginations, and how those imaginations are instantiated through the 
practices of the market. Finally, I show how Evangelicalism as an “imagined community” 
can be further located within Charles Taylor’s method of the “social imaginary”. This 
then allows me to gather up all my mapping together in one overlay for theological 
explication and diagnosis in part II of my thesis. 
 
4.1 Karl Polanyi: The subordination of social life to the market 
 
To comprehend the sudden changeover to an utterly new type of economy in the nineteenth 
century, we must now turn to the history of the market, an institution we were able 
practically to neglect in our review of the economic systems of the past.  
 
— Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
Polanyi and Weber were acutely aware of the need for accounts of the history of things 
in order to understand concrete realities. They believed such accounts, if made, could help 
explain their own contexts, and serve as predictors of future situations. For many have 
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ignored religious actors in making historical accounts, as we have seen.1 Even more 
startling than that paucity of historical method, is the failure to consider use of any 
historical accounts for understanding current situations. Economists are particularly 
prone to this failure.2 For many economists, the mechanisms of economics are ontological 
realities that come from nowhere, and are underwritten by no-one but themselves. 
Furthermore, economists have failed to consider how their rationalised, over-ontologised 
systems encompass human beings, and their nature.3 Yet the recent and ongoing global 
financial crises have given rise to a new impetus to consider the history of our economic 
systems, and, furthermore, how current failures in markets are due to a lack of attention 
to the history of economics.4 Whilst economists are prone to ignore economic history, 
theology and economics are even more likely to ignore and suffer avulsions with each 
other. Other economic histories, such as that by Tomas Sedlacek, have emerged since the 
2007 credit crunch.5 It is beyond my thesis to compare and contrast Polanyi with this and 
other accounts, but others have begun that work.6 Also, a theological review of the 
technical mechanisms of capitalism, as mentioned at the outset of my thesis, are beyond 
                                                 
1 In Chapter Two of this thesis, we saw how Anderson and McKendrick elided religious actors 
out of any consideration in their accounts of society and history. See McKendrick, The Birth of a 
Consumer Society, and Anderson, Imagined Communities.  
2 To understand how the history of economics became optional for economists, and the 
consequent problems for the field, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The 
Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science (Economics as Social Theory) (London: Routledge, 
2001). Also, see Stephen A. Marglin, The Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an Economist Undermines 
Community (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). Indeed, there is a plea to read economic 
realities through historical accounts of economic thought, or face the consequences of not doing so, with 
Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni, Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2007). Bruni and Zamagni draw on 15th and 16th Century civic humanism in contrast to Polanyi’s 
use of Marxist materialism. In any event, their warnings were too late, as the credit crunch unfolded in 
2007. 
3 It seems the recent credit crunch and global crises that ensued have caused leading economists to 
reconsider the nature of human beings within market systems, for example see https://www.theguardian. 
com/commentisfree/2016/feb/05/economics-global-crash-human-behaviour, accessed 12th January 2018. 
4 Kevin O’Rourke, “Why Economics Needs Economic History”, accessed 29th December 2017, 
http://voxeu.org/article/why-economics-needs-economic-history. 
5 Tomas Sedlaceck, Economics of Good and Evil: The Quest for Ecumenic Meaning from 
Gilgamesh to Wall Street (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
6 One such excellent summary and comparison of Polanyi’s economic history with other such 
accounts can be found in Tim Rogan, The Moral Economists: R.H Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, 
and the Critique of Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
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my remit, but again, others have begun to foray into this needed area of examination.7 
The nature of markets, the habits, practices and dispositions of them, and how human 
beings live within, is, however, my focus. 
There is a long history of debate over whether capitalism arose late or earlier in 
human history, and whether it was generated by natural human behaviour. Polanyi 
considered capitalism to be a recent invention in human history where “the self-regulating 
market is a new human invention for which there are no parallels in past human history.”8 
Weber similarly considered capitalism a late arrival in human history, inextricably linked 
to the emergence of the Protestant church.9 Indeed, it was religion which held capitalism 
at bay, being able to ‘discipline’ behaviours away from motives for gain. For Polanyi, the 
defining feature of capitalism is the emergence of the self-regulating market (SRM), 
where, for the first time in history, the market was disembedded from social relationships, 
such as those of religion.10 As Gregory Baum writes: 
 
In the past, Polanyi argues, economic activity was embedded in the social relations that 
made up the community as a whole. What was new and startling with the self-regulating 
market was that it ‘disembedded’ the economy from its social base, created widespread 
cultural alienation among workers and owners, and left society and the natural environment 
without protection. This ‘disembedding’ of economic activity from people’s social relations 
remains a key concept in Polanyi’s analysis.11 
The SRM is so foreign to humans and “so devastating in its consequences” that societal 
countermovements take place.12 These claims are in contrast to those of market liberals 
and Marxists. Where market liberals insist that the market is self-regulating, Polanyi 
declares this view a “utopian myth.”13 For markets require protection and regulation to 
                                                 
7 For a recent attempt to explain this methodological divide and address it, see Kidwell, Theology 
and Economics. 
8 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd 
ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), 5. 
9 See Chapter Two of this thesis, and Weber and Parsons, Spirit of Capitalism, 36. 
10 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 5. 
11 Gregory Baum, Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics (Montreal: McGill-Queen University 
Press, 1996), 4.  
12 Baum, Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics, 6. 
13 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 3. 
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exist, and the societies around markets require protection from the effects of those 
markets. Marxists, and those supporting Marxist material accounts, insist that markets 
should be fully embedded within ‘socialism’, but Polanyi determines that this is an 
impossible subordination.14  
Polanyi’s historical and materialist account contrasts with Weber’s Ideal Type 
account in more than just method, but also in terms of diagnosis. Weber shows how 
religion, in terms of beliefs and practices, formed capitalist markets, whilst Polanyi gives 
an account and explanation of how the markets were restrained by religion initially, but 
ultimately broke with religion and any other social relationships.15 Polanyi views the 
formation of capitalist markets as a process in which Christian understandings of human 
relationships and responsibilities towards each other are replaced with the “secular 
religion” of the market.16 This location of engagement by religion, then subsequent 
evacuation of the religious, is the pathogenesis I am looking for, where forces once 
resisted by Evangelical Christians with intense engagement are eventually co-opted and 
redeployed for the further development of capitalism.  
There are many important assumptions to Polanyi’s work that are vital to make 
explicit before any interface with Evangelicalism can be made. His work relies on a 
dialectical understanding of history from Hegel and Marx. Functionalist and dialectical 
theories like this presuppose that history moves according to certain laws, and that 
humans are governed by “necessity”. Yet history must remain “open” to the Christian 
and, for my project, avoid any ontologising of history.17 I therefore approach Polanyi’s 
                                                 
14 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Foreword” to The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, 2nd Beacon Paperback ed., by Karl Polanyi (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), 
xxix. 
15 In particular, see Chapter Five, “Evolution of the Market Pattern,” of Polanyi, Great 
Transformation, 59–70. 
16 Ibid., 106–107. 
17 See Baum, Ethics and Economics, 6, for further discussion of this priority for Christian 
readings of Polanyi. I am aware that theological understandings of the nature of history vary greatly, for 
example, in MacIntyre’s genealogical accounts of the Christian Narrative; see Alasdair MacIntyre, Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame: 1990). In support of Baum’s claim, and how, for Evangelicals’ salvation, history is the arena 
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account as an economic history that reveals developments and trends, and not ontological 
“laws”.18 However, like Polanyi, and this is where my project began, I am examining how, 
for Christians, social life should not be subordinate to the market. As Joseph Stiglitz 
writes, “For Polanyi the deepest flaw in market liberalism is that it subordinates human 
purposes to the logic of an impersonal market mechanism.”19 Having established my 
reasons that relate Polanyi to my thesis questions, I now explore Polanyi’s thesis in detail, 
to test its validity, and determine its further serviceability for my project. 
 
4.2 The Social Limits of Markets: Karl Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ thesis 
Polanyi began The Great Transformation whilst exiled in England in the late 1930s, after 
being an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. He completed 
The Great Transformation during the Second World War, whilst in the USA. Having 
experienced revolution and dictatorships first hand, he sought to explain the political 
upheaval of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through an exploration of the 
economic history of the origins of those times.20 Polanyi saw four institutions as the 
foundation to the political unrest that had taken place: a political balance of power system, 
the international gold standard, the liberal state, and the SRM.21 The Gold Standard, a 
system in which the value of currency is based on gold, was extant amongst all major 
nations through the 1920s. The UK withdrew from the standard in 1931, due to market 
forces upon its currency. The collapse of the gold standard was “proximate” in cause to 
                                                 
in which God reveals himself, see Edward W. Klink III, and Darian R. Lockett, “Type 2: Biblical 
Theology as History of Redemption” in Understanding Biblical Theology: A Comparison of Theory and 
Practice (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012), 59–92. 
18 The captivity of Evangelicalism to the forces and social logics of capitalism cannot be 
explained for the Christian as being ‘determined’ by economic laws within Evangelical understandings of 
salvation history. See again Klink and Lockett, “Type 2: Biblical Theology as History of Redemption.” 
19 Stiglitz, “Foreword,” xxxviii and xxxv. Further, I will show that the sociality of Christianity, 
the natural habitat for Christians of the ‘ecclesia’, should determine the dialectic of the relationship 
between Christians and the market. 
20 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 3. 
21 Ibid. 
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the “superstructure erected upon the gold standard” by the liberal state with its “creation 
of the self-regulating market.”22 Moreover, “the subordination of human society to the 
logic of the market in a way to undermine political will is the central problem with which 
Polanyi deals by putting the nineteenth-century market economy in a comparative 
historical perspective with the aid of the findings of anthropological research on primitive 
and ancient economies.”23 It is this focus on the emergence of the SRM that differentiates 
Polanyi from many other economic historians, in that he sees the SRM as a modern and 
new phenomenon, one that emerges from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, distinct from other forms of market society.24 More important, and central to 
his thesis, is the claim of the nature of the SRM as being something outside of social 
relationships. For the SRM could not exist without interventions and creation by society, 
where, “inevitably society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took 
impaired the self-regulation of the market.”25 Central to Polanyi’s thesis is the assertion 
that society and social relationships are vital to humans, and that the SRM is problematic 
to that, owing to how the SRM is disembedded from social constraints. Where previous 
methods of market exchange existed, they did so with reciprocity. The SRM marks the 
first time that the market became an institution itself, based around the fictions that lacked 
relational reciprocity, specifically labour, land, and money.26 The work of George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson supports the idea of labour as a metaphor, showing how this metaphor 
functions as a myth to understand the external world.27 For my purposes, I assume 
Polanyi’s claims of the nature of these fictions.28 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ayse Bugra and Kaan Agartan, Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twenty-First Century: Market 
Economy as Political Project (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1. 
24 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 87. 
25 Ibid., 3–4. 
26 Bugra and Agartan, Market Economy, 2. 
27 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980). 
28 The work of John Searle would be a starting place to confirm the nature of these fictions. Searle 
considers money, marriage, property and government to be fictions that exist only because we believe 
they do; see John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1995); John 
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Markets had previously existed, but they had been controlled and regulated by the 
social relationships of societies. The SRM was an invention of the late nineteenth century, 
despite the claims by others in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the SRM 
was “natural”.29 Polanyi traces, using Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, the beginnings of 
the idea of a market as a function of the natural life of nations. This idea then combined 
with a move towards understanding markets scientifically and, in particular, the new 
Darwinian understandings of human nature as competitive, until laws governing 
economics were placed under “Nature herself.”30 The SRM is not natural, and is founded 
on fictions, namely the new “commodities” of land, labour, and capital.31 Previously, land, 
labour, and money were not produced and then traded in markets as commodities: 
 
Labour is simply the activity of human beings, land is subdivided nature, and the supply of 
money and credit in modern societies is necessarily shaped by governmental policies. 
Modern economics starts by pretending that these fictitious commodities will behave in the 
same way as real commodities, but Polanyi insists that this sleight of hand has fatal 
consequences. It means that economic theorizing is based on a lie, and this lie placed 
human beings at risk.32  
Polanyi evidences his thesis with an example of how governments constantly have to 
intervene to protect society from the effects of the market and to protect the SRM itself. 
Polanyi describes the social history of the nineteenth century as a result of a ‘double 
movement’ process: 
 
On the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe and the amount of goods 
involved grew to unbelievable dimensions, on the other hand a network of measures and 
policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market 
relative to labor, land, and money. While the organization of world commodity markets, 
world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard 
gave an unparalleled momentum to the mechanism of markets, a deep-seated movement 
sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market controlled economy. Society 
                                                 
Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
29 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 116–130. 
30 Ibid., 130. 
31 Ibid., 75.  
32 Fred Block, “Introduction,” to Polanyi, Great Transformation, xxv. 
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protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system—this was the 
one comprehensive feature in the history of the age.33 
On one side of his argument, Polanyi traces the philosophical and legislative efforts 
needed to establish the SRM through the enclosures of the 1790s, the Poor Law Reform 
of 1834, the Bank Charter Act of 1844, the eruption in the 1830s of ‘laissez-faire’, and 
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.34 The other side of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ are 
the social movements and legislative actions to protect people from the ravages of the 
SRM, such as labour unions, the Chartist movement, and the first legislation that preceded 
the establishment of the welfare state. 35 Marx predicted the collapse of the mechanisms 
of capitalism, which would include the SRM, through the uprising of the working class 
in response to unfair distributions of production and the related exploitation of workers.36 
Yet Polanyi in contrast demonstrates how landowners and bankers joined workers in 
seeking protections from the market. As they sought increasing protections against the 
SRM, the tension of the ‘double movement’ became too much, so that the SRM was 
impaired, with the resultant First and Second World Wars, and the rise of dictators who 
sought to reinsert the market within social and national limits.37  
Polanyi remained uncertain as to the future outcome of the SRM, which he saw as 
an economic experiment in which liberalism and fascism/socialism remained on either 
side of the ‘double movement’ tension.38 The neo-liberalism that was founded on a 
“secular salvation through a self-regulating market” has emerged throughout Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America in a way that Polanyi could only have dimly glimpsed 
from his location in history. 39 But his theories immediately correlate with other failures 
                                                 
33 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 79–80. 
34 Ibid., 85–87, 96, 143, 198. 
35 Ibid., 179–184. Legislation against free markets was not planned as collectivism, as many 
liberals suggested, but was rather an unplanned response to the dangers and abuses of the free market, 
such as children dying in chimneys (see ibid., 147–148). 
36 Polanyi does highlight how the damage of the SRM and responses of people varied by class 
(ibid., 158–160). 
37 Ibid., 29–32. 
38 Ibid., 262. 
39 Ibid., 141. 
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of the SRM, such as the more recent 1997 East Asian crises.40 More substantively as a 
correlation, within the timeframe of my thesis production, we have the current global 
failures of SRM markets with the Global Credit Crunch that Polanyi’s work presaged. 
Polanyi’s double movement is presently writ large, with unprecedented protectionist 
interventions by nation states, and continues to generate application for present day 
challenges.41 Polanyi concludes his work with the claim that the ongoing tension between 
liberalism and fascism/socialism is not around a dividing line of the economy, but is an 
issue of morality and religion.42 Liberalism and fascism/socialism might profess identical 
economics, but they are embodiments of particular ideals.43 What is at stake are the 
principles that embody these ideals, and of how they function like religious systems. 
Polanyi would have us believe that western identity is made up of three ‘facts’ taken from 
religion. First, that an understanding of death came through the Old Testament; second, 
that knowledge of freedom arose through the “discovery of the uniqueness of the person 
in the teachings of Jesus in the New Testament;” and finally, that knowledge of society 
was gained through life during the industrial revolution.44 These religious foundations for 
identity are now disembedded from the daily life of people within capitalism by the nature 
and mechanisms of the SRM. 
 
 
                                                 
40 In his foreword to ibid, xv, Stiglitz demonstrates the use of Polanyi’s theories for subsequent 
failures of the SRM with the East Asian market crises. One assumes Stiglitz would now add to this 
foreword the failures of markets in the current global credit crunch. 
41 For example, see Kurtulus Gemici, “Beyond the Minsky and Polanyi Moments: Social Origins 
of the Foreclosure Crisis,” Politics & Society 44.1 (2016): 15–43. 
42 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 267. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 267–268. 
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4.3 Modulations and Intersections: Polanyi’s thesis in wider debate 
In June 2008, Gregory Clark, claiming that the free market was not an invention of the 
eighteenth century, but was one of mankind’s oldest “social institutions”, offered this 
assessment of Polanyi’s theories:  
 
History has not been kind to Polanyi’s prognostications. Free-market capitalism is a 
resilient and stable system in much of the world — particularly in English-speaking 
countries. It is the policy of world bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. It is conquering vast new domains in places such as China, Eastern Europe, 
and India. International trade barriers have been substantially reduced. The gold standard is 
gone, but has been replaced by floating exchange rates, set by market forces. Better 
monetary management has greatly reduced business cycle severity. Between the traditional 
enemies of Western Europe — Germany and France — all is gemütlich.45 
The largest criticism of Polanyi’s thesis has been that he is wrong and that the market is 
a ‘natural’ state of affairs for humans. Yet at the time of Gregory Clark’s claim, we found 
ourselves at the start of the largest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. One 
must assume Gregory Clark made his judgements about Polanyi just prior to the economic 
events of 2007–2008, and submitted his work for publication as the global crisis began to 
unfold. This economic crisis is so great that the Financial Times has devoted a whole 
section to ongoing reporting and analysis of it.46 Stock markets have had meltdowns, 
whole countries have been on the brink of bankruptcy, and remain there, protectionism 
remains a major action, from governments to ground protests by workers.47 Polanyi wrote: 
“The profitability of business depended upon stable exchanges and sound credit 
conditions, both of which were under the care of the banker.”48 Under “the care of the 
banker” now seems a rather quaint phrase, if not an oxymoron, given the role of bankers 
                                                 
45 http://www.nysun.com/arts/reconsiderations-the-great-transformation-by-karl/79250/ (accessed 
1st October 2010). Gregory Clark is professor of economics at the University of California; see 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/ (accessed 1 October 2010). 
46 “Financial Times In Depth,” last modified 10th May 2018, accessed 14th May 2018, 
http://www.ft.com/indepth/global-financial-crisis, with regular anniversary reviews of the year since 2007 
to tell the ‘unfinished business’ of the crises, https://www.ft.com/creditcrisis. 
47 For ongoing debt issues facing Italy as recently as September 2017 see, for example, 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/italy-financial-crisis-deutsche-bank-2017-9?r=US&IR=T, accessed 29th 
December 2017. 
48 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 208. 
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in recent economic history. Far from being incorrect in his analysis, Polanyi seems to be 
prescient of the current global credit crunch. Indeed, much ongoing analysis of the 2007–
2008 credit crunch considers the centrality of Polanyi to understanding these events: 
 
Another inescapable recognition is the substantial social cost of the financial crisis. 
Extending the analogy, one can call this “the Polanyi moment”—the realization that 
markets, when left to their own devices, are destructive to social relations and fabric. The 
dire consequences of the 2007–8 crisis are a testament to the power of Polanyi’s insights on 
the perils of markets.49  
The double movement of marketisation and the protection of society from the 
effects of the markets is seen more starkly at the time of writing. Governments have bailed 
out banks, and rushed through legislation to protect the free market, whilst simultaneously 
chastising the markets and introducing protections for their societies against the failings 
of the free market. For example, in 2010, a UK coalition government issued a statement 
that was unthinkable just two years earlier: 
 
The Government’s agenda is not one of laissez-faire. Markets are often irrational or rigged. 
So I am shining a harsh light into the murky world of corporate behaviour. Why should 
good companies be destroyed by short-term investors looking for a speculative killing, 
while their accomplices in the City make fat fees? Why do directors forget their duties 
when a fat cheque is waved before them? Capitalism takes no prisoners and kills 
competition where it can.50 
EU Government interventions for protectionism of the type Polanyi details and predicts 
continue to take place. At the time of writing this thesis, Greece as a nation continues to 
skirt bankruptcy with a record deficit.51 It would seem that the cause of that debt is a 
Greek society that was unwilling to let the market be disembedded from its deeply cultural 
                                                 
49 Gemici, “Beyond the Minsky and Polanyi Moments,” 15–43. 
50 Vince Cable, UK Business Secretary, as quoted in Andrew Porter, Robert Winnett, and Rosa 
Prince, “Banks Face New Tax on Bonuses,” The Telegraph, 22 September 2010, accessed 1st October 
2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8017380/Banks-face-new-tax-
on-bonuses.html. 
51 Debt evolution details can be found at https://countryeconomy.com/national-debt/greece, 
accessed 19th December 2017. A rather more dramatic rate of the growth of this debt in comparison with 
other countries can be viewed at https://www.nationaldebtclocks.org/debtclock/greece, accessed 19th 
December 2017. 
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and social values.52 In effect, the people refused to live by the ‘rules’ of the market as self-
regulating. Ironically, their unwillingness to conform to the self-regulating disembedding 
of the market from their societal makeup is deemed to be an example of selfishness and 
unwillingness to work for the ‘common good’. That common good, it would seem, is the 
belief that markets are the society to which all societal relationships should conform, such 
that Greece “behaves as a collection of atomized particles, each of which has grown 
accustomed to pursuing its own interest at the expense of the common good.”53 One could 
argue the Greeks had a different collective imagination for life, and refused to let it be 
subordinated to market imaginations. In any event, the turmoil of the past decade and the 
continued economic shocks predicted to continue have surfaced public and political 
recognition that markets are not natural. Rather, they are subject to the nature of the 
people within them, and their relationship with society. The relevance of Polanyi for our 
understanding of capitalist markets seems stronger than ever. For example, Jürgen 
Habermas draws heavily on Polanyi, as much as he did Weber, as my last chapter noted. 
Habermas has developed from Weber and Polanyi a social-theory thesis of the 
“uncoupling of system and life world,” of how economic life is embedded or not in the 
life of social systems.54 Indeed, many anthropologists, political ecologists, economic 
sociologists, and moral philosophers take their cues from Polanyi.55 Yet, within 
economics proper, we continue to find the most resistance to Polanyi.56  
Polanyi provides us with two pathogenic mechanisms of the market: the problem 
of the separation of state and market, and the ethical impoverishment of society, in which 
humans are reduced to a Homo oeconomicus understanding of humanity.57 It is this 
                                                 
52 Michael Lewis, “Beware of Greeks Bearing Bonds,” Vanity Fair, 1st October 2010, accessed 
29th April 2018, http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/10/greeks-bearing-bonds-201010). 
53 The concluding comments of Lewis, “Bearing Bonds”. 
54 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (London: Heinemann, 1984), 12. See 
also Gareth Dale, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 4. 
55 Ibid., 4–5. 
56 Ibid., 5. 
57 Ibid., 2. 
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assertion that human nature is somehow ‘better’ when not established around exchange 
markets that comes in for much critique.58 What motivates people within non-exchange 
societies, and why is exchange seen as a less ‘natural’ basis for humans? Polanyi argues 
in response that it is the nature of the market that is inherently conflictual, that it leads to 
individuals being compelled to compete with each other.59 Here we find a coherence 
between Weber and Polanyi, something also echoed by Emile Durkheim, whereby a free 
market erodes ethical and social obligations with a “pervasive anomie”.60 For Polanyi, it 
was religion that was able to keep this anomic existence at bay. Weber demonstrates the 
possibilities of religion that became embedded in economic society, able to bring this 
much-needed discipline to markets. But this religiously disciplined market life ultimately 
gave way to non-religious resources for understanding society, i.e., the liberal utopia 
detailed by Polanyi. 
Despite Polanyi’s seemingly pessimistic prognostications, he was optimistic for the 
future of free markets if they were able to attend to the problems he diagnosed. He 
believed that attention to these issues was possible by recognising the gap between liberal 
SRMs on the one hand, and state control of markets through fascism and socialism on the 
other. What was needed was the recognition that “the difference between the two is not 
primarily economic. It is moral and religious,” and of the way in which religion had 
previously been vital for setting social limits of markets. 61 Here we find support for the 
claims I made in Chapter Two, in which we saw Evangelicals initially making such moral 
and religious responses to emerging capitalist markets. Evangelicalism can be seen as an 
example of the necessary ‘religious’ restraining and disciplining forces to the market, the 
                                                 
58 For a detailed critique of Polanyi’s anthropology on this issue, see Michael Hetcher, “Karl 
Polanyi’s Social Theory: A Critique”, Politics and Society 10, no. 4 (1981): 406–409. 
59 Hetcher, “A Critique”, 411. 
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loss of which Polanyi lamented.62 Evangelicalism was once an initial countermovement 
par excellence to the dynamics described by Polanyi, but it remains to be seen if it can 
recover a mode of ongoing countermovement. 
The locus of salvation moved from the nature of Christianity to one in which the 
SRM becomes the site of a “secular salvation”.63 This site of “secular salvation” intersects 
directly with my previous account of the move from assurance to the issues of 
‘providence’ by Evangelical Christians. We can now understand how providence as 
evidence of salvation becomes conflated with SRM ‘imaginations’ of the markets as 
‘natural’, i.e., the developing aseity of the SRM. For I have already shown the move of 
aseity from Christian community into an aseity of the market, where the market becomes 
the ontological basis for all relationships and identity.64 From this, we might understand 
how Evangelicalism has ceded its ecclesial and societal embeddedness to market logic. 
The market itself becomes a society, as identity and practice relocate from within 
religious communities to the market itself as the site of a new religious and embedded 
community, a new market community. Polanyi sees a move from a Christian society with 
a responsibility to others, which limited the effects of markets, ultimately replaced by a 
turn to the self that “renounces human solidarity” with the development of the “secular 
religion” of the market.65  
Polanyi’s account can be seen as providing many implicit theological contours in 
its diagnosis and implications. It maps out where markets become the site of identity, 
belonging, and being for people, replacing previous religious affiliations and 
commitments. This points us towards the possibility for more explicit theological 
diagnosis, in particular that of theological anthropology. By that, I mean we need to ask 
where Polanyi produced his understanding of the nature of humans as social creatures in 
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his account. As Gareth Dale writes: “With Aristotle and Marx he [Polanyi] defines man 
as a social creature, but whereas for Marx man’s sociality evolves out of human 
interaction with nature through social labour, Polanyi privileges the creation of moral 
community, a human capacity that achieves its highest form in religious myth.”66 This 
claim reveals the competing understandings of human nature for Polanyi’s account — 
and all other accounts — of life in capitalist markets. We need to understand these 
accounts of human nature, i.e., which theological anthropologies are competing with each 
other? Furthermore, how do those theological anthropologies underwrite and construct 
daily social realities within capitalist life? Where and what imaginations are within these 
theological anthropologies, that fund these constructions of relationships in market life? 
All these questions are the purview of theological accounts. Polanyi’s own conclusion 
points to the nature of the religious and theological as a response to his diagnosis. 
Polanyi’s view of Christianity was certainly ‘unorthodox’ amongst his economist and 
academic peers, in that he read Christianity through a “Hellenic prism” of man as citizen, 
making a life in the polis, but in communion with God, rather than relying on the polis 
for ethics.67 Polanyi also views Christianity through Aristotelian thought, such that “in 
denouncing the principle of production for gain as boundless and limitless, ‘as not natural 
to man,’ Aristotle was, in effect, aiming at the crucial point, namely, the divorce of the 
economic motive from all concrete social relationships which would by their very nature 
set a limit to that motive.”68 But ultimately, Christianity for Polanyi was important 
because of its ability to unify individuality with sociality. For Polanyi it was not any 
Christian reality that was important, rather, what was crucial was how Christianity dealt 
with eschatological questions, and the connectedness of individuals to ethical 
communities. When it comes to a diagnosis of the nature of humans within the market, 
Polanyi draws heavily on Marx’s philosophy and anthropology, in particular theories of 
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“alienation” and “commodity fetish”.69 Within this, markets are seen as undermining 
community, converting private vice into public virtue, where humans damage one another 
to serve their own interests.70 I make an aside and an assertion here, that the leisure that 
emerges in market society is often construed as idleness in contrast to the previous 
Protestant Work Ethic. But Josef Pieper would point us to a different understanding of 
leisure as the location for reception of spiritual and physical realities.71 Leisure is not the 
hiding of vice as virtue, it is the key location for authentic religion. Or to paraphrase 
Erdozain’s work, while others might often describe western consumers as “entertaining 
themselves to death”, we are rather “playing our way to virtue”. 
After moving to London, Polanyi helped found the Christian Left Auxiliary 
Movement. Whilst many members of this group were neither Marxist nor Christian, they 
“were deeply indebted to both ideologies and would effortlessly switch from deploying 
Marxian theory against liberal Christians in one breath to invoking the words of Jesus in 
the next.”72 One of the best-known but sporadic supporters of the Christian Left was the 
Labour Party intellectual Richard Tawney, author of Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, 
whom we encountered in my previous chapter. It would seem that Polanyi had no hopes 
for Christianity’s ability to resist the pathologies of the SRM, but instead, saw it as 
requiring the buttressing of communism for its sense of sociality.73 In reaching for a 
synthesis of Christianity and socialism, Polanyi describes how socialism has religious and 
moral roots and that in “these roots lies the Christian inheritance.”74 Fascism has to 
destroy Christianity because Christianity is the condition of the ‘countermovement’ to the 
market, and the possibility of socialism is Christianity:75 In Polanyi’s own words, “If you 
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are trying to establish a new social order you are trying to integrate a new system of social 
habits, and you can’t do that without a religious symbol for the keystone.”76  
In many regards Polanyi is redolent of Connolly, seeking to use the resources of 
Christianity, as if they can be further evacuated from any context and connection to the 
faith in Jesus Christ that generated those beliefs. There is no recovery of Christian 
resistance per se for Polanyi. Christianity is inadequate on its own for Polanyi because 
Christianity, in his view, is unable to recognise the reality of modern society. For whilst 
simpler societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were able to recognise their 
Christian inheritance, late-emerging capitalism, with its inherent issues of power and 
coercion, resulted in individuals unable to leave the contract of the new market society.77 
When social relationships are remodelled on market relationships, the market becomes 
the paradigm of social relationships, and the market is disembedded from all socio-logics 
other than its own, where individuals are powerless to ‘opt’ out of this society. At the 
same time that Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation, Weber, as my previous chapter 
noted, was also lamenting the loss of Christianity in continuing to shape and respond to 
market forces.  
I may agree with Polanyi that Christianity carries within itself the notion that 
society is a “relationship of persons.”78 I may also agree, as with other social theorists 
such as Emile Durkheim, that individuals are “persons through interactions with others 
and that, in this sense, society does not remain purely extrinsic to persons,” such that 
individuals enter into the definition of their identity as persons in community.79 However, 
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I argue that it is not that Christianity is unable to recognise that society is disembedded 
from the SRM, rather the SRM is a society with which people are in an embedded 
relationship. For there are social relationships within the SRM where reconstructions of 
a social logic around market exchanges takes place that create forms of society. 
Christianity reveals that the SRM is an alternative society in itself. I can look to prior 
forms of the church in history like Evangelicalism, not to modify them as Polanyi would, 
but to be resourced by them. For I contend that Evangelicalism is one form of Christianity 
very able to ‘recognise’ modern societies, and was an effective ‘countermovement’, albeit 
with the subsequent loss of a Christian socio-logic to the market that I have already 
highlighted.80 Rather, it is in recognising that the market is a society, and one that is 
religious in its nature and makeup, that we might discover the nature of a true and ongoing 
Christian countermovement. In that sense, the Evangelical mission into market society is 
most at peril where it has failed to perceive the market as analogous to religion. Is 
Evangelical Christianity able to understand its mission in the marketplace as one that is 
about contesting religious identity? Here I am not attempting to turn the tide, like King 
Canute, for all Evangelical market capitulations, and claim something about 
Evangelicalism that is fanciful at best and naïve at worst.81 
 
4.4 Further Criticisms of Polanyi: Historical and conceptual 
Polanyi’s causality is also questioned, and whilst his ‘double movement’ tension is 
broadly accepted, it is easily modified.82 For example, does the marketisation of society 
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always lead to protectionism, or does regulation lead to marketisation in response?83 
Further criticisms of Polanyi are generally clustered around issues of historical accuracy 
to the events he details, and the lucidity of the conceptual constructions he makes from 
these. Many alternative historical accounts of the development of capitalism are at odds 
with Polanyi, in particular, that of Richard Tawney in Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism.84 Tawney was a contemporary of Polanyi, and someone of whose work 
Polanyi would have been aware. For Tawney, the rise in market mentality began in the 
sixteenth century, when medieval market developments saw a transformation in social 
relations.  That later combined with eighteenth-century attitudes by elites, whereby 
individuals were seen as needing to fend for themselves.85 This pursuit of self-interest was 
also seen as being part of God’s providential plan. In this, Tawney suggests that it is not 
religion that makes capitalism, à la Weber, but rather, it is the development of capitalism 
that leads to the formation of a Protestant religion that is most suited to a market society. 
Evangelical providence was now ‘imagined’ to be existing solely within marketised life. 
These markets are the ‘natural’ way for God’s providence to be manifest. What is at stake 
with these competing historical accounts, is whether changes in social relationships 
preceded the industrial revolution and capitalist markets, or were the result of them.86 We 
might see that the market depends upon Christianity for its understanding of the 
individual, whilst at the same time drawing individuals into itself, and away from social 
forms able to counter it, a rival society and an ‘ecclesia’ of sorts.87 We can begin to see 
how Weber, Polanyi, and Tawney are complementary to understanding how 
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Evangelicalism is a countermove to the markets, but is also formed by the markets 
themselves. 
Conceptually, Polanyi comes in for the strongest criticism in his definition of the 
SRM. He appears to refer to it as “an ideal type (or model) – a system that operates 
according to its own rules and no others; as a ‘utopian experiment’ carried out by 
economic liberals but doomed to failure because the goal is unrealizable as an actually 
existing system.”88 Polanyi’s ontological understanding of the SRM is to be questioned, 
for does he mean that markets are an ontological possibility, or merely an ideology that 
is unrealisable?89 Whilst critics suggest that these descriptions by Polanyi are, if not in 
tension, then certainly contradictory, how can an ‘ideal type’ exist as an actual system? 
This tension is often resolved by suggesting that it is actual markets that require state 
intervention whilst ideal types of SRM are the utopian myth that Polanyi asserts never 
existed.90 We should note that Polanyi’s Great Transformation was written across a 
period of time and various locations, such that his work displays his thinking as it 
developed, and circumstances were such that he was never able to harmonise his text.91  
There is a way for us to harmonise and combine the Weberian and Polanyi/Tawney 
accounts of the market. The Ideal Type for Weber is the imagined basis for the 
construction of capitalism, whilst Tawney’s account offers the effects of the sociality of 
the market shaping the imaginations for those markets. Polanyi highlights the non-
Christian resources that come to shape the imaginations for the understandings of the 
market as self-regulating. This reading of these accounts suggests that the issue for my 
thesis is how the ideas and beliefs of Christianity used by agents rationally in the real 
world come to be affected by the material experience of the sociality of the market. For, 
rather than a contradiction, these accounts reveal an intersection with the “imagined 
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communities” thesis of Anderson, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Even if the 
SRM does pose a threat to the social fabric of life, as Polanyi suggests, such that 
governments are frequently forced to respond, why are people who are aware of these 
effects still willing to order life around the SRM? 92 Most importantly for my project, why 
are Evangelicals so complicit in that life ordering?  
The limits of Polanyi’s account also reveal something else. Polanyi, by his own 
argument, states that there can never be an SRM, pointing out that on the one hand the 
embedding of the market economy is normal and necessary, yet on the other hand, 
protective countermovements weaken market self-regulation.93 One way in which we may 
read Polanyi’s account theologically is as a description of an eschatological condition and 
possibility of life for humans within the created order. How Evangelical Christians should 
live in this eschatological space, and have lived in this space, faithful or not to their 
horizons, is indeed the heart of my project. This eschatological horizon and struggle for 
identity formation in the face of new economic spaces and realities can quickly be viewed 
within Evangelical history. For example, Erdozain’s historical study reveals how the 
Evangelicalism that moved to respond to the new challenges of living longer, having 
leisure time, and new wealth, and that provided a means for Christian identity within this 
new economic world, was ultimately subsumed into the activities around which it had 
ordered Christian life.94 Erdozain notes Martin’s thesis on secularisation that Christianity 
often over-identifies with the territories that it conquers.95 Where Evangelicalism grew in 
response to the material challenges of a capitalist society, we have now arrived at the 
situation where UK Evangelicals find the largest growth to be within the middle classes.96 
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4.5 Diagnosis: Mechanisms of pathogenesis 
Deploying Polanyi’s analysis, we can now overlay features of his account with my own, 
to press into my diagnosis of the pathogenesis between Evangelicalism and capitalism. 
 
4.5.1 Pathogenesis: Commodification 
Polanyi highlights Robert Owen’s diagnosis that economic problems are social ones.97 
Indeed, many aspects of Polanyi’s thesis are underwritten by Owen’s work.98 Polanyi’s 
and Owen’s claim is that there is anomie within the nature of capitalist markets that 
combines with the unrestrained character of humans.99 It was not just that the SRM, in 
being disembedded from social relationships, caused problems. Instead, it was the nature 
of humans themselves within a disembodied SRM that was the primary locus for concern. 
At the root of this relationship was the move within SRMs from production to exchange, 
where the nature of exchange interacts with the most problematic issues of human 
nature.100 This move from production to exchange is the mechanism and process of 
commodification.  
It is this exchange nature of the SRM, i.e., commodification, and its interplay with 
an understanding of human nature, i.e., a theological anthropology, that is the site of 
pathogenesis within capitalism. We have arrived at a location where the pinnacle of 
identity in market society is the individual who ‘pays his way’, is in ‘nobody’s debt’, and 
believes that he can be “unentangled in the evil of power and economic value,” separate 
from everyone.101 The SRM destroyed all non-market relationships through this move 
from production to exchange. Whilst the policy of laissez-faire in early capitalism was 
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the “freedom from regulation in production”, the late-capitalist condition is a move to 
“consumption” through exchange. 102 This move to a society constructed by consumption 
instead of by symbolic exchange, has been explained by Baudrillard in his Symbolic 
Exchange and Death.103  
One contour to the development of exchange is understanding how credit emerges 
within the fiction of money that replaces specie. This goes some way towards supporting 
Bell’s claim that it is the invention of credit that ultimately undoes the Protestant ethic 
that had previously restrained consumption.104 The ability to consume now and pay later 
was an ethic vastly different to the Weberian Protestant Work Ethic. Polanyi provides an 
account of the ‘fictions’ necessary to the SRM, of land, labour, and money, and how they 
are mobilised through production and into exchange.105 Where previously, commodities 
from production were sold within markets, land, labour, and money, which are not 
commodities, are marketised:  
 
Labor is only another name for human activity which goes with life itself, which in turn is 
not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached 
from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is 
not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, 
as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or 
state finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land, 
and money is entirely fictitious.106 
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Yet Polanyi is quick to affirm that, despite these fictions for the SRM, they are also actual 
market realities.107 Commodity fictions supply real-world organising principles, chief of 
which is that “no arrangement of behaviour should be allowed to exist that might prevent 
the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of commodity fiction.”108 
Here, Polanyi is at pains to make sure that he is not recapitulating a Marxist commodity 
fetish thesis.109 We may accept that labour, land, and money are fictions within the SRM, 
and that these combine with human nature in the production of the pathologies of the 
SRM that Polanyi highlights. But how do those fictions work, and how are they sustained 
in terms of agency and identity construction? We must get at the nature of those fictions, 
and how they work in combination with the nature of humans such that the SRM is a 
mode of operation to which humans seem determined to adhere. In my map-making 
mode, there is a continuing signpost here about the need for a theological explication of 
commodification, an analysis to which my next chapter will attend. 
 
4.5.2 Pathogenesis: Resistance is futile 
Baum argues that Polanyi reveals the complexity of modern SRM societies, wherein once 
we were able to discern the impact of our way of life on others, but now our ongoing 
desire to be ethical has become blocked by the disconnection of our lives from all sources 
of production.110 Polanyi’s thesis demonstrates how the ethical longings of bourgeois 
society cannot be met by that society, for “the capitalist society to which we belong is 
dominated by material forces that behave according to a logic of their own and thus 
deprive the citizens of the responsibility for their own lives.”111 Protestants responded to 
this ethical anguish with the restriction of the ethical to issues that were inward and 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Baum, Ethics and Economics, 26–27. 
111 Ibid., 27. 
146 
 
intimate, ignoring issues and ethics of society, and all too often “repudiated” any notion 
of “civil consciousness”.112 From this, we may understand Evangelicalism within the 
market as a place where the anxieties over the providence of the market are related to 
issues of internal ethics and morality, rather than to an ongoing countermovement of a 
collective social aspect. This occurs due to the powers of the market in disciplining people 
into privacy and isolation from each other. What that power is, and how it operates, needs 
to be diagnosed further, and made explicit with a theological diagnosis to which I will 
return later. 
Dale has developed the work of Polanyi to show how there have been many 
ongoing countermovements to the SRM since the time of Polanyi’s writing. He has 
charted the history and theory of many of these counter-movements as they have sought 
to address the tension between neo-liberalism, utopianism, and socialist and fascist re-
embedding of the market into social relationships. His conclusion is that the current 
economic crisis shows how the neo-liberal belief system has “cracked asunder.”113 Yet, 
as we have seen, most economists do not concede this. Polanyi’s work continues to bring 
a perspective to analysis of contemporary issues. For example, understanding the welfare 
state as a countermovement to the market reveals the later ongoing marketisation of 
society, and the undoing of that welfare state, owing to the ongoing pressures of emerging 
capitalism.114 Baum also suggests that Polanyi, if alive today, would view the grassroots 
movement of environmentalists as part of a countermovement to the damaging impact of 
the SRM and land.115 Dale also determines that there is currently an appetite for re-
embedding the markets in the social, but that the prospect in the short term is a move back 
towards continued marketisation.116 For example, it is in current western government cuts 
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to state benefits for the very people that need to be protected from the market that the 
neo-liberal utopia is still being pursued. In this, perhaps, we see the ontological belief that 
it is the market that will ‘save us’, and not the addressing of the failings of human nature 
in relationship to goods and markets, the latter of which should be the primary concern 
of the Christian. Ayse Bugra reminds us that Polanyi’s predictions of the ongoing 
institutional separation of the political from the economic, such that society would be 
reduced to “an appendage of the market”, has come to pass.117 It is the  
 
…contemporary neo-liberal world, where the emphasis placed on voluntary gift giving, 
civil initiatives, and romantic notions of civil society are used to hide the reality of an 
unprecedented commodification of life and livelihood on a global scale, is less equipped 
than ever to appreciate the implications of the liberal denial of power and take against 
them.118 
It is not the neo-liberal dream that has faltered, but rather that capitalism has “lurched 
from crisis to crisis.”119 The parallels of Polanyi’s nineteenth century with our own age 
are disturbingly easy to chart.120 Polanyi describes the horrors of the industrial revolution 
and the social degradation it wrought on workers and children.121 In our present-day 
context, we see that all of life is marketised; from health to education, welfare to science, 
social Darwinism persists in its drive to replace the citizen with a consumer, and all forms 
of social relationships able to counter the ravages of the SRM are increasingly 
enervated.122 Dale postulates that this course is so unsustainable that there may be a turn 
back towards a Marxist ethic, as Polanyi sought to establish.123 Yet, despite all these 
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examples of countermovements, and aspirations for new ones, the result of them all seems 
to have been the further adoption of the SRM, and the pathogenesis to which it leads.124  
Again, we are left to ask why and how this pathogenesis arises? If the earliest social 
counter-movements that arose in response to the SRM that sought to re-embed the social 
within the market and all subsequent ones failed, why is that?125 Is there really, as Polanyi 
and Owen suggested, something about the ontological nature of humans combined with 
the SRM that leads to these problems, that no economic countermove can ever address? 
Whilst social theorists continue to look for their own ‘countermovements’ in modern 
society, informed by Polanyi’s thesis, I continue to ask: can Evangelical Christianity 
rediscover its ability as a countermovement in differentiation from secular hopes?126 
Evangelicalism provided an unparalleled response to the pathologies of the SRM with 
hospices, welfare, education, etc.127 Can Evangelism repeat that move and countermove 
today, and what is it currently doing with regard to late-capitalist markets? Where are its 
ongoing ‘islands of social care’ à la Martin? 
Polanyi may reject the concept of human nature as Homo oeconomicus, that human 
nature is not purely economic but cultural and social.128 Yet he sees the emergence of 
human selfishness and individualism as a reaction to the materialist conditions of the 
SRM.129 Here is revealed the further commitment to understanding of human nature, and 
Polanyi’s is redolent of a doctrine of the fall. There is something about human nature 
itself that becomes captive and resonates with the deforming forces of capitalism. Perhaps 
it is not that the SRM produces this selfishness and anomie, but that the SRM disciplines 
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the nature that already exists within humans. For Christians, this materialistic 
preoccupation is not a cultural product of the SRM but is inherent in basic human nature. 
In this, I am further reaching for theological descriptions. The SRM has its own 
constructions and economic life to which humans remain willing to cede their daily lives 
and deepest identities, including Evangelicals. The world of economics, as on the one 
hand “irrational”, set around human wants and needs, and “rational” on the other, with 
regard to the shaping of moral and religious values.130 Indeed, Polanyi criticises Weber 
for his unwillingness to integrate these issues of scarcity and irrationality within his 
understanding of the economic.131  
 
4.5.3. Pathogenesis: Oikos and polis 
It is worth noting a particular social arrangement from Polanyi’s work that points towards 
how we might understand the social arrangement of Christianity to all and any aspects of 
market life. Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ thesis was concerned with modern economies; 
his attention in the last part of his life was directed towards “archaic economies”.132 He 
was searching for a “good society” in which the nature of social relationships was the 
makeup of natural institutions.133 Polanyi located this within Aristotle and the ancient 
Greek world of the oikos, and thereby joined the oikos debate and its related controversy. 
On the one hand, there were arguments that the oikos, the household of the ancient world, 
was self-sufficient and did not partake in the modern phenomena of land, labour, and 
capitalist markets.134 On the other hand, various theorists advanced analyzes that the 
economies of the ancient world, particularly Greece, were prototypes of our modern 
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market economies.135 Weber attempted a synthesis of these views, and as we know, his 
Protestant Work Ethic contends that modern capitalism is unique to human history, 
catalysed by Christianity. Whilst Weber determined that the nature of markets in the oikos 
was fundamentally different to modern capitalist markets, he conceded that oikoi 
functioned as “centres of commercial exchange.”136  
Polanyi took Weber and others in the debate as his guides, developing his own 
ideas that it was wrong to see the oikos as strictly self-sufficient as the “primitivists” did, 
and on the other hand that the “modernists” were wrong in reading modern market 
mechanisms back into antiquity.137 The principle problem discerned by Polanyi in all 
these accounts, including that of Weber, was the propensity to consider trade and markets 
as exchange mechanisms independent from social institutions.138 Other than Weber, it 
seems that most protagonists in the debate were unable to “conceive of an economy within 
market places and extensive trade and money use as co-ordinated in any manner other 
than through market mechanisms.”139 Polanyi sought to establish that it is in antiquity that 
we find the possibility of markets that are not co-ordinated through disembedded 
exchange mechanisms. Many anthropologists and economic historians argue the obverse 
of Polanyi, that some ancient societies were motivated by material and personal gain with 
no regard for the well-being of wider society.140  
Beyond economic arrangements of the social, the notions of oikos and polis point 
to a need to understand ecclesiology around these arrangements. If the early church was 
an oikos-polis, a new social ordering within the economics of its day, this has implications 
for such social ordering today for the people of God. We can understand how the early 
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church overcame the antimonies of the polis and the oikos, to form a hybrid oikos-polis.141 
There are Christian understandings of the oikos to review and deploy against Polanyi and 
other social theorists, in order to understand how the early church was both a move, and 
countermove, to the nature of market and political life. Does the church therefore exist as 
the possibility of a non-marketised social entity? Can answers to these questions help us 
to better understand the emergence of the sphere of the economic from that of the polis 
and the oikos into current ‘commercial society’? I will return to these questions and this 
oikos-polis location in my next chapter and explicit theological review.  
 
4.6 Social Imaginaries: Imaginations for collective social life 
We have noted Polanyi’s suggestion that the resources of religious traditions are replaced 
by the resources of Neo-Darwinism and the “invisible hand of the Market” of Adam 
Smith.142 There is a kind of imaginative exercise taking place here. For if the neo-liberal 
establishment of the SRM was a utopian myth, it was a myth established with the 
imaginative use of resources other than those of religions previously able to keep the 
SRM at bay. Or, at the very least, it took new understandings of humans and the market 
for the liberal project to be imagined and enacted. Polanyi traces how the resources of 
neo-Darwinian and associated scientific accounts of human nature led to the ideas of 
scarcity, survival of the fittest, and competition becoming the accepted ‘nature’ of the 
market and human life within it.143 The neo-classical (or ‘marginalist’) branch of 
economics in the Austrian school of thought anticipated much of Polanyi’s work.144 
Moreover, Polanyi was familiar with their work, wherein they suggested that economic 
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history and economic anthropology could not be separated with regard to understanding 
the nature of institutions and relationships with society.145 In this methodology, 
institutions were to be understood as “historically specific mentalities”, a type of “Homo 
mass-pyschologicus”, which gives priority to human needs and desires.146 This means that 
 
economic phenomena such as capitalist activity should therefore be understood 
psychologically, as mentalities that express themselves as sets of ideas and moral systems, 
customs and laws, specific to a people of a certain race or nation. Economic life is 
transacted within political and social organs that achieve their unity not simply through 
borders and an integrated territory but in the first instance as a ‘spiritual unity by the 
socializations of the actors, with law, morals, and religion…as their prime expressions’. 
The common element that unites the particular economies of a nation or state, he [Gustav 
Schmoller] says, ‘is not simply the state itself, but rather something deeper: the community 
of language, of history, of memories, of customs and ideas. It is a world of common 
feelings and ideas….’147 
This is a community of imagination so to speak, of a similar order to the “imagined 
communities” of Anderson.148 Historicists, unlike Marxists, disregard the “relationship of 
social classes to the means of production, concentrating instead upon economic 
institutions, understood as psychological based phenomena,” whereby all economic 
behaviour is founded in psychology.149 This methodology allows for an understanding of 
actors in the economic realm through accounts of psychology, history, and anthropology 
such that the behaviour of groups can be understood only as ethical considerations.150 
Polanyi’s account enables us to explore how, for economic actors in time and space, the 
social experience around internal experiences of beliefs and market relationships takes 
shape.151 The notion of how communities imagine, and then act out those imaginations, 
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allow us to comprehend how economic life is embedded within cultural and social 
systems. 
Polanyi refuses an evolutionary perspective, and the “necessary progress” of the 
social theory of his day.152 Modernity is no “high point” for Polanyi, with previous epochs 
stages toward achievements in modern society. Previous cultures have exhibited 
examples from which we can learn today.153 He is neither a “functionalist”, nor a supporter 
of dialectical historical methods.154 Polanyi can therefore be read theologically with an 
ontology of irrational human and social nature, and epistemology of rational behaviour 
and agency. How then do the resources of Polanyi’s neo-Darwinian and Hobbsian society 
combine with how humans construct identity and interact with the resources, beliefs, and 
practices of Evangelicalism?  
Whilst there are many who have abandoned Christianity for the resources of their 
“imagined communities”, Christianity in many parts of the world, including the USA, 
continues apace. American Evangelicals continue the combination of beliefs centred 
around providence, with an understanding of the market as the natural source of God’s 
providence.155 The fictions of the SRM can be seen as the raw materials for a post-
Protestant Work Ethic, where in the face of new anxieties over wealth and poverty, a link 
between providence and the market is formed. We can view Evangelical Christians as 
actors rationally responding to the challenges of new global capitalist markets, who then 
unintentionally give over their understanding and priority of social relationship to the 
ontology of the SRM. Weber demonstrated that it was religious discipline that set the 
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limits to markets, something Polanyi also affirms.156 Yet ultimately, religion, in its process 
of ‘disciplining’, combines with the nature of the SRM, so that markets became ‘natural’ 
and the site of God’s providence. Where religion once disciplined the markets, the 
markets now discipline believers. We must not underestimate the anxieties that a 
Darwinian world presented people faced with unparalleled wealth and poverty. As we 
have seen, Evangelicals responded missionally to the many new anxieties of the modern 
world. They relaxed their ecclesiology at a time when the SRM was being parasitic to 
other social forms, thereby determining new social realities between the oikos and the 
polis. The SRM in Polanyian terms is a utopian fantasy and social imaginary that makes 
plausible various constructions and disciplines of practices around desire. It is no wonder 
that the sociality of the Christian life was thus too easily given over to the socio-logic of 
the market. This approach to ecclesiology, in which the form of church is allowed to take 
its logic from the new market contexts in which Evangelicals found themselves, is seen 
with Whitefield’s claim that “it was best to preach the new birth, and the power of 
godliness, and not to insist so much on the form: for people would never be brought to 
one mind as to that; nor did Jesus Christ ever intend it.”157 It would seem that what is at 
stake is how human beings imagine life, and how those imaginations are disciplined and 
enacted. In other words, how are imagined resources, beliefs, and practices formed into 
identity and social relationships within capitalist markets? The work of Charles Taylor 
and “social imaginaries” is helpful at this point as a method to answer this question. 
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4.6.1 Charles Taylor and Social Imaginaries 
Polanyi’s Great Transformation was not to be reversed. With the current teetering of the 
global capitalist market system, Polanyi’s diagnosis remains starkly prognostic and 
relevant. But it would seem that history tells us that humans by nature and inclination 
now persist in the pursuit of the SRM for living and being. We have already highlighted 
how both Weber’s and Polanyi’s accounts bring us into contact with human nature and 
societal relationships set around imaginings of the market. But they both fall short in 
diagnosing the nature of humans and the market, and the neo-liberal vision remains as 
strong and compulsive as ever.  
The immense changes in politics, and the economy in the time period of our 
accounts, are met with new “collective experiences”.158 Ordinary people in their embodied 
lives have responded to these changes with a multiplicity of “contrast experiences”159. 
Within those experiences, people’s understanding of self and moral visions are played 
out within institutions of work, family, home, and now the new market society.160 There 
is no one account for understanding the new modern ways of living, or of approaching 
identity and sociality within this new landscape. Rather, as Charles Taylor has 
determined, we need to speak of “multiple modernities” in order to understand the 
plurality of complex and collective experiences that have taken place.161 Within the 
accounts made so far, we are left with an “elusive set of self-understandings, background 
practices, and horizons of common expectations that are not always explicitly articulated, 
but that give a people a sense of a shared group life.”162 Taylor draws upon Jürgen 
Habermas and the Imagined Communities thesis of Anderson in suggesting that one way 
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to account for these multiple understandings is with the notion of “social imaginaries”.163 
Social imaginaries provide a reflexive account of modernity that avoids focusing, on the 
one hand, on technical determinations around “ideas”, and on the other, on materialist 
accounts of how people feel and respond in relation to these “ideas” and related 
processes.164  
Given the materialist account of Polanyi and the Ideal Type of Weber, Taylor’s 
social imaginary method offers a way to bring these accounts together, and to bring them 
into further contact with all my work so far. The notion of a social imaginary functions 
as an overlay to all my previous mappings. I will summarise and survey Charles Taylor’s 
social imaginary thesis, and, as I do so, establish points of connection with my own 
account. With this made, I will then be in a position to better compare and contrast 
theological accounts of those relationships and the Evangelical church as a kind of “social 
imaginary”. 
 
4.6.2 What is a “Social Imaginary”? 
By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual 
schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I 
am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together 
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations.  
 
— Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 
Taylor differentiates the “social imaginary” from social theory as being about how 
ordinary people ‘imagine’ social surroundings, in non-theoretical terms, given that most 
do not possess these theoretical terms, and yet this social imaginary makes possible shared 
practices around a common understanding.165 We all “carry an implicit map of social 
space” that does not require us to be conscious of theorising about it.166 Taylor sees 
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theories as highly influential, but they are improvised and inducted into new practices 
such that they are ultimately “schematized” into the reality of space and time, and become 
a “dense sphere of social practice.”167 The resources for the imagination of human nature 
within the neo-Darwinian and fictitious markets of Polanyi show how a variety of 
resources for imaginations, i.e., social imaginaries, are improvised and used for practices 
that are socially embodied.  
For Taylor, it is not that ideas lead to material actions, or that material actions result 
in ideas; rather, human practices are simultaneously material, and modes of 
understanding: “Because human practices are the type of thing that makes sense, certain 
ideas are internal to them; one cannot distinguish the two in order to ask the question: 
which causes which?”168 Taylor sees materialist accounts such as that given by Marx as 
implausible. We may be able to identify many examples of where an economic motive 
explains a moral idea, an account in economic terms, for example, of the “spread of the 
reformation doctrine of salvation by faith […] not [being] very plausible.”169 Thus, “ideas 
always come in history wrapped up in certain practices, even if these are only discursive 
practices. But the motivations that drive toward the adoption and spread of these packages 
may be varied.”170 Taylor cites “civility” as an example of something that is not a natural 
condition of humans, but one that requires education and discipline, which religion is able 
to provide.171 Then, there is the Protestant notion of a “good life” with the imaginings of 
new social order against the indolence of monks and beggars.172 We can see that the 
Weberian Protestant Work Ethic functioned as a type of social imaginary, where rational 
beliefs and conceptions of a way of Christian life are improvised and practised through 
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the ascetic of that social ethic. Taylor establishes far more than just a method for 
understanding how people imagine social existence, such as understanding cultural 
revolutions in secularism, and many other things beyond my accounting.173 
 
4.6.3 The Great Disembedding 
Taylor proposes that the process of the re-conception of society as a collection of 
individuals be understood as “The Great Disembedding”.174 Previously, religious life was 
inseparable from social life, where “we primarily related to God as a society,” and 
religious actions of prayer and worship were understood as an agency that acted for the 
whole group of one’s belonging.175 Earlier societies were unable to imagine the self 
outside of membership of those societies, with social embeddedness integral to identity. 
Christianity, with its conceptions of the church as a society that relativises other social 
arrangements, was the first imagination of a new identity in the direction of 
individualism.176 The Gospel itself is a disembedding from social and collective 
memberships into a new social reality.177  
Weber’s thesis cannot be traced clearly to show a correlation between capitalism 
and the beliefs of Protestant Christianity; Taylor sees the relationship as being rather more 
“diffuse”.178 In Weber’s thesis, moral self-understandings are embedded within religious 
practices, but not with one coming first, or driving the other.179 But Taylor admits that we 
can determine that the beliefs of Protestant society do give a different shape to the 
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capitalism of western society than that of Chinese culture, for example. Likewise, we can 
see how my Weberian account allows for the shaping of capitalism by Protestantism, 
while at the same time its practices and the ascetic within those beliefs shaped the beliefs 
of Protestantism. 
The disembedding nature of the Protestant Work Ethic can be brought into contact 
with Polanyi’s thesis of the disembedded SRM. The SRM, with its fictions of the 
marketisation of labour, land, and money, combine with the Protestant Work Ethic 
practices of daily life, such that the imaginations at work ultimately disembedded people 
from their religious roots and religious collectives. Again, I contend that the SRM in its 
nature functions as a social environment in which individuals are disciplined through the 
practices of the market around imaginations of identity and belief. Here, we recall the 
location on my previous mapping of the internal move within Arminian pietism into an 
experience and imagination of providence, that then disciplined daily living around the 
nature of the SRM. Christianity, once able to ‘discipline’ identity within that 
environment, is ultimately replaced by the disciplines of the market itself.180  
 
4.6.4 Disembedding the Economy: Public and private life 
Taylor traces how this “Great Disembedding” has worked out in modern social 
imaginaries, starting with economic life. The new modern social imaginary involves a 
new theory of moral order that changes our understanding of God’s providence and the 
nature of his benevolence.181 Taylor traces this development from previous cosmological 
understandings of the place of humans sustained within that creation to the addition of 
                                                 
180 I am mindful here of the claims of Anabaptists, and Hauerwas, along with others, who would 
understand the church today as an alternate community/culture. Insisting that church is an alternative 
culture does not make it so however; see Theo Hobson, “Against Hauerwas,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 101 
(2007): 300–312. The question perhaps is, does telling a different genealogy à la MacIntyre offer 
sufficient grounds for asserting an alternative identity? Maybe the genealogy can only be told in relation 
to the genealogy of capitalism. 
181 Taylor, Social Imaginaries, 69. 
160 
 
eighteenth-century ‘invisible hands’, and the viewing of society through the lens of 
engineering design and ordering.182 Humans move to a society ordered around an 
exchange of services, with nature itself deemed to be an economic order.183 Ontological 
hierarchies of kingship are maintained, but with deference to how kings keep the new 
market economies in order.184 But eventually, the economy becomes more than a 
metaphor, and is established as the ultimate ontological orientation of society. 
Taylor corroborates the location of market aseity highlighted in Sedgwick’s 
account, as discussed earlier. For we saw previously that Sedgwick describes the 
ontological move of aseity into the market as none other than the relocation of aseity of 
God into the economic. The market takes on the ontological values of God.185 Campbell 
also reminds us that this move into exchange and consumption is one of the 
imagination.186 We see the Polanyian neo-Darwinian imaginations for human nature 
combining with a post-Protestant Work Ethic that relocates identity creation into market 
activities, and the imaginations of providence of that market for identity construction. 187 
Our question here again is: what is it about the nature of the market and the nature of 
humans that leads to this dialectic of imagination between identity and the market? Is 
Sedgwick correct, that it is the telos of the market, not the market per se, that is the 
problem requiring an alternative set of desires in response?188 Or is the market 
ontologically problematic, given to providing an alternative social identity, with its own 
ascetic and disciplining practices around the intrinsic problems of human identity? In 
either case, it is the ascetic nature of the market, and the ways in which desire is imagined 
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within identity construction and market practices, that my mapping continues to direct us  
for further theological analysis.  
This change in self-understanding can be attributed to a new spiritual dimension, 
one whereby Weber may be right, “even if not all the details of his theory can be 
salvaged.”189 A move then takes place within Protestantism away from the idea of higher 
vocations, with the claim upon ordinary life, work, family, and sex, as the locus for God’s 
activity with His people. This affirmation of ordinary life facilitates the “promotion of 
the economic to its central place.”190 This new idea and order of the economic gives rise 
to a move from management of the economic by governments, to a defining of the 
fundamental way in which humans relate to each other.191 In effect, other social 
dimensions of human existence are shifted, such that the public and private spheres of life 
change into new modes of agency. However, we may counter with our account from 
Polanyi of how this state of affairs is unsustainable. Taylor sees the disembedding of 
society into the market economy as one in which “society has been unhooked from 
‘polity’ and floats free through a number of applications.”192 But, we have seen that 
society is not free floating; rather, there is a re-embedding of human relationships into the 
socio-logic of the market.193  
Taylor continues with an extended discourse on how the public sphere develops 
into a “metatopical space” in which members of society could exchange ideas, i.e., as a 
metatopical agency, but one that exists independently of political society and completely 
within profane time.194 It is modern literature à la Anderson’s thesis that has allowed us 
to slice time vertically, holding together “myriad happenings.”195 With the economy as 
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the “first mode” of society, and the separation of the public from that sphere, the world 
of the family and the self, retreats into the intimate and private sphere.196 Houses are 
constructed to protect people from others, whilst the centre of gravity of life shifts towards 
seeking “the good life” with a new aesthetic, in which art and music are intended for 
personal enjoyment and to enrich the private sphere.197 This new understanding of human 
identity and private life finds its acceptance and definition in public space and in the 
nature of exchange in public life.198 Here, we see the nature of the oikos and polis 
reconfigured around the emerging aseity of market life. 
The development of reformation churches into a generation of ‘free’ churches 
centred around voluntarist associations, reinforces and creates this metatopical common 
agency.199 Ironically, the intrinsic nature of Christianity to imagine one’s identity, 
whereby membership of church orders all other allegiances, plays out within the modern 
social imaginary as strong commitments to associate with others beyond traditional 
“fealty”.200 The voluntarist nature of modern Evangelicalism brings us to understand God 
and all of life as unmediated, and collapsed into the private.201 The result is “modes of 
imagined direct access” that abolish all hierarchal belonging and mediation. However, 
this modern individualism “doesn’t mean ceasing to belong at all – that’s the 
individualism of anomie and breakdown – but imagining oneself as belonging to ever 
wider and more impersonal entities: the state, the movement, the community of 
humankind.”202 Imagining ourselves in this new sphere involves belonging to a new 
                                                 
196 Ibid., 104–105. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid., 106. 
199 Ibid., 160. 
200 Ibid., 107. 
201 It is interesting to note that, in response to Baptist understandings of voluntarism, some like 
Paul Fiddes at Oxford have suggested instead that we need to understand ourselves not as voluntarists, 
but in the theological concept of covenant, even as ‘Free Church’ people. See Paul S. Fiddes, “A Fourth 
Strand of the Reformation”, Ecclesiology, 13, no. 2 (2017): 153–159. 
202 Taylor, Social Imaginaries, 160. 
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collective agency, which we can now determine takes its impetus from market 
imaginations for social relationships.203  
 
4.7 Conclusion: Bearings for Theological Navigation 
Here I pause to overlay all my explorations and maps so far, to see what we have 
discovered and what these signpost as the next place to venture. 
Through Charles Taylor, I have been able to bring Weber and Polanyi into contact 
with my findings from the work of Bebbington, Martin and Anderson.204 We can now 
understand how Evangelicals moving into new economic environments sought to respond 
to the challenges of those environments, and were able to use the tools of capitalist media 
to share new ways of constructing identity and relationship with others, society, and the 
market for ‘islands of social care’. Taylor highlights the ontologising of capitalist 
markets, which correlates with my work on Weber and Sedgwick, for an understanding 
of how the providence of God is relocated to the market. We see a movement, a sleight 
of hand, in which initially God provides through the market to enact imaginations for the 
telos of life, but, ultimately, God is removed from this process completely, leaving as the 
only reality the market itself. We can also now understand how Selves are imagined and 
created within the SRM through this providence of the market, a providence that is 
activated through the disciplines of the market.  
I have also suggested that Taylor’s account is not just a “great disembedding”, but 
that it also reveals the embedding within the socio-logic of capitalism, of imaginations 
for self-creations in market life. Christianity carries within itself the process of 
disembedding self from other social relationships, a process which then falls captive to 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 163. 
204 For example, Taylor references Martin regarding his claim that people need support in the new 
economic worlds they come to inhabit, and regarding how Pentecostal Christianity provides this, much 
like Islam gives identity to African-Americans in disadvantaged contexts; Taylor, Social Imaginaries, 
150. 
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being unable to re-embed people into market social realities.205 We can view 
Evangelicalism as a movement that was a corollary to the development of social 
imaginaries of capitalist markets.  Evangelicals initially used the disciplined ascetics of 
the market for identity and relationships within capitalism.  Market ascetics ultimately 
led to the formation and substitution of market imaginations for life. In other words, the 
church stopped being a thing in and of itself for Evangelicals. It became simply a tool to 
provide care within the market, ceding its logic to the market as a dispenser of religious 
goods and services.206 Then, we have the voluntarist nature of human identity. In 
voluntarism, identity is reduced to that which the self chooses, with resources exchanged 
within a market society, and no grounding in any social and communal context, other 
than the market. It may be that the market, with regard to identity and social relationships, 
is not the Marxists’ “alienation” of humans under capitalism, nor is it the “anomie” of 
Durkheim, or even Weber’s “iron cage”. Perhaps instead, it is that social relationships 
and the desire to belong in community are a “fundamental social imaginary” of all 
humans, the desire for which gives us all our references for meaning and being.207 If that 
is the case, we may view the collapse of identity into the SRM, fuelled by the Evangelical 
post-Protestant Work Ethic, as the metonym of church and ecclesiology. The market is, 
                                                 
205 Baudrillard claimed that capitalism has completed and perfected itself, such that social reality 
is a simulation built upon the ‘code’ of consumer signs, rather than the meaning of objects themselves. 
There is a re-embedding and inscription of people into the social logic of consumption, and an ongoing 
loss of reality replaced by hyper-reality. See Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and 
Structures, edited by Natalie Aguilera (London: Sage Publications, 1998).  Also, see Jean Baudrillard, 
For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, translated by Charles Levin (St. Louis, MO: Telos 
Press, 1981), 59. 
206 For example, the Victorian penchant for ‘sermon tasting’, of travelling to multiple Sunday 
services and collecting publications of sermons, soon became so popular that it could be remarked that 
“some of the most distinguished Preachers of the day appeared again through the press almost before they 
had left the pulpit”; it is estimated that English Anglicans alone published over one million sermons a 
year. See Robert H. Ellison, The Victorian Pulpit: Spoken and Written Sermons in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1998), 46. 
207 Drawing on the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, Max Farrar, in discussing the epistemological 
nature of community in society, makes this claim for how conceptions of ‘community’ work as 
fundamental social imaginaries, where community is the organising principle of life; see Max Farrar, 
“Re-Thinking ‘Community’ as a Utopian Social Imaginary”, accessed 3rd February 2018. 
https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Max_Farrar /publication/268331132_Re-
thinking_%27community%27 as_a_utopian_social_imaginary/ links/5489bbf80 cf2d1800d7aa030/Re-
thinking-community-as-a-utopian-social-imaginary.pdf. 
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if not a false body, then at least a competing body, to which humans have ceded all socio-
logic, because of its promise of actualising community desire; however, it has never 
produced a community, but rather fostered an idealisation and unrequited desire for 
community. 
These interim conclusions now allow for, and point to, the need for more explicit 
theological discussion, giving rise to some key theological questions. It is a theological 
diagnosis that my thesis ultimately seeks to make, making that which has been implicit, 
explicit. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Rival Ascetics of Desire: False Bodies, Resistance and Co-Creation 
 
The problem is not that some coherent, holistic Christian Culture has been shattered but that be-
lievers practice and use Christian doctrines and symbols in a way that prevents them from influ-
encing their everyday social practices. They are instead engaged with habits of interpretation and 
use drawn from consumer culture which treat cultural objects as consumable decorations for the 
pre-existing structure of everyday life.1 
 
 
“The foremost cartographers of the land have prepared this for you; it’s a map of the area that 
you’ll be traversing.” 
 
[Blackadder opens it up and sees it is blank] 
 
“They’ll be very grateful if you could just fill it in as you go along.” 
 
Blackadder II, episode no.3, “Potato” 
Evoking my map-making method, we can see where water flowed, and landscapes were 
shaped by formational forces as Evangelicalism interacted with capitalism. But what was 
it about those forces, and the nature of the landscape as they interacted, that led to what 
emerged? My last three chapters have been a kind of morphological mapping, concerned 
with the general landscape of Evangelical life within emerging capitalism, as I seek to 
diagnose the pathogeneses in that relationship.2 I have made a kind of “morphology of 
landscape” that has mapped human activity, i.e., Evangelicalism, in cultural 
environments, i.e., social relationships of capitalism.3 My mapping and account is a kind 
of palimpsest, not an actual location but an ideal type, allowing observers to “summarize 
and identify actual scenes” of Evangelical life in capitalism.4 A landscape as palimpsest 
                                                 
1 Vincent Jude Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture 
(New York: Continuum, 2003). 
2 Beyond the general landscape, and in terms of the structure of Evangelicalism, I have integrated 
some historical vignettes throughout the thesis.  
3I do not force map-making methods upon those methods of my thesis. Geographers seeking to 
interpret geographical landscapes have drawn upon socio-cultural, philosophical and linguistic methods to 
get beyond ocular visions, i.e., what we can understand led to how things came to be as they are, that we 
can see. For example, see Carl Ortwin Sauer, “Morphology of landscape,” in Land and life: a selection of 
writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer, edited by John Leighly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 
315–50.  
4 Nancy Duncan and James Duncan explain how landscapes function as palimpsests, and how 
landscapes function as ideal types that cannot be seen, but instead allow an observer to locate themselves 
within symbolic landscape accounts, enabling them to describe their own location in that landscape. See 
Nancy and James Duncan, “Doing Landscape Interpretation”, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Geography (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009). 
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can then be defined, and further understood through multiple methods: of place, 
environment, history, region, mineral composition, political, social, religious and others. 
My method for further understanding in this, and then my next and final, chapter is the 
theological. For the theological allows me to move beyond the phenomena and 
epiphenomena I have mapped to the diagnostic. To move from the implicit to the explicit. 
In particular, to examine human nature within the nature of capitalism, to diagnose why 
Evangelical belief and practice interact with each other in market society as they do. 
In particular, this chapter makes explicit the theological contours of my second and 
third chapters, and their analyses of the Protestant Work Ethic. It is the overlay to that 
map, to which the first chapter of this thesis pointed. Where the Protestant Work Ethic, 
and modulations of that, are about competing ascetics, this chapter theologises the nature 
of those ascetics. I will now delineate late-capitalist markets and Evangelical Christianity 
as rival schools of desire, problematising them not as a dichotomy, but as modes of 
resistance, resonance, and co-option around their ascetics. This chapter also overlays my 
fourth chapter, for ultimately this diagnosis allows me to explain why Evangelical 
imaginations have become embedded in market imaginations for providence, in a post-
Protestant work ethic. In order to do this, I identify, from Neo-Augustinian sources, 
specific theological accounts that have problematised the relationship between 
Christianity and capitalism, and then deploy those against my thesis problem. I conclude 
that these theological accounts are correct in suggesting capitalism as a competing school 
of desire with rival ascetics and aesthetics, but that they overly dichotomise the 
relationship between the social realities of capitalism, and the ecclesia. At least they do 
insofar as any possible Evangelical habitation and horizon is concerned.  
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5.1 Neo-Augustinian Resources: Theologically problematising the relationship 
between capitalism and Christianity 
We have, at the start of this thesis, seen the paucity of Evangelical critique of Christianity 
in relationship to capitalism. There have been a handful of, already noted, congregational 
studies, historical studies, and ecclesial critiques of Evangelical congregations within 
capitalism.5 If we are looking for a sustained and extensive theological engagement of the 
nature of Christianity within capitalism, it is to be found in a clutch of neo-Augustinian 
and reformed sources. Gathering together these accounts provides opportunity to examine 
how others have theologised the broader nature of Christian belief and practice within 
capitalism. Indeed, many of these sources and accounts arise within the stable of my key 
protagonists, Milbank and Connolly, who generated the impetus for this thesis. Milbank 
and Connolly make extensive use of Augustinian/Reformed resources for their theoretical 
accounts of capitalism and Christianity.6 To examine those sources serves my needs for 
theological accounts, whilst at the same time bringing me into direct contact with the 
main critics of Evangelicalism. These Neo-Augustinian sources also interact with post-
Marxist material accounts in a way similar to how I have with Polanyi, to attain the ‘nitty-
gritty’ for ‘hard’ accounts of the social arrangements of capitalism and Christianity. Like 
me, they want their accounts to be “situated within contingent social and historical 
practices.”7 
Before we can examine and then deploy those sources, we need to ask the question; 
why not go directly to Augustine, rather than work from neo-Augustinian accounts 
                                                 
5 Even the recent and excellent Kidwell, Theology and Economics, is about the methodological 
relationship between theology and economics, and not the daily life of belief and practice by Christians 
within capitalism. 
6 For an explication of the Augustinian sources of Milbank and Connolly, see Keer, “Simplicity 
Itself,” and K. Roberts Skerret, “The Indispensable Rival: William Connolly’s Engagement with 
Augustine of Hippo,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72, no. 2 (2004). 
7 Stephen Long explains how social scientific accounts are insufficient for explaining economic 
life, and that materialist accounts like those of Marx, and, we assume, post-Marxist variants, can help 
theology in understanding contingent human action. See D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology 
and the Market, Radical Orthodoxy Series (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 101. Also, in some 
ways Long is a precursor to the work of Kidwell, Theology and Economics, explicating the 
methodological relationship between theology and economics. 
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centred on his theology? For Augustine produced a pedagogy of desire, summed up in 
his maxim that desiderium sinus cordis (“longing makes the heart deep”).8 The nature of 
desire, and understanding desire, sits at the centre and nexus of capitalism and its 
interactions with human nature. Such an accounting of desire within the relationship 
between Evangelicalism and capitalism might undoubtedly and profitably be made with 
reference to Augustine. Indeed, much work is currently being undertaken in this area, 
drawing on Augustine directly to diagnose and understand aspects of current public life 
and culture.9 However a theological account of the nature of desire in relation to 
capitalism and Christianity from within a re-reading of Augustine would be a huge 
undertaking far beyond my thesis remit, and would overwhelm my thesis objectives. 
Similarly, it would be too much of a task for my thesis to make an Augustinian assessment 
of Evangelicalism in relation to its ascetics of desire. Instead, I have situated my 
theological work in this chapter within neo-Augustinian resources, and thereby 
Augustinian horizons.  
There are many other Augustinian trails that we could follow in relation to my 
project. For example, we could explore the issue of possessions with the nature of 
‘having’ and ‘use’, but this would bring us more into contact with the technical aspects 
of capitalism in relation to Evangelicalism, and away from the social arrangements I am 
exploring.10 So, rather than assess whether the resources I use are sufficiently 
Augustinian, or whether Evangelicalism is Augustinian in its theology and practice, I 
instead suggest that we can compare these theological accounts with the implicit 
                                                 
8 St Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 28–54, translated and edited by John W. Rettig, 
The Fathers of the Church, Volume 88, 40.10 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1993), 133, accessed 10th February 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32b344. 
9 For two examples of where such work is currently being conducted, see Joshua Hordern, 
Political Affections: Civic Participation and Moral Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
and Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2011) which demonstrate, amongst other things, how Aquinas draws on 
Augustine’s understandings of emotions. See also Eric Gregory, The Politics of Love: an Augustinian 
Ethic of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
10 For example, see William Schweiker and Charles T. Mathewes, Having: Property and 
Possession in Religious and Social Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). 
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theological contours of the ascetics of Evangelicalism already mapped in this thesis. It 
will be sufficient to suggest how neo-Augustinian accounts overlay my map so far, and 
of what that reveals. I am, in essence, running several neo-Augustinian accounts 
recursively against my accounts, joining a conversation that is already underway with 
those who are influenced by Augustine, in particular, those critical of Evangelicalism. I 
will build on their accounts whilst identifying at the same time that these neo-Augustinian 
resources are insufficient for the reparative I seek. In short, the thesis turns back to the 
sources engaged with at the beginning, returning to those sources which set the thesis 
agenda in order to evaluate their arguments. 
 
5.2 Technologies of Desire: Capitalism’s victory over desire 
Whilst many Christians see capitalism as “quite compatible with Christianity,” capitalism 
is “actually antithetical to the faith and an obstacle to history’s true end”, or so claims 
Bell.11 Capitalism has developed into a “savage” form in which its victory over all 
ideologies is complete.12 So much so, that he asks: “Can Christianity fund resistance to 
capitalism?”13 Via the work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, Bell seeks to show 
that capitalism is not just an economic issue but also an ontological problem.14 
Contemporary capitalism is seen as the display of this faulty ontology and misplaced 
desire, which Christianity must resist.  
                                                 
11 Daniel M. Bell, Liberation Theology after the End of History: The Refusal to Cease Suffering, 
Radical Orthodoxy Series (London: Routledge, 2001), 1. 
12 Bell, Liberation Theology, 9. Here, Bell deploys the term ‘savage capitalism’ from Franz J. 
Hinkelammert, Cultura De La Esperanza Y Sociedad Sin Exclusión (San José: D.E.I, 1995). As an 
example of this ‘savage capitalism’, Bell argues that third-world debt is a primary tool used by the West 
to control the third world (Bell, Liberation Theology, 12). 
13 Ibid., 1. 
14 In particular Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Gilles Deleuze and Claire 
Parnet, Dialogues II (European Perspectives), rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); 
and Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 1st ed. (Boston: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). 
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Capitalism’s perceived victory is one, not over history, but over desire. Capitalism 
disciplines desire by a “pincer movement” of the deterritorialisation of desire 
(overrunning all previous forms of social organisation), and the machine and mechanisms 
of capitalism that reterritorialise desire as axiomatic for the market, ultimately using the 
form of the ‘State’ to regulate that behaviour.15 The State operates on the basis of other 
power relationships; there is good and bad about the State. Models of power which locate 
the State as sole possessor of power are now bankrupt. For the State now finds itself under 
the control of the market. In Bell’s own words, “liberalism severs the link between 
maximal government effectiveness and maximal government itself.”16 A reformulation of 
government as ‘civil society’ takes place under Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, the early 
theorists of this civil society. Civil society and political society are further differentiated, 
and the State becomes immanent in the economic process, and moves away from 
acquiring wealth, towards supporting the individual in acquiring wealth. The health and 
prosperity of a nation is now measured in totality by the wealth of its individuals. 
Therefore, the goal of liberal government becomes the securing of optimal conditions for 
the economics of society.17  
Bell goes on to diagnose and describe the practices of consumerism in capitalism 
as “technologies”; technologies that arrange people around misplaced desire. This is 
again drawn from the work of Foucault to explicate technologies as “ensembles of 
knowledges, instruments, systems of judgements, buildings and spaces bound together 
by certain presuppositions and objectives.”18 Bell’s main proposal is that liberation 
theology offers an understanding, and the real location of Christian resistance. Capitalism 
is to be resisted in such a way that the church becomes a separate economic, political 
state. Bell’s argument here is that we should resist in a way where the church is an 
                                                 
15 It is through the work of Foucault that Bell maps this development of capitalism, see Bell, 
Liberation Theology, 19. 
16 Ibid., 27. 
17 Ibid., 28. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
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economic formation in its own right. The church is the only res publica, à la Augustine, 
in a world in which it has ceded its notion of political and public life to the market. Instead 
of a correlation, the church becomes a separate world in its own right, an ecclesiology of 
separation: “Therefore only a more substantive ecclesiology, one that begins by 
collapsing the distinction between the theological and the social, between religion and 
politics, stands a chance of resisting capitalist discipline.”19 Here is the location of the 
most troublesome aspect of Bell’s work, for he offers no example of alternatives to 
capitalism after the call to overthrow it (albeit non-violently). He also proposes the church 
as a counter-polis to the state, which is problematic, first because it is questionable as to 
whether the church is a polis in and of itself against the world.20 Then, second, his 
proposition leads us to ask how the church could be a full counter-polis with its own 
statecraft, and produce goods, educate, enforce legal processes, etc.21 Bell, if he is useful 
for my project, is not with this counter-polis proposal, but with his diagnosis of 
technologies of desire. For it is certainly right that Christians are called to embody a way 
of life in the world, but it is quite another to constitute the church as against, and out of, 
the world. Such counter-polis is anathema to Evangelical ecclesiology and engagement 
in the world, as we have seen in previous chapters of this thesis. Bruce Hindmarsh reminds 
us that Evangelicals have never had such a high view of ecclesiology: “When one thinks 
about Evangelicals and what they hold dear, one would be forgiven for not thinking 
immediately of the church. Indeed, one might even suggest, given the history of schism 
among evangelicals, that “evangelical ecclesiology” is an oxymoron, like “an honest 
                                                 
19 Bell, Liberation Theology, 72. 
20 Stanley Hauerwas, and many of his students (of whom Bell was one, with his PhD dissertation 
supervised by Hauerwas which then formed the basis of his later work), advocate this view of the church 
as counter-polis. See, for example, Arne Rasmussen, The Church as Polis. 
21After similarly highlighting the problems of assuming the church as counter-polis, Miroslav 
Volf succinctly takes Bell to task on the impossibility of such a counter-polis being able to undertake 
actual statecraft. See Miroslav Volf, “Liberation Theology After the End Of History: An Exchange,” 
Modern Theology, 19, no. 2 (2003): 261–269. A kind of theological argument ensued between Volf and 
Bell, with Bell writing an extended response to Volf’s critique of his work, and then Volf writing a 
rejoinder to that response. See first Daniel M. Bell, “What Gift Is Given? A Response To Volf,” Modern 
Theology, 19 (2003): 271–280. 
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thief” or “airline food”.”22 The activism of Evangelicalism could not have taken place 
within an understanding of the church as a counter-polis totality. However, this lack of 
ontological constraint enables us to see how the ontologies of other social realities, such 
as those of the SRM in capitalism have become the dominant social realities for 
Evangelicals. Indeed, most Evangelicals rarely ask what the church is, unlike their 
Protestant forebears and Catholics.23 The “free form” nature of more recent 
Evangelicalism leaves it prone to taking shape around cultural forces and ontologies, for 
every church.24 There is certainly a spiritual ontological reality, where the church qua 
church is a creation of the Spirit, but as it exists in the world, it exists within a wider polis, 
and its members are of various oikoi, that sometimes make competing demands. For, “the 
whole authorisation of the church is conveyed by the Spirit, so that Pentecost can be seen 
as the moment at which the church comes to participate in the authority of the ascended 
Christ”.25 There is a distinct moment of ascension and Pentecost before the Parousia of 
Christ. This moment is where the social practices of the church are embedded in social 
realities and take place through worship.26 Yet, conscious review of the nature of church 
does not lead to that review being an ontological reality. For churches may have credal 
confessions, whilst their actual ecclesiology may be rather more implicit; in other words, 
a doctrine of the church does not ‘make’ the church.27 A popular Evangelical trope is to 
repeat the call to be ‘in the world but not of it’.28 We might turn this ‘in the world but not 
of it’ profession around, to see how Evangelicals have also wanted to be in the church but 
                                                 
22 Bruce Hindmarsh, “Is Evangelical Ecclesiology an Oxymoron?” in John G. Stackhouse, Jr., ed., 
Evangelical Ecclesiology: Reality or Illusion? (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 15. 
23 Howard A. Snyder, “The Marks of Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in ibid, 83. 
24 For a detailed survey of ecclesial traditions, and an outline of recent Evangelical ecclesial 
forms, see Veli-Matti Kärkkainen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology: Ecumenical, Historical & Global 
Perspectives (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2002). 
25 Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162. 
26 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, 104. Here, Bretherton develops and extends O’Donovan’s 
ideas of the authorization of the church by the Spirit. 
27 Snyder makes a similar claim about the functional nature of a church in contrast to doctrinal 
and confessional constructions. See “The Marks of Evangelical Ecclesiology,” 81. 
28 John 17:16. 
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not of it, with the result that they find no identity within the church other than the goods 
and services it dispenses to them. For Evangelicals have ended up rather more in the 
world than they profess, where “The gulf that had once yawned between the church and 
the world had virtually disappeared.”29 Bell is a warning that unless Evangelicals have 
some footing in the church, they will find their social realities completely determined by 
market ontologies.30 
Those market ontologies are extant, for Capitalism no longer needs to justify itself: 
it has “come out”, and everyone must live as entrepreneurs or be marginalized.31 Churches 
are run as businesses, and all sports are financially endorsed; everything is now ‘out of 
control’, free-floating, and captive to the market. The “credit card has surpassed the time 
card” for access to the economy.32 Desire is thus seen as restless, and revolutionary in its 
own right. Drawing on Deleuze, Bell believes that resistance is impossible. Real 
revolution is about nurturing the flow of desire, rather than its destruction: It is the need 
to exceed the desire fostered by capitalism with a re-ordered desire.33 Here we encounter 
a notion and nature of resistance, begging the question: what sort of resistance is 
appropriate for my thesis? Bell’s resistance is a complete refusal, a counter-polis, 
providing an alternative way of life to capitalism, where resistance is replacement in toto. 
The resistance my thesis seeks is more the kind set out in my first chapter, of re-narration, 
recapitulation, and an Ochian reparative in the mode of ‘physician heal thyself’. My focus 
is on how Evangelicals might get their own house in order, and not about the dismantling 
of capitalism. The resistance I seek is one that does not over-ontologise the world, into 
the kind of anti-Christ Bell creates. Percy is closer to what I seek for what I mean by 
                                                 
29 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 264. 
30 I have in mind here Paul Fiddes, and his covenant theology that resists and refutes the 
voluntarist reduction of church to the mere free association through choice by individuals. See Paul 
Fiddes, Tracks and Traces: Baptist Identity in Church and Theology (Studies in Baptist History and 
Thought) (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 42. 
31 Bell, Liberation Theology, 31. 
32 Ibid., 32. 
33 This echoes the suggestion by Miller to deepen agency, which I will highlight in the conclusion. 
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resistance, and I overlay his assessment of the Church of England’s mode of resistance 
as taking place within the larger aspect of resilience. Here, “resilience has two faces to it: 
resistance and accommodation.”34 
Bell presses his claims further, arguing that capitalism is a voracious 
deterritorializing, a form of madness that needs something more intense to overcome it. 
If “politics precedes being,” the ontology of capitalism must be ruptured.35 Capitalism’s 
victory is ontological: “Capitalism is erected on the [...] ontology of univocal desire shorn 
of any particular ethos.”36 Capitalism is to be understood as a technology of desire in 
competition with the technologies of desire of the body of Christ. Yet, this seems to be 
claiming too much; that Christianity is not just about the focusing and training of desire, 
but it is desire - a complete “economy of desire.”37 This places too high a value on 
individual agency, able to marshal the resources of life within capitalism as a kind of 
“religious mirroring of the capitalist mentality to serve as the alternative to capitalism.”38 
It is not only un-Christian to over-ontologise the church as the technology of desire, it is 
also something Evangelicals cannot accept. For Christianity is about a life formed through 
the agency of Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit, and not principally the 
technology of the church. It is an Evangelical impetus, as with much of Christianity, that 
it is not the church that makes us Christian, it is the person and work of Jesus Christ. Or, 
as Volf so penetratingly puts it: 
 
…for God forbid that the church would understand itself as a technology for inducing the 
death of self and for giving birth to Christ in it! The church would then become a temple of 
Satan, rather than the house of God. It is God who opens the hearts to the Gospel, God who 
kills the old self and makes alive the new, God who comes to dwell in the soul—and all the 
self-binding of God to the means of grace notwithstanding, God does all this when and 
                                                 
34 Percy, The Shaping of the Church, 61. 
35 Bell, Liberation Theology, 33. 
36 Ibid., 34 
37 Ibid., 92. 
38 Volf, Liberation Theology After the End Of History, 265. 
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where God wants, with no strict correlation between external means of grace 
(“technologies”) and their internal effect.39  
Nearly a decade later, Bell still claims that capitalism as an ontological reality is an 
economy of desire, and the church is a counter-ontology and competing economy of 
desire.40  
A proposal for counter-technologies of desire is made by Bell from a study of 
Bernard of Clairvaux, where Cistercians offer an example of “technologies of desire”.41 
These are deemed capable of resisting the technologies of capitalism.42 The analogue here 
is of how twelfth-century Cistercian’s liturgies functioned as technologies of desire, able 
to resist the pathologies of the prevailing culture. Bell anticipates objections to this use 
of Bernard, due to his support for the Crusades and his privileged monastic life. Despite 
such objections, he asserts that there is an attitude shown by Bernard, a willingness to 
embody and live faith with technologies that shape desire.43 The claim here is that 
capitalism is an assemblage of technologies around desire, and nothing less will suffice 
than to grasp that the church is a place to practise alternative and resistant assemblages. 
But again, this begs the question; can we reduce Christianity to a competing of desire, 
i.e., technologies, when in fact it is about the deployment of technologies around 
something or rather someone – the gift of God in Jesus Christ to the world? If the church 
is a technology of desire, i.e., it trains desire, that training is surely, as per Volf, less about 
being a telos around notions of counter-polis, and more about the ordering of desire 
                                                 
39 Miroslav Volf, “Against A Pretentious Church: A Rejoinder To Bell’s Response,” Modern 
Theology, 19 (2003): 281–285. 
40 Bell updates his work within the credit crunch context of the last decade. This time, Volf did 
not review Bell’s work, probably due to his original critique standing against Bell’s ongoing claims for 
the ontology of the church as a counter-polis, and competing economy to capitalism. See Daniel M. Bell, 
The Economy of Desire: Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World (The Church and 
Postmodern Culture) (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academi, 2012). 
41 Anthony Lane has written a seminal work on Bernard of Clairvaux. In it, he reveals Bernard’s 
complex relationship with monastic and scholastic theology, and how this was integral to Bernard’s 
liturgical prayer and worship ascetics. See Anthony N. S. Lane, Bernard of Clairvaux: Theologian of the 
Cross (Trappist, KY: Cistercian Publications, 2013), 41–48. 
42 Bell, Liberation Theology, 88. 
43 Despite his best attempts, Bell remains wholly unconvincing with regard to these objections. 
The unrealistic lifestyle for Bernard’s technologies and Christendom’s outworking of them in the 
Crusades should give us pause for concern, as indeed they have for others in the church’s history. 
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around the person of Jesus Christ. Now such ordering around Jesus Christ might indeed, 
and ultimately, become some kind of counter-polis. 
Connolly’s methodological claims, explored in the first chapter of this thesis, of 
capitalism as an assemblage of resonances, certainly inheres with Bell’s claims. This is 
no surprise, for Connolly, like Bell, draws on Deleuze to understand capitalism as an 
assemblage of beliefs, relationships, and practices. It is the resonance of the assemblages 
of Christianity with those of capitalism that explains the inability to resist capitalism’s 
pathologies. Connolly calls Christians to look outside their worship practices, and to enter 
into a new assemblage of “existential orientations, relational tactics, local strategies, 
academic reforms, microeconomics experiments, large social movements, media 
strategies, shifts in economics and political ethos, state policies, and cross-state actions.”44 
Connolly is unwilling to find any resistant assemblages within Evangelicalism, unless 
they are redeployed around his neo-liberal agenda, as we saw in the first chapter. In 
comparison, Bell looks to the liturgical worship practices of the Cistercians as a way to 
counter any resonance of capitalist assemblages. The problems of Bell’s account also lead 
me to refocus on the Evangelical horizon, of how faithful performance of life around the 
person of Jesus Christ takes place, rather than some alternative counter-polis Evangelical 
economy. However, one does not need to stray too far off the side-roads of Evangelical 
history to locate communities seeking to live as a counter-polis. For example, Robert 
Beckford has explored Afro-Caribbean immigration into the United Kingdom, and the 
way dub music has served as a resistance to the stresses of capitalist markets upon 
immigrants, whilst enabling them to construct a new identity within that location.45 
Beckford describes the harsh conditions of poor labour markets that arise for immigrants 
within the flow of capitalist markets, the necessity for “cultural resistance” to those 
conditions, and the role the Pentecostal Afro-Caribbean church has played in that 
                                                 
44 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 144. 
45 Robert Beckford, Jesus Dub: Theology, Music, and Social Change (New York: Routledge, 
2006). 
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process.46 Beckford would have us read the reconfiguration of church hall worship by 
immigrant Afro-Caribbeans as types of “resistance to a hostile social climate.”47  
Evangelicalism is prone to over-accommodation on one side of its historical 
archipelago and, on the other, to over-resistance by withdrawal from the world48. As 
Warner notes, Evangelicalism’s “propensity for missional pragmatism leads to cognitive 
bargaining with the prevailing popular culture.”49 The discussion in this section also 
prompts me to ask whether the practices, in particular the worship life of Evangelicals, 
are able to provide a resistant assemblage, and counter technology of desire. And can 
such resistance be made whilst simultaneously responding to any previous undesirable 
resonances by Evangelical practices in capitalism? In order to get at that possibility, I 
now turn to explore in more detail one of the key mechanisms within the assemblages of 
capitalism, something at the heart of capitalist technologies of desire, namely 
‘commodification’. This examination of commodification is made with the work of 
Vincent Miller who has a different proposal and understanding for resistance and faithful 
living, more amenable to my project. 
 
5.3 Commodification: The atrophy of resistance 
Miller, author of Consuming Religion, is rather relaxed in his use of the terms 
“capitalism”, “consumerism”, and “commodification”.50 He makes little attempt to define 
capitalism, and employs the terms almost interchangeably. However, late twentieth-
century capitalist markets are indeed his focus, in particular, the social arrangements of 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 37–44. 
47 Ibid., 45. This is a concrete example of the kind of Pentecostal ‘islands of social care’ we saw 
with Martin, Tongues of Fire in chapter two of my thesis. 
48 From Brethren enclaves (see Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 157–159, 276) to 
prosperity churches (see Miller and Yamamori, Global Pentecostalism, 175–177). 
49 Warner, Re-inventing English Evangelicalism, 222. 
50 For example, Miller, Consuming Religion, 42. Miller talks about capitalism as having 
developed from early to late forms, but never defines what he means by capitalism or what those 
developments are.  
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consumer society around those markets.51 He is concerned with the social arrangements 
that take place within capitalism, and of how “consumer culture involves a great 
expansion in who may exercise cultural agency.”52 Capitalism now “constructs every 
person as the author of his or her own identity, expressed aesthetically through the 
consumption and display of commodities.”53 Regarding consumerism, Miller is primarily 
concerned with the mechanism of commodification.54 He provides an account of the 
developments of late capitalism, and of how consumer culture arises around those 
developments. Aided by post-Marxist material critiques, he identifies commodification 
as the process by which capitalism takes its cultural shape and form. Indeed, for him it is 
this commodification that presents the largest competition to religion and, therefore, to 
Christian ecclesiology. He contends that, if Christian ecclesiology is concerned with the 
social arrangements of life around beliefs and practices, it is principally commodification 
that undermines that possibility. 
There is a thesis here, that consumerism is not a definable set of beliefs and 
ideologies that Christianity can counter, but rather that “it is primarily a way of relating 
to beliefs – a set of habits of interpretation and use – that renders the ‘content’ of beliefs 
and values less important.”55 It is not that Miller does not believe that anything needs to 
be challenged in consumerism (such as the anthropological beliefs of consumers), but 
rather, that there is a preceding problem that renders any such critique impotent. Such is 
the power of this process that consumerism is able to ignore any critique of itself and, 
ultimately, turn it into an item for marketing, and further consumption. It achieves this 
with an unconscious “protean power”, abstracting the beliefs and content of Christian 
                                                 
51 It is the ‘cultural logic’ of capitalism that Miller explores, rather than the technical 
arrangements of capitalist economics (see Miller, Consuming Religion, 63–66). However, he does seek to 
explain commodification as a technical practice within consumerism, but even then, does so from a social 
and cultural perspective. 
52 It is ‘consumer culture’ that Miller explores within the sociality of capitalism; see ibid., 26–31. 
53 Ibid., 29. 
54 Ibid., 32–35. 
55 Ibid., 1. 
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symbols and practice from the concrete reality of a formed Christian life.56 The start of 
this process of abstraction is the mistaken notion that we form beliefs which lead to 
changes in behaviour; that meaning informs practice in some linear and concomitant 
manner. Whilst we develop alternative theologies to counter the beliefs of consumer 
culture, we fail to realise that consumerism operates without the need for any supporting 
ideology (rendering any ideological critique self-defeating), and that dissent is so woven 
into the DNA of consumerism, that capitalism uses any critique as raw materials for new 
consumer goods.57 
This state of affairs, of beliefs stripped from originating practices, is inherent to the 
processes of ‘commodification’. In addition to disempowering critique by even the most 
robust oppositions, commodification erodes the holding of any beliefs in a concrete and 
communal context. This has disastrous consequences for anyone or any group who wishes 
to hold to beliefs and concretise them into a pattern of daily life and formation. 
Commodification is a process of abstraction that is an expansion of who may “exercise 
cultural agency”, in which “it constructs every person as the author of his or her own 
identity, expressed aesthetically through the consumption and display of commodities.”58 
 
The Emergence of Commodification 
The development and the nature of commodification can be traced through Marxist 
productivist accounts. Henry Ford applied the theories of Fredrick Taylor to workplace 
pay, such that today the aesthetic of an item becomes just as important as its function to 
its value. There is a transformation in the value of items away from production costs for 
ownership, whereas Guy Debord says, we have “moved from being to having.”59 Several 
philosophical discourses further underpin this economic analysis; from Henri Lefebvre 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 18. 
58 Ibid., 29. 
59 Ibid., 37. 
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he obtains an understanding of how the value of something becomes a function of what 
is signified by the image of a commodity. Then, from Guy Debord, Miller considers how 
we have moved from “having” to “appearing”; that everything has moved into 
representation as the apogee of Marx’s predictions of commodity fetish. There is a telos 
to this process, made with the work of Jean Baudrillard, in which human beings take on 
the pessimistic status of terminals consuming media images.60 
Miller attempts to be supra-philosophical and correlates his overall analysis against 
the work of Fredrick Jameson, in order to map cultural understanding in the abstract to 
the concrete action of politics. We now consume so many things that we cannot possibly 
have the energy to consider the origins of those items. There is a concomitant collapse of 
the temporal into agency and identity.61 Here, I suggest that insomuch as we can speak of 
Christian identity at all, we have to speak of Christian identities, the fact of which 
undermines Evangelicalism in every way. Especially since we do not merely have as 
many identities as churches, or even as many identities as Christians, but we have as many 
Christian identities as each individual wishes to construct over the course of his or her 
lifetime. 62 As Lyotard predicted, modernity has fragmented into ever new modernisms, 
until we are left with a war of all against all, and I suggest, arrive at a war of self against 
self.63 The sheer energy required for creating a self and life within the consumerism of 
late capitalism leave little left for creating Christian identity. Moreover, commodification 
                                                 
60 In 1966, Baudrillard completed his doctoral thesis, “Thèse de troisième cycle: Le Système des 
objets” (Thesis of the Third Cycle: The System of Objects), under the tutelage of Henri Lefebvre. Also, 
see Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. 
61 Miller, Consuming Religion, 63–66.  
62 Justification for this claim is supported by Anna Robbins who, drawing on Jean Baudrillard, 
The Consumer Society, explains how human identity has become free-floating from any community, 
relationships and even one’s own self; see Anna M. Robbins, “It’s always right now’: Framing the 
Struggle for Meaning in Contemporary Culture,” HOLINESS, 2.3, (2016): 359–368. 
63 This disintegration of the self is explained in Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition, 15–16. The extensiveness of these multiple selves and the battle of self against self, is 
surveyed extensively in the sociological study of James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, The Self We 
Live By: Narrating Self in a Postmodern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), and then a 
collection of essays they edited, Jaber F. Gubrium, and James A. Holstein, Institutional Selves: Troubled 
Identities in a Postmodern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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is more likely to result in the resources of Christian faith being consumed as raw materials 
for creating this consumer identity. This articulation explains the phenomena set out at 
the start of this thesis, that Christianity is all too easily co-opted in the ‘dispensing of 
religious goods and services’. Miller then moves to apply this analysis to the effects on 
religious identity formation and Christianity in general, as now follows. 
 
Effects of Commodification on Religion 
What happens to religion within the cultural logic of consumerism? Primarily, what takes 
place is the abstraction of beliefs from contextual traditions, which weakens their ability 
to impact on concrete daily life, and any connection to the communities from which they 
originated. The result is that new communities are unable to form around those beliefs: 
 
Traditions are pillaged for their symbolic content, which is then repackaged and 
recontextualized in ways that jettison their communal, ethical, and political consequence. 
Traditions are valued as sources of “poetic and imaginative imagery,” while their logic, 
systems of doctrine, and rules of practice are dismissed for their rigidity and exclusivity.64 
Whereas community and religious groups previously met psychological needs, 
consuming has taken the place of producing well-being: “People no longer hunger for 
salvation or an era of justice, but for ‘the feeling, the momentary illusion, of personal 
well-being, health, and psychic security.’”65 This commitment to the agency of the self 
makes the sustaining of religious communities almost impossible. Then those who are 
able to synthesise their religious beliefs still have the problem of connecting those beliefs 
to the concrete of everyday life. Bretherton has highlighted how those trained in this 
nature of agency are unable to undertake the difficult problems and rich commitments 
that vibrant institutions like the church requires.66 Percy has similarly noted this disabled 
agency, manifest in practice, by the ecclesial progeny of Evangelicalism, such that “many 
                                                 
64 Miller, Consuming Religion, 84.   
65 Ibid., 85. 
66 Bretherton warrants this claim with the work of Miller. See Luke Bretherton, “Beyond the 
Emerging Church”, in Andrew Walker and Luke Bretherton, eds. Remembering Our Future: 
Explorations in Deep Church, (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), 47. 
183 
 
Fresh Expressions therefore constitute a perfect fit for a post-institutional culture that 
does not want to invest in complex organisations and infrastructure for the common 
good.”67 Without a community to support their beliefs, it is the willpower of the individual 
alone that sustains them. There has been a shift “from a world in which beliefs held 
believers to one in which believers hold beliefs.”68 Miller concludes that religious beliefs 
and practices are in danger of being extracted from complex (deep) cultures and contexts, 
and of being abstractly consumed and unable to form practices of everyday life.69 The 
therapeutic individual now aligns himself with post-Fordist marketing, and its use of 
religious symbols, to construct his own religion, to support his therapeutic choices.70 
 
Misplaced Desire 
 
We, like Miller, are led to ask: why do human beings engage in this behaviour, and what 
might be the remedy to that behaviour? There is a point of intersection between the 
abstracting process of commodification and a theological problematizing around the issue 
of misplaced desire. Here Miller, like Cavanaugh and Bell, sees an Augustinian account 
of desire as able to explicate the problems of commodification, but also to offer the 
possibility of a response and resistance to its pathologies. Miller cites Bell in the 
production of his account of desire and of understanding consumerism as a competing 
ontology of desire to that of Christian desire.71 This theological critique discerns that 
consumer desire is not the attachment to things per se, but the complex desire for desire. 
This desire absorbs any longings for transcendence, justice, and self-transformation.72 
                                                 
67 Percy, Shaping the Church, 78. 
68 Miller, Consuming Religion, 90. 
69 Ibid., 91–94. 
70 Here, Miller, like others such as Michael Budde, situates current late capitalism with a post-
Fordist context, i.e., the emergence of a type of capitalism that differs from that system of capitalism 
formulated in Henry Ford’s automotive factories and production lines. For details of post-Fordist 
understandings of late capitalism, see Michael L. Budde, The (Magic) Kingdom of God: Christianity and 
Global Culture Industries (Boulder, CO, London: Westview Press, 1997). 
71 Miller, Consuming Religion, 112. 
72 Ibid., 144. 
184 
 
Consumer culture, whilst making people shallow and narcissistic, also derails those who 
seek to respond to it.73 This is redolent of Richard Roberts, who reminds us of the 
possibilities within the marketplace for agency, which are only limited by the 
imagination, where the church becomes as locked into social niches as much as the rest 
of society have.74 Recent extensive surveys of young adult Christians reveal this 
shallowness to faith. There is a trained disposition that disables people from engaging in 
the practices of faith they aspire to.75 So then, the obvious question, if this is the case, is 
whether it is possible to resist this situation and lead to a Christian imagination for agency 
in the world?  
 
Possibilities for Action 
 
The nature and status of agency is the site of any possible resistance. In Marxist accounts, 
one reading of agency is as a superficiality, a shallow bricolage, with ill-informed 
syntheses that are ignorant misuses of religious beliefs and practices: “When the building 
blocks are so commodified the bricolage they fund is less likely to be surprising or 
subversive of the status quo, since it is built with the elements that offer little resistance 
to shallow appropriation.”76 On the other hand, there are possibilities for bricolage. 
Bricolage, as per de Certeau, is an important process where knowledge is both practical, 
                                                 
73 For an extended study on how a culture of narcissism emerged in a post-Protestant Work Ethic 
world, see Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979). 
74 Richard H. Roberts, “A Postmodern Church? Some Preliminary Reflections on Ecclesiology 
and Social Theory”, Essentials of Christian Community (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 194–195. 
75 See David Kinnaman, Unchristian: What a New Generation Really Thinks About Christianity 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2007); Christian Smith et al., , Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of 
Emerging Adulthood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Lost in Transition is not about Christian 
young adults, but encompasses them. The research background to this book led to the research on 
Christian young adults; see Kenda Creasy Dean, Almost Christian: What the Faith of Our Teenagers is 
Telling the American Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). The imaginations for life in 
consumer culture by parents is handed on to their children, where faith has been reduced to the 
“Therapeutic Moralistic Deism”. In summary, God is there to feel better, to be protected from the pains of 
life, and to get you the things you want in life. For further scrutiny and analysis of the effects of affluence 
on young adult Christians, see David A. Sims, The Child in American Evangelicalism and the Problem of 
Affluence: A Theological Anthropology of the Affluent American-Evangelical Child in Late Modernity 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009). 
76 Miller, Consuming Religion, 162. 
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and a cultural practice, with concrete action and significance, as long as the building 
blocks available are complex and rich. Here, the problem is not in the nature of bricolage 
itself, for that is to assume that the bricolage of commodification is somehow inherently 
deficient. It is the shallowness of the resources within bricolage that is the problem. We 
see that bricolage has been the normal response and means of growth of the church in 
history, that there is not, nor has there ever been, a linear relationship between theology 
and practice: “People appropriate religious idioms, as they need them, in response to 
particular circumstances. All religious ideas and impulses are of the moment, invented, 
taken, borrowed, and improvised at the intersection of life.”77 In a similar vein, we see 
that “the problem with consumerism culture is not that the masses are encouraged to 
develop their own religious synthesis but that believers encounter the elements of 
tradition in an abstract, fragmented form and are trained to engage them as passive 
consumers.”78 The response to a shallow bricolage is to encourage a deepening of 
religious agency, to modify and develop the nature of bricolage in use by religious 
traditions, to “give people the formation and responsibility necessary to engage their 
traditions creatively as mature practitioners.”79 There is here, a hope that religious 
traditions can provide material for complex engagements with culture, whilst academic 
theology possesses resources and methods that can contribute to, and strengthen, popular 
religious agency. Miller concludes his work with suggestions of how religious agency 
may be deepened in this manner as bricolage within consumerist culture.  
 
Unmasking and Deepening 
 
Deeping of agency has a twofold approach: first, challenging and unmasking the 
abstracting effects of consumerism, and second, supporting and deepening consumer 
                                                 
77 Kathryn Tanner, “Theology and Popular Culture,” in Changing Conversations: Religious 
Reflection and Cultural Analysis, edited by Dwight Hopkins and Sheila Greeve Davaney (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 113.  
78 Miller, Consuming Religion, 9. 
79 Ibid., 10. 
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agency. This unmasking may be possible through the liturgical stabilisation of beliefs and 
the practice of negative rituals, the prohibitions to religious experiences, and practices as 
an antidote to a consumer culture: 
 
Negative rituals, which reinforce the sacred by restricting access to it, have less appeal in 
consumer culture, which does not understand ritual prohibitions or cultic abstinence. Save 
an admission fee, it knows no iconostasis or temple veil. Its icons and idols are not 
protected in an inner sanctum open only to ritually purified initiates, but displayed before 
all on the covers of magazines and on billboards.80 
Unlike our consumer culture, which gains access to anything it wants in return for ‘an 
admission fee’, we need a veiling and withholding of some of our symbols and beliefs, 
thereby preserving them as elements of religious agency. The deepening of agency might 
be fostered around the encouragement of an increasingly educated laity. This would be a 
laity able to apply their superficial appropriations from the external pluralism of 
consumerism to the internal depth and plurality of the Christian faith. The church has 
previously all too often resisted self-agency and ring-fenced the internal pluralism of the 
church from its members. It must now see its vast historical depth and traditions as an 
opportunity to catalyse its members into a bricolage that embraces the complex.81 Despite 
his concluding optimism, Miller sounds a cautionary note that apathy, as the consumer 
malaise, may remain the response of consumers.82 This pessimistic warning is redolent of 
Weber, Milbank, and others, who fear any mode of resistance is doomed to be repackaged 
and consumed by the mechanisms of capitalism in concert with the nature of human 
beings.  
We now better understand how commodification renders agency superficial, and 
unable to connect beliefs to the deeper sources of those beliefs. A response to this state 
of affairs is a worship-centred one, where the church is called to retrain desires, and orient 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 206. 
81 O’Donovan makes a case for agency on the basis of a formative programme that resists the 
tendencies of other formative influences; see Oliver O’Donovan, Self, World, and Time: Ethics as 
Theology, Volume 1: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013). 
82 Miller, Consuming Religion, 224. 
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them rightly. A deepening of agency is called for that only worship can generate. Where 
the worship of Evangelicals has generated a training into superficiality and dispensing 
religious goods and series, can it be reconfigured to orient engagement with the world 
more faithfully in a mode of resilience and resistance? In order to address that question, 
we now turn to the work of William Cavanaugh to ask how bodies in their social 
arrangements for life are configured.  
 
5.4 False Bodies and Perverted Liturgies 
Cavanaugh’s analysis enables me to bring Bell’s technologies of desire, i.e., practices of 
life in capitalism, into contact with the worship practices of the body of Christ, whilst 
being attentive to Miller’s concerns with the issue of agency. I can now theologically 
explicate how imaginations for life are enacted in capitalism, and further, how beliefs and 
practices of Christianity become co-opted by the practises of life within capitalism. 
 
5.4.1 The Res publica 
In Torture and Eucharist, William Cavanaugh examines the torture that took place under 
General Pinochet in Chile. Cavanaugh claims that the State’s approach to torture can be 
best understood as a disciplined liturgical process enacted upon bodies that are social, 
institutional, and physical.83 On the other hand, with the body of Christ, Jesus is master 
of our bodies, and the State attempts to claim that it holds this role.84 The State, with its 
practice of torture, disappears bodies such, that its victims practise the self-discipline of 
their own removal from public life.85 This torture can be understood as a perverted liturgy 
that fragments people into isolation, and membership of false bodies.86 Under the regime 
                                                 
83 William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ, 
Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 1. 
84 Ibid., 71. 
85 Ibid., 33. 
86 Ibid., 2. 
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of torture, human bodies are atomised from proper social embodiment, and the church as 
the true res publica is replaced by the State with a related false soteriology.87 This is 
because the church is not a rival polis to the State but is an alternative time-space reality 
to the State, which is a false body.88 Now here Cavanaugh’s argument is redolent of Bell, 
with a potential over-ontologising of the church as a counter-Polis to the world. But 
Cavanaugh, unlike Bell, does not see the church as an economy of desire which must 
replace the economic systems of capitalism. Rather, the church in its worship is what is 
most authentic and most real, and should bring order to all other social relationships. 
The situation then arises in which the body of Christ is excluded from the political 
realm, which, rather than resolving conflict, “enacts it”.89 Therein, “the state protects us 
from the threats which it itself creates.”90 Instead of engaging in public life under the 
terms and logic of the State, the church is the only real public and authentically political 
body, thus revealing the false realities of the State and the market.91 Cavanaugh draws on 
the worship life of the Catholic church in Chile to demonstrate and then theologically 
explicate how the Eucharist is the primary response and act of “resistance” par excellence 
by the church to torture.92 Here, the Eucharist is a public enactment that forms the res 
publica in opposition to this isolation and fragmentation. But Cavanaugh is required to 
explain how this act of resistance had to be recovered by the Catholic church in the face 
of prior complicity with the state of Chile. This is because the Catholic church in Chile 
abandoned political space for the social, thereby exacerbating the problems of torture 
with its ecclesiology. This ecclesiology helped to create an autonomous political realm 
                                                 
87 Cavanaugh traces how the Social Contracts of Hobbes and Rousseau are replaced by the 
Hegelian three-phase conception and progression of the ‘nature-civil-political’ body, with a resultant 
soteriology of the State as peacemaker, and as something that most contemporary Christians have 
adopted, see Ibid., 6. 
88 Given the lack of role for the State within Cavanaugh’s portrayal, it is difficult to see the State 
as anything other than rival. 
89 Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 9. 
90 Ibid., 9. 
91 Ibid., 10. 
92 Ibid., 229. 
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by withdrawing the church into civil society as the soul of the people.93 Cavanaugh 
diagnoses the influence of Jacques Maritain in this ecclesiology to have led the Chilean 
Catholic church to deny itself as a type of body politic.94 This left Christians as part of a 
mystical body within which they were supposed to attend church then enter the world and 
incarnate their Christian values on their own, although they are unable to do so.95 When 
the church moves away from the State into the social, it becomes just one of many social 
groups. Salvation becomes about the inward, the church becomes mystical, and any 
reality of the future Kingdom becomes more related to individuals than to social groups. 
There is no sense in which the church is itself a body analogous to other bodies with a 
corporeal incarnation or body politic.96 With the church gone from politics, only the State 
can impersonate God in an embodied manner such that secular faith does not stay private; 
instead, it takes hold of our physical bodies and commands both them and our souls.97 
The liberation of church from State led to its privatisation and domination by the State.98 
Cavanaugh suggests that Augustine’s “two cities” theology may help to diagnose the 
relationship between church and State. It also enables us to retrieve and enact the 
Eucharist as an act to “resist” the evil of the State and its violence, whereby the church is 
made publicly visible: “If the Church is to resist disappearance, then it must be publicly 
visible as the body of Christ in the present time, not secreted away in the souls of believers 
or relegated to the distant past or future. It becomes visible through its disciplined 
practices, but the church’s discipline must not simply mimic that of the state.”99 In the 
early medieval period, Augustine’s theory of time and relationship held sway. Two cities, 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 120. 
94 In the fourth chapter of Torture and Eucharist, Cavanaugh provides an extended section 
showing how Maritain’s ‘dual planes of existence’ was acquired from Aquinas and Dominican 
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being directed by the church. See “A Distinction of Planes,” in ibid., 151–202. 
95 Ibid., 120. 
96 Ibid., 141. 
97 Ibid., 193. 
98 Ibid., 202. 
99 Ibid., 10, 234. 
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one formed by love of God and one by love of self, occupied two different times, not 
spaces.100 Whilst the earthly city is not everlasting, the heavenly city sojourns with the 
earthly city in the “time between times.”101 This Augustinian notion of time gave way as 
the State became sempiternal to natural law in borrowing its sacred symbols from the 
church.102 At the same time that the State as church emerged, the church as State emerged 
in parallel.103 As church made itself at home in the world, it lost its sense of being pilgrims 
passing through towards an eternal home. There is a contrast between Augustinian 
imagination of time with the secular imaginations of uniform homogenous time, of cause 
and effect, concluding that we have arrived at an understanding of church as a community 
that moves linearly from past into present and endless future.104 In this imagination, the 
Eucharist interrupts the world, and provides a new identity; we become part of the body 
of Christ such that communion is an anamnesis, a remembering and re-enactment of the 
past.105 We are literally “re-membered” into the body of Christ.106 
 
5.4.2 The Oikos-Polis: Competing social bodies 
Cavanaugh asks what such Eucharist counter-politics looks like in the contemporary 
world.107 He suggests that the church needs to be embodied in spaces from which it has 
been disappeared. For the church is a lived and public reality instantiated within the 
conflict of the oikos and the polis.108 For him, this embodiment is primarily through the 
Eucharist. The church has lost its sense of homelessness in the world and has adopted the 
secular rhythms of society instead. Church is not a political space, but neither is it a ‘no-
                                                 
100 Ibid., 222–223. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 222. 
104 Ibid., 223.  
105 Ibid., 229. 
106 Ibid., 234. 
107 Ibid., 253. 
108 Ibid., 268-269. 
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space’ – or in the words of John Zizioulas, church is institution and event, not one or the 
other.109 In other words: 
 
The Eucharist is therefore an ‘event’ in the sense of an eschatological performance in time 
which is not institutionally guaranteed, but it is an event which is ontologically 
determinative…the Eucharist is the ‘beating heart’ of the Church. Day by day, week by 
week, the Church is gathered around the Eucharist, but then disperses, only to gather again 
at the next Eucharist.110 
The church is between polis and oikos, with its centre of gravity and home in 
pilgrimage.111 Cavanaugh has similarly sought to extend his thesis of the State as a false 
Catholicity and body into other understandings of socio-economic reality.112 Whether it 
is notions of the nation state, civil society, or globalisation, Cavanaugh determines that 
they are all “imagined practices”, constituted by disciplines around those imaginings.113 
They are “ways of organizing bodies around stories of human nature and human destiny 
which have deep theological analogues.”114 All of these theological analogues, upon 
further examination, are exposed as “false theologies”.115 This diagnosis can be extended 
into understanding globalisation as a false body, deploying Michel de Certeau’s 
distinction between “itineraries” and “maps”.116 “Itineraries” are pre-modern “spatial 
stories”, as narratives and movements to traverse through space and time, whilst “maps” 
are the modern practice of erasing itineraries and the totalising of space and time into 
homogenised grids.117 A map is the flattening of complex social space, where the local is 
                                                 
109 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: St 
Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1985), 15. 
110 Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 270. 
111 Ibid., 271. 
112 Cavanaugh does this most immediately in William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination 
(London: T & T Clark, 2002). His more recent work focuses more on a theology of economics than the 
ascetics and social imaginaries of capitalist markets. See William T. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed: 
Economics and Christian Desire (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008). 
113 Cavanaugh draws on the work of Anderson for understanding how historically contingent 
imagined communities take shape. This brings his work into close contact with my similar diagnosis of 
Evangelicals within capitalism. See Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 1. 
114 Ibid., 2. 
115 Ibid., 4. 
116 Ibid., 100. 
117 Ibid., 100–101. 
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subsumed into the universal by the nature of production and consumption within global 
markets.118 Here, his account is redolent of those we have already seen in Polanyi’s 
description of how the fictions of land, labour, and money are enacted through physical 
practices around social imaginations. We may understand Polanyi’s fictions of land, 
labour, and money as taking place through this distinction of ‘mapping’. At the end of 
my previous chapter I suggested that the collapse of identity into the SRM had been 
fuelled by an Evangelical post-Protestant work ethic, such that SRM had become a 
substitute for the body of Christ. Cavanaugh helps us to understand how the social 
realities that the practices of capitalism constructs are not just functionally, but 
theologically, a body in competition with the body of Christ. Anglo-Catholic 
ecclesiologies, such as those articulated by Cavanaugh, call us to consider how the church 
is a social body competing with other social bodies. We cannot merely consider the 
church as a free-for-all social arrangement. The church is the Body of Christ, mediating 
an experience and presence of Jesus in the world. As Oliver O’Donovan reminds us, the 
church is not just one choice amongst many, but is the ultimate choice for Christians to 
make – a choice that brings order to all our other social arrangements and choices.119  
Many Evangelicals of all persuasions would do well to question how their 
churchmanship is often used to serve the purposes of other social arrangements, like the 
SRM. How often, if at all, do Evangelicals consider how the church is not a means to 
other ends, but is instead a distinct group of God’s people in the world, called to a 
particular mission? As per the beginning of my thesis, Evangelicals would quickly claim 
that the daily aspects of life are meant to be used in service of the mission of God’s people 
through the church, not the other way around. But it will not do for Evangelicals to over-
ontologise the world and the SRM as the anti-Christ.  
                                                 
118 Ibid., 102. 
119 O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, 178. 
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Cavanaugh’s conclusion is that space is dominated and ultimately detached from 
any particularity. There is a discipline to living within the global economy that results in 
a mapping of social reality, as isolation, fragmentation, and detachment.120 This correlates 
with my earlier conclusion that this account of Evangelicalism within capitalism reveals 
a great disembedding from ecclesial social relationships towards an insertion into market 
social realities. For participation in the practices of capitalist markets is nothing other than 
the enactment of a narrative that is completely counter to the body of Christ as a social 
and theological reality.121 Cavanaugh’s response to this problematic is to claim (again) 
that it is the Eucharist that resists and enacts a true embodiment around the body of Christ 
as an alternative social imaginary and reality.122 Ultimately, the performance of the 
Eucharist is an act of consumption in which we ourselves are consumed into a new social 
identity of the body of Christ, in contrast to how consumption within late-capitalist 
markets has us mapped into the social realities of capitalist practices.123 For the practice 
of the Eucharist is resistant to the pathologies of commodification in capitalism “because 
the consumer of the Eucharist is taken up into a larger body, the body of Christ.”124 We 
must, however, question Cavanaugh’s pessimistic diagnosis. Are we able to view late-
capitalist markets merely as ‘false bodies’, within which the only ecclesial resistance we 
can offer is the practice of the Eucharist?  
 
5.4.3 Capitalism as Perverted Liturgies 
Can we correlate Cavanaugh’s diagnosis of the State as performing liturgies on bodies, 
whether individuals or any group and association, with the conditions of social 
relationships in late-capitalist market contexts? If torture is a ‘perverted liturgy’ as an 
                                                 
120 Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 106–111. 
121 Ibid., 112. 
122 Ibid., 116–117. 
123 Ibid., 119–121. 
124 Cavanaugh, Being Consumed, 54. 
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ascetic, can we, by extension, diagnose the ascetics of late-capitalist markets as a similar 
perverted liturgy? In other words, does the social imaginary of the Evangelicalism with 
which we are concerned (where we have understood Evangelicalism to be various sets of 
practices and habitation in competition with the ascetics of late capitalism) find an affinity 
and analogue with Cavanaugh’s diagnosis? To put it more bluntly, can we perceive late 
capitalism to be a similar ‘perverted liturgy’? Can we discern whether late-capitalist 
markets manifest as a similar ‘false body’ constituted by its ascetical practices and 
demands of social and human bodies? One does not have to look too far to see the 
ascetical demands placed on young people, for example to participate in the lifestyles of 
late-capitalist markets, with the associated costs of disciplining their bodies with diet and 
clothing at great expense of time and money.125 The hours and costs of market lifestyle 
participation seem tortuous and liturgical.126 
Cavanaugh alerts us to how capitalist markets can be understood as the construction 
of a false body, through market ascetics, to the body of Christ. The response is of a 
political nature, and ecclesial. The Eucharist is the countermove, and act of resistance, in 
which the false embodiments of market relationships are resisted. For Cavanaugh, the 
church is a counter-polis to late-capitalist markets. This co-inheres with my previous 
chapter, where we understand the church as an oikos-polis, a place of social reality that 
sets the limits for the social realities of the market. We also saw earlier how Evangelicals, 
on the one hand, responded missionally with providing “islands of social care” in 
response to the anxieties of emerging capitalist market life. But as they relaxed their 
ecclesiology to do so, the Polanyian SRM imagination for life emerged and became 
                                                 
125 For an expansive survey and example of the effects of modern economics on young people, 
see Adrian Furnham, The Economic Socialisation of Young People (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 
2008). 
126 I examine how consumerism functions as a perverted liturgy in Clark, “Consumer Liturgies,” 
43. For an example of how Evangelical Christians in the USA directly collude and conflate religion with 
diet and exercise industries, see R. Marie Griffith, Born Again Bodies: Flesh and Spirit in American 
Christianity (California Studies in Food and Culture) (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004). 
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parasitic to other social forms. Where the church had once been an Oikos-Polis, all aseity 
now collapsed into market identities.  
Cavanaugh displays the type of Anglo-Catholic turn to which Milbank calls us, but 
leaves us with something decidedly non-Evangelical. For it requires an ontological 
understanding of markets as inherently counter to Christian identity and formation, and 
as we have seen, that is something distinctly non-Evangelical.127 In addition, the Eucharist 
is the only ascetic practice available from Cavanaugh for counter-political formation. 
Evangelicalism, as demonstrated in the first chapters of this thesis, may have a far wider 
range of worship resources to counter the formational forces of the market. And those 
resources are made possible from an understanding of capitalist markets as places for co-
creation, as well as resistance. Cavanaugh does help us to appreciate that Pete Ward’s 
alternative proposal to embrace shopping as a spiritual practice should be explored with 
some caution, lest the forces of the capitalist markets embed us further into their social 
realities. 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Beyond the Eucharist 
We have seen that, like Cavanaugh, Miller as a Catholic sees this unmasking and 
deepening of agency as potentially taking place principally through the Eucharist and the 
Mass.128 Now Catholic worship undertakes far more than the Eucharist in daily practice, 
and again, I do not need to demonstrate the obviousness of that here. However, the 
theological claims by Catholic theologians like Miller and Cavanaugh prioritise the 
                                                 
127 For a ‘classic’ example of an Evangelical ontological account of the nature of ecclesiology, 
along with the willingness of Evangelicals to extend and locate ontological understandings onto the 
market as places for Christian formation and identity, see Brad Harper and Paul Louis Metzger, Exploring 
Ecclesiology: An Evangelical and Ecumenical Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazzos Press, 2009). 
The extent of that embrace of markets for Christian identity varies greatly amongst Evangelicals, and at 
one end, see Pastor Ted Haggard call Christian leaders to “harness the forces of free market capitalism in 
our ministry.” See Exploring Ecclesiology, 261. The Evangelical impetus generated from a general 
refusal by many Evangelicals to over-dichotomize the church and the world and belief that God is 
involved in mission in the marketplace, is evidenced in Stackhouse, Evangelical Ecclesiology, 204. 
128 Miller, Consuming Religion, 217. 
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Eucharist in a way that is insufficient for my project. We have seen how Bell and 
Cavanaugh make an overly dichotomised account with their reified view of the church 
and the resources they use, compared to Miller. Rather, Miller views consumer society 
not as a ‘false body’ but as a competing one. Cavanaugh and Bell provide no possibility 
for such a location within capitalist markets.  
It seems we now have two crucial theological moves to make with our neo-
Augustinian resources. First, how might we problematise capitalist markets as rival 
schools of desire, not as a dichotomy, but rather as modes of resistance, resonance, and 
co-option? As the first three chapters of my thesis have shown, this is the logic of 
Evangelicalism in its relationship to other socialities. Cavanaugh and Miller may be 
correct in suggesting capitalism be understood as a competing school of desire with its 
ascetics and aesthetics. But they leave us with an account that is antithetical to the 
Evangelicalism of my thesis. Their account has been illuminating — in terms of 
understanding the competing nature of the ascetics within capitalism — but it is not 
amenable to my project in terms of over-dichotomising the church and the world. For I 
am making a strong and bold case, in the face of the evidence from Milbank and Connolly, 
that present-day Evangelicalism, despite its very real problems, has, within itself, modes 
of resistance and co-creation that are unique to it, and necessary. Cavanaugh, Bell, and, 
to some extent, Miller, do not provide for such a resourcement as we have noted. For they 
leave us with an ecclesiology where the body of Christ in its social arrangements is 
permanently at odds with the world. This forecloses the Evangelical impetus I wish to 
retrieve. There is an over-ontologising of the church in its relationship to other social 
bodies that reveals an ecclesial mode of life that is decidedly non-Evangelical. There is 
competition between the body of Christ and other social arrangements in the world, and 
those social bodies are created through habits and practices around imaginations for life. 
Second, this chapter also uncovered implications for understandings of Providence, of 
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how the privatised demand-and-desire provision of the market shapes how we think God 
provides. My next chapter will make this even more explicit. 
It is a broader understanding of how habits and physical practices deploy 
imaginations to which we now turn in my final chapter. This will allow us to consider 
further how worship practices are indeed competitive, something the sacramental turn in 
this chapter has mapped, whilst avoiding an over-dichotomizing of the church and the 
world. We will also explore how worship practices can be more affective around Christian 
imaginations for living and allow for the recovery of resistance by Evangelical habits. 
Ultimately, I will arrive at my thesis proposal for how Evangelicals can deepen agency 
in the face of anxieties in market life, instead of continuing to capitulate and resonate with 
them. I will demonstrate that beyond the Eucharist, even the broadest sacramental and 
liturgical turns are insufficient to respond to the deforming forces of market imaginations, 
overly relying on curriculum to do the heavy lifting of formation. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Rival Ascetics of Desire: Beyond the Eucharist 
 
The symbiotic alchemy of map-making that occurs in religious groups is produced from the 
delicate fusion of the social imaginary with a prevailing theological construction of reality. 
The worldview that emerges will, invariably, not only determine how a church or 
congregation sees itself within the world, but how they see the world around them. This 
exercise – or rather ongoing process – rarely produces an actual map. But it does produce a 
kind of inner map in the mind of the believers: places to avoid; places of plenty, and so 
forth. In some cases, it will produce actual maps. 
 
— Martyn Percy, “Symbiotic Alchemy” 
 
Tomorrow 
we shall have to think up signs, 
sketch a landscape, fabricate a plan 
on the double page 
of day and paper. 
Tomorrow, we shall have to invent, 
once more, 
the reality of this world. 
 
— Octavio Paz, “January First” 
 
Map-making is the effective metaphor of my thesis method. As we have explored already, 
map makers – cartographers – do not reveal the world the way it is. Rather, they 
approximate, reduce, symbolise, and resort to imaginative exercises to reproduce and 
recreate an experience of something else. Map-making is literally a metaphorical 
exercise, of referring to one thing by the production of another. The nature of this 
imaginative reproduction means that “To ask for a map is in effect to say, ‘Tell me a 
story’”.1 We all carry around maps, approximations of the world, the “inner maps” Percy 
highlights above. These inner maps are the social imaginaries, the stories that human 
beings exercise agency around – consciously and unconsciously. The inner maps of life 
in capitalism are overlaid with the theological maps of the Christian life, producing an 
admixture story. Or as Percy describes, a “symbiotic alchemy” takes place.2 What is 
                                                 
1 Peter Turchi, Maps of the Imagination: The Writer as Cartographer (San Antonio, Texas: 
Trinity University Press, 2007), 11. 
2 Martyn Percy, “Symbiotic Alchemy: Mapping the Futures of English Revivalism and 
Evangelicalism” in The Wisdom of the Spirit: Gospel, Church and Culture, eds. Martyn Percy and Pete 
Ward (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 33. 
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imagined is used to reproduce an experience, and what is experienced is then re-mapped 
into a cycle of reiteration, for ongoing reimagination. 
This chapter now maps theologically this realm of the imagination and its 
instantiation in practice. It is a mapping of the symbiotic alchemy between the social 
imaginaries of Christianity and capitalism. In particular this mapping is produced as a 
further overlay to the accounts of capitalism in my third and fourth chapters. In doing so, 
I seek to explain how imaginations for Christianity within capitalism are instantiated in 
the real world. At the same time, this theological mapping moves recursively across and 
over the rest of my thesis as a whole. It furthermore picks up where we left off in my last 
chapter, attending specifically to the limitations of the accounts in that chapter. 
 
6.1 Affective Practices of Desire: The possibilities of co-creation and resistance 
The sources of my last chapter left us with over-dichotomised accounts of the body of 
Christ with capitalism. Graham Ward is helpful at this juncture. Ward offers a 
metaphysics and theology more amenable to my search for understanding co-creation and 
resistance. Ward has been a collaborator with one of my main thesis protagonists, 
Milbank, with regard to the Radical Orthodoxy series of books. These books set out a 
“postmodern critical Augustinianism.”3 Indeed Bell’s work, examined in my previous 
chapter, also falls within this Radical Orthodoxy stable.4 Like others with neo-
Augustinian resources, as per my previous chapter, Ward has considered the nature of 
                                                 
3 Radical Orthodoxy's origins are found in the Radical Orthodoxy series of books, the first of 
which is John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology 
(Routledge Radical Orthodoxy) (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1998). The series can be viewed at 
http://www.routledge. com/books/series/SE0084/). Milbank's Theology and Social Theory, while not part 
of this series, is considered the precursor to this movement. Milbank initially considered Radical 
Orthodoxy to be a postmodern critical Augustinianism movement; see John Milbank, “‘Postmodern 
Critical Augustinianism’: A Short Summa In Forty Two Responses To Unasked Questions,” Modern 
Theology 7, no. 3, (April 1991): 225–237.  
4 Bell, Liberation Theology. 
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capitalism and its effects upon human beings for cultural and religious formation.5 If my 
thesis has, so far, surfaced an understanding of the ascetics of belief and practice in 
capitalism, then this chapter now theologises those ascetics as rival schools of desire.  
 
6.1.1 Dissolution: The social logic of capitalism 
Ward claims a social atomism has occurred in late capitalism and secular modernity, to 
which Christianity must, and can, respond.6 The horizon for Ward’s work and 
understanding of this anomie is an Augustinian horizon of the City of God as a social 
reality in competition with the Earthly City.7 This Augustinian horizon allows for a 
construction and proposal of a Christian anthropology, that then allows us to consider the 
nature of social and public bodies: specifically, where individual bodies are located, and 
where the body of Christ is located in relation to other “bodies”.8 We can deploy Ward 
over and against the diagnosis by Bell and Cavanaugh, where the social bodies of 
capitalism are antithetical and ontologically opposed to the body of Christ. For 
Christianity does not have to be so completely against socialities of culture, or indeed, 
give into the opposite process by over-assimilating.9 In terms of a metaphysical and 
ontological reading of social bodies, we might ask how the one true social body – the 
body of Christ – has been displaced and dematerialised into social bodies within secular 
and capitalistic modern cities. In other words, “what kind of bodies occupy what kind of 
space and in what kind of relationship to other such bodies?”10 We have arrived today in 
                                                 
5 For example, see Graham Ward, Cities of God, Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2000), 
3, 35, 50, 54, 146. 
6 Ward, Cities of God, 75. 
7 The title of Graham Ward’s Cities of God is a play on the title of Augustine’s work The City of 
God; see Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, translated 
by Henry Scowcroft Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003). Ward draws extensively on wider Augustinian 
theology as well as specifically from Augustine’s The City of God. For specific references where Graham 
Ward brings Augustine’s The City of God into contact with his wider theological proposals, see Ward, 
Cities of God, 226–238. 
8 Ward, Cities of God, 2. 
9 Ibid., 7–9. 
10 Ibid., 83. 
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late capitalism, at a ‘transcorporeality’ in which “the body of Christ is mapped onto and 
shot like a watermark through the physical bodies, social bodies, institutional bodies, 
ecclesial bodies, sacramental bodies. All these bodies are available only in and through 
textual bodies.”11 This is Ward’s ‘analogical’ method, constructed with a post-
structuralist somatic and semiotic reading of culture and church.12 This post-structuralist 
method considers the Freudian and psychological understandings of desire within human 
socialities to get closer to those lived experiences.13 However, his post-structuralist 
method raises some concerns, which I will highlight as I deploy Ward’s account.14  
My thesis has mapped three stages of intensification in the relationship between 
Christianity and capitalism.15 Ward notes his own complex schema and process of 
intensification of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism.16 There has been a 
loss of religious checks and balances on the use of capital, as well as a migration to the 
commodification of all aspects of society. We have arrived at a time where “with the rise 
of the market-driven consumerism, cities become increasingly secular places – given over 
to the production of goods for consumption. As a consequence, in such cities, faith 
becomes privatised”.17 The domains of salvation, eschatology, and ontology have become 
displaced into the socialities of commodified life within the city.18 This correlates with 
my own diagnosis and previous account of the collapse of aseity from religious identity 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 93. 
12 Ibid., 7-9. 
13 Ward outlines his post-structuralist commitments in detail in ibid., 11–13. 
14 For example, see Maarten Wisse, ‘Graham Ward’s Poststructuralist Christian Nominalism’, 
SOPHIA 49, no. 3 (2010). 
15 My chapters one through to four map; 1) the emergence of the Protestant Work Ethic within the 
birth of industrial society; 2) the development of Evangelicalism within the development of commercial 
society; and 3) the arrival at a post-Protestant Work Ethic within globalised late-capitalism. 
16 Ward, Cities of God, 34–38. Ward provides a compressed and intricate outline of the rise and 
development of cities that arrive at the “advancement of capitalism, humanism, secularism, divorced from 
any need for God,” 38. His analysis highlights the mechanisms of commodification, the loss of religious 
constraints on consumption, and the role of imagined communities, for the development of cities into 
places of consumerism. 
17 Ibid, 24 
18 Ibid. 
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into market identities, and of how we can read the competing socialities of capitalism 
ontologically.  
Despite the desire not to see Christianity as antithetical to culture, we see in Ward’s 
descriptions of capitalist culture a pessimistic outlook similar to that of Cavanaugh and 
Bell, i.e., that capitalism is a false body which the body of Christ must eternally resist. 
There is an attempt to be alert to such pessimistic description by Ward, and he maps some 
possible theological responses to this state of affairs.19 Ultimately, it is the denouncement 
of the earthly city that Ward chooses to pursue. Unlike Cavanaugh and Bell, this 
denouncement is made within the context of Augustinian warnings against reducing 
culture to something completely antithetical to God. In terms of my own account so far, 
I have demonstrated that, for Evangelicals, retreating from the world, embracing natural 
theology, and liberally dissolving the distinctiveness of faith, are similarly not acceptable.  
Setting aside Ward’s claim that Evangelicals resemble conservative Catholics with 
their two-kingdom theology (and are thereby anti-modern), I concur with him that 
Christians cannot renounce the world theologically because scripture tells us not to.20 
Furthermore, we live within the world; we cannot see it and leave it to “rot and go to 
hell”.21 We can see here how this undergirds my project, in that we understand 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 43–44. Ward outlines these options as; a) a retreat into itself by theology; b) the further 
embracement of natural theology in seeing this state of affairs as part of creation; c) the correlation of 
theology to culture, such that the doctrines of faith, crucifixion, incarnation, and resurrection are merely 
metaphors for understanding transcendental experience; and d) the emphatic rejection and denunciation 
by theology of the earthly city. 
20 Ibid., 69. A detailed discussion of two-kingdom theology, and how it relates to Evangelicals 
and the domains of our concern are beyond my thesis remit, but I note and suggest that it is the collapsing 
of the church and the material into the spiritual, the totalising of the Kingdom as the market, that is the 
situation to which Evangelicals have most contributed with their theology and practice. This contrasts to 
recent two kingdom theology, such as that of Darryl Hart, whose work asserts a collapse by Evangelicals 
into a social gospel, see Darryl Hart, A Secular Faith: Why Christianity Favors the Separation of Church 
and State (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2006). This Catholic two-kingdom theology of course is distinct 
from Lutheran two-kingdoms theology. Ward expands on his use of two-kingdoms theology with regards 
to Luther and Augustine, and how he sees them as a type of Christian genealogy. See John Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory and Its Significance for Community Building: A Conversation with John 
Milbank, accessed 5th June 2018. https://bit.ly/2Jghgkg. For an assessment and locating of Milbank’s two-
kingdoms theology with regards to Evangelicals, see Bruce Ellis Benson and Peter Goodwin Heltzel, 
Evangelicals and Empire: Christian Alternatives to the Political Status Quo (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos 
Press, 2008), 253. 
21 Ward, Cities of God, 69. 
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Christianity as neither renouncing the world, nor leaving it to its relentless drive to 
consumption. Nor can we develop a humanistic approach that is unmindful of the 
ideologies and theologies buried within the social realities and practices of the market 
and late capitalism (something I have accused Pete Ward of doing in the first chapter of 
this thesis).22 We need responses that relate positively and critically to the postmodern 
city, and cultural context of capitalism. To renounce the world or be subsumed 
humanistically is ineffectual.23  
There is a theological advance beyond Bell and Cavanaugh that Ward makes, by 
broadening his understanding of the ontological resistance in the Eucharist. This is made 
through a further Christological move. For the body of Christ should be seen more 
broadly than the Eucharist, in the Ascension and salvation history, outlining how the 
Spirit transposes the church into a complex space of redemption.24 This understanding 
seems more hospitable for my account. For this is to understand the church as a 
community of desire, able to counter and work within the other ontological socialities of 
capitalistic desire, through more than just the Eucharist. For Ward, a counter-economy 
and resistance take place in the Eucharist, as a primary resistance to the dissolution and 
social logic of consumption.25 This is grist to Cavanaugh and Bell’s mill; who explain 
how social bodies are false bodies in relation to the body of Christ. Despite Ward’s claims 
of the possibilities of co-creation and resistance, we are offered little more than 
Cavanaugh and Bell. The Eucharist is again located as the ontological scandal in which 
Christ consumes us as we participate in it.26 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 70. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 116. 
25 Ibid., 95. 
26 Ibid., 103. 
204 
 
Despite Ward’s wish to avoid an ontological dualism, does he achieve it, and does 
he fall prey to a type of nominalism in his ontology? 27 Not the nominalism that ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy’ rejects, of a world totally disconnected from God’s being, but rather the 
broader nominalism of universals, such that Ward’s account arrives at a place where he 
claims that “there is no analogical ordering of the world that reflects the being of God, as 
there is only one big analogy: namely that everything, however different it is, is 
symbolically rooted in God.”28 This broader nominalism runs the risk of making co-
creation with the material difficult, within the limits of his theological method and 
aspirations.29 Such nominalism is ironical, given the aspirations of Radical Orthodoxy and 
its proponents like Graham Ward to oppose nominalist views, and to construct a 
participationist ontology.30 
We are then left with a question: how does the soteriological displacement of 
Christ’s body, and the reverse of that displacement, take place through the Eucharist (and 
wider worship processes) into other bodies such as the church? I suggest that there is 
incorporation into the body of Christ that takes place broadly, i.e., through far more than 
the Eucharist, in the worship of the church. It will take something more than the Eucharist 
to reverse the displacement of bodies into capitalist socialities. Graham Ward, despite his 
theological aspirations, is trapped with a theology that leaves unrealised the possibility 
for co-creation and resistance, and remains abstracted in the mode Healy and Miller have 
warned us about. Ward’s theological project, whilst promising, needs extending 
phenomenologically to demonstrate “how worship works” in the real world. But before 
                                                 
27 Graham Ward, “Bodies: The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ,” in: John Milbank, Catherine 
Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London: Routledge, 1998), 97–
116. 
28 Wisse, ‘Poststructuralist Christian Nominalism’, 368. 
29 For an extended critique of Ward’s nominalism, see Ibid. In terms of engagement in the 
material, this article in particular explores the implications of Ward’s nominalism and sexual 
relationships. There are implications from this critique more broadly of how any nominalism by Ward 
sets up problems for engaging concretely with other realities of material existence. 
30 For further explanation of how Ward might have inadvertently constructed a nominalist 
theology that undermines his participationist aspirations, see Ibid. 
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we turn to this, we will continue further with Ward’s own work, which points towards 
this phenomenology of reception and participation. 
 
6.1.2. Materialising the Political: The erotics of redemption and liturgical 
participation  
In contrast to the depoliticization, dematerialization, and commodification that 
characterizes late modern culture, the Christian gospel announces a theology of creation, 
embodiment, and resurrection that revalues the material. Thus, Christianity is a more-
thorough materialism than the faux-materialism of a commodified world of consumption 
and disposal. 
 
James K. A. Smith, “Foreword,” to Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship 
With Miller, we saw how commodification rips signs and symbols away from originating 
beliefs and practice, such that the articulation of ‘better’ beliefs does not lead to ‘better’ 
practice. The commodification of beliefs is not merely into cultural artefacts, as products 
for consumption; rather, the cultural artefacts of commodification are also producers.31 
We can therefore understand how the ‘practices’ of commodification produce political 
and social arrangements. These social arrangements take shape around the social 
imaginaries of late capitalism. It is not that social imaginaries have an ontological 
foundation per se.32 For stories are not ontologies, but ontologies are what happen when 
people re-tell and re-enact stories. Stories do not exist on their own; they have to be told. 
There are metaphysical forces in commodification, signs and symbols that we can read, 
and around which agents make their productions. Commodification can therefore be 
understood as what happens when agents in capitalism make social arrangements around 
the stories of late capitalism, i.e., the Polanyian fictions of land, labour, and money for 
the SRM. Commodification is not the complete abstraction of all beliefs from practice, 
but the practice itself that narrates and instantiates the imaginations of late capitalism. It 
                                                 
31 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens, The Church and 
Postmodern Culture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 153. 
32 Ward makes this claim in his Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
129. 
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is the way that the social imaginaries of late capitalism are enacted and habituated. In 
other words, we might understand practice/enactment as discourse, and discourse as 
practice/enactment. This is the the cultural logic of “late capitalism”, an understanding of 
which Ward draws from Fredric Jamieson.33 The body of Christ is displaced by the 
processes of commodification, and those processes obtain their impetus from competing 
desires within capitalist imaginations. Here, the church is a community of desire displaced 
by competing desires within other socialities, i.e., communities of desire.34 This also 
brings us beyond the mechanisms of commodification back to Bell and his claims that 
technologies of desire are deployed by competing communities. 
For there is a contrast between the socialities of desire and mechanisms of desire. 
On the one hand, via a “post-structuralist genealogy” of desire, we can understand 
psychologically and mechanistically how social bodies emerge which parody ecclesial 
accounts.35 Direct contact with the work of Cavanaugh is made by Ward, for a theological 
understanding of the social.36 Ward also displays a deeper theological understanding of 
Bell’s “technologies of desire”, showing how habituated practices around social 
imaginaries are made possible by the print capitalism highlighted by Anderson.37 The 
body of Christ can be understood as an alternative community of desire, an “erotic 
community”.38 This is an Augustinian (and Thomist) account of how Christ is present in 
church worship, specifically in the Eucharist.39 Such an account is primarily about how 
                                                 
33 Here, Graham Ward is referencing the title and work of Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, 
the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991); see Ward, Cities of God, 3. 
34 In particular, see Ward, Cities of God, Chapter 6, ‘The Church as the Erotic Community’, 152–
182. 
35 Ward, Cities of God, Chapter 5, ‘Communities of Desire’, 117–151. 
36 Ibid., 117–118. 
37 Ibid., 146–147. 
38 Ibid., 152–181; Ward constructs and arrives at this understanding by way of genealogy of 
presence, with Augustine and the relationship of the present and presence (156), Aquinas, where Christ is 
our nourishment and really present (157–159), Calvin, where Christ’s flesh and blood are spatialised 
between presence and absence, such that an economy of desire is set up between lack and not having 
(167), and Žižek where participation is understood as a mode of simulation, where notions of the now are 
commodified (170). 
39 Ibid., 156–161. 
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desire and presence in the Eucharist has become displaced into other social realities. Ward 
suggests that all human beings have a fundamental appetitus; a hunger that is also a desire, 
where human beings “crave the other” in an image of the “divine appetite in which the 
Father craves the Son and the Son the Father, and both the Spirit who maintains the eternal 
craving open with respect to the world God created out of his excess of loving.”40 Here, 
desire is a result of plenitude rather than lack.41 
With regards to developments of the Eucharist by Protestants, Ward claims that we 
see with Calvin, a dislocation between sign and symbol in the Eucharist. This dislocation 
lent itself to an undoing of an Augustinian understanding of the relationship between sign 
and symbol.42 Here we see perhaps the early cultural and market forces around faith, the 
mechanisms of commodification diagnosed by Miller, where the real presence moved 
into the consumption of symbols, such that reality was not in the symbol itself but in 
something that lay beyond it.  
The church can be understood as an alternative community of desire, whose 
formation around that desire can be mapped through a doctrine of participation. That 
participation is then understood through a doctrine of the Spirit and a theological 
anthropology.43 It is this participation that Ward suggests is the place where we can co-
create with the world and resist the pathologies of culture, such as capitalism. Yet Ward 
still leaves us with participation being principally based around the Eucharist, his horizon 
dropping again from a broader understanding of ecclesial worship. Ward does have a 
broader theology of participation, but it remains largely an abstracted account. Ward’s 
account, whilst promising a more nuanced account of desire that would see the church as 
a likely place for the training of desire, seems to lack the psychology and phenomenology 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 172 
41 Angel F. Méndez-Montoya provides a summary and extension of Ward’s argument here for a 
theology of food. See Angel F. Méndez-Montoya, The Theology of Food: Eating and the Eucharist 
(Chichester West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), 67–68. 
42 Ward, Cities of God, Chapter 5, “Communities of Desire,” 161–167. 
43 Ibid., 171. 
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of reception for which he calls.44 It will fall to me to locate such an account. In order to 
achieve that, I make a final step with Ward and explore how imagination within 
“imagined communities” operates between praxis and poiesis. This allows me to bring 
the work of this chapter into direct overlay with previous chapters and point forward to a 
final step for the explicit theologising and conclusion of my account. 
 
6.1.3 Praxis and Poiesis: Social imaginaries and ontological realities 
How does religious action create concrete socialities and effect cultural change? Ward 
locates an answer via an understanding of the practices of everyday living within the 
“imagined communities” motif of Anderson.45 Combining this, and the work of Charles 
Taylor on “social imaginaries”, we can see that social arrangements are constituted by “a 
set of imaginary relations,” such that “any particular historical and cultural understanding 
of the public is inseparable from an implicit account of being human and in 
relationship.”46 Such imaginaries provide models for all working relationships. Imagined 
ideologies of relationships and the lived experiences around these lead to the learning and 
internalizing of what it means to be relational.47 These imaginaries are “crucial fictions” 
(as Charles Taylor calls them). They are not ontological realities. Instead they are “ways 
of making sense, they are forms of poesis.”48 We ask, as does Ward, what makes one 
‘fiction’ more effective than another?49 In other words: how might we understand the 
ways in which one social imaginary might be more persuasive than another over time?50 
By this, I understand that social imaginaries function in part as ‘technologies of desire’, 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 166. 
45 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
46 Ward, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice, 122. 
47 Ibid., 122. 
48 Ibid., 129. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 129-130. 
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some of which are more affective in how they train and direct human desires, and 
therefore are more effective in their reproduction and instantiations. 
We can juxtapose Graham Ward further with my earlier analysis of Miller’s work.51 
Concern about the cultivation of desire is not only central to the Christian tradition, it is 
central to all anthropologies and “cultures” as Miller reminds us.52 In other words, our 
purpose is not to analyze the cultures within capitalism per se, but rather, to understand 
how desire works within cultural structures and social practices. For consumer desire in 
capitalism does not arise from a “coherent anthropology that can be contrasted with 
Christianity.”53 Even if such a contrast can be made, it is not a contrast I need to make, 
except in one regard. I assert desire operates universally for all human beings, as that 
which leads to all identity formation. And there is one fundamental contrast between 
Christian and non-Christian desire. Or rather, there should be one key contrast, whereby 
Christian desire arises from a call beyond the self. The desire of the non-Christian self is 
then understood as one that is incomplete. This status results not from any lack by the 
subject, but from being trapped and focused on a perpetual call to the self. Christian desire 
has as its object, or should have as its object, God and the other.54 I am asserting that the 
ordering of life by and around desire is the liturgical anthropology and nature of all human 
beings.55 In the face of that, I want to understand how Christian worship might be more 
affective and then subsequently effective for the training of desire than the “sophisticated 
systems of forming and inciting desire that the world” has seen within late capitalism.56 
Ultimately, I am asking how the soteriological imaginaries of Evangelicalism have 
affected and shaped Christian identity and might do so with greater effectiveness within 
                                                 
51 Miller himself draws on the work of Graham Ward to make his account of desire within 
consumerism; see Miller, Consuming Religion, 111–112. 
52 Ibid., 107. 
53 Ibid., 107. 
54 Ward, Cities of God, 75. 
55 Our primary concern is how Christianity has been deformed and misformed by the cultures of 
late capitalism. Moreover, our analysis of this topic is focused on how Evangelical Christianity, with its 
own worship practices, has added to such distortions.  
56 Miller, Consuming Religion, 107. 
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capitalism. But none of this tells us what it is about the self, the nature of human identity, 
in concert with certain social imaginaries that gives rise to such variations in 
persuasiveness. Graham Ward asks a similar question himself, suggesting that it is in 
understanding the somatic, and not just the cognitive of imaginaries, that we will find our 
answer.57 
Bringing the work of Paul Ricoeur into contact with that of Charles Taylor, Ward 
correlates that with Freud and Husserl, to delineate how social imaginaries work at the 
cognitive level by agents acting through a will.58 Ultimately that will is “set in motion by 
a motivation,” the inner desire that is the ground for all actions by agents.59 For Ward, 
like Ricoeur, wants to affirm the notion of individuals having a sense of agency. It is the 
nature of motivation at the heart of the “poetics of individuals willing,” that is key to 
understanding how human beings choose to “act in some ways/circumstances and refuse 
to act in others.”60 Motivation is that which operates solely under the will of the individual 
according to Ricoeur. Yet, this seems to be an unnecessary lingering Cartesianism.61 
Instead, as Ward writes: “motivation (and the values that motivate) are not independent 
of cultural context but arise only from within sets of cultural possibilities and values. In 
motivation something is believed, and believed in strongly enough to affect behaviour.”62 
There is an “association of poiesis to praxis,” where imagination and desire are the two 
forces between that association.63 Here, we see Ward at odds with his interlocutors, who 
have an understanding of human beings as “individual volitional subjects who are 
subsequently in relation one to another by choice.”64 Instead, Ward would have us view 
the actions of agents as located within “larger economies, forces or a nexus of cultural 
                                                 
57 Ward, Cultural Transformation, 130. 
58 Ibid., 130-140. 
59 Ibid., 140. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 141. 
62 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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possibilities.”65 This begs a question of whether any notion of the subject ‘unravels’ if 
such cultural forces are at play.  
There is a complex discourse from social theory that points to a need for Christian 
understanding of agency within poiesis.66 Now, I do not seek to establish a universal 
understanding of poiesis. Rather it is Christian conceptions and behaviours for poiesis 
and praxis (and in particular those of Evangelicals) that are my task. Such desire and 
narration has only one true and worthy object, namely Jesus Christ. Most importantly, it 
is the soteriological imaginaries of Evangelical communities that orient Evangelical 
agents for cultural production that are my concern. Desires and the ascetics around them 
are situated between poiesis and praxis, where desire is: “complex, multi-focused and 
held to be maintained by a power that is greater than that of any individual or even 
collective. For praxis is a “reading, rereading and composing the world in which it 
operates; fashioning from the flux of the social imaginary representations”, i.e., the stories 
around which human beings exercise their agency, for poiesis.67 Here, poiesis is “an 
imaginative praxis that transforms the social,” i.e., in poeisis, desires are practically 
imagined, taking what is present in the world already, but then translating them into 
something new.68 Desire and imagination are the forces that gives rise to transformative 
practices and an embodiment in Christ. They are also the forces that give rise to self-
creation, the autopoiesis of the social imaginaries of late capitalism. 
So, I am closer to understanding theologically (by which I mean political theology, 
with the ontological metaphysics of Graham Ward) the boundaries for social bodies; of 
how desire gives rise to embodied practices for formation of those social bodies. In terms 
of my mapping, I now draw down a gradient marked on my mapping, where the gravity 
of my account moves me towards an exploration of liturgical enactments of imagination. 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 7, 149–154.  
67 Ibid., 153-154. 
68 Ibid., 154–155. Here, Ward sketches out an Aristotelian ‘practical imagining’. 
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This is in order to better understand the habituation and disciplines of desire around 
cultural imaginaries. For it is worship that is the place where social imaginaries are 
trained, and desire enacted. We have arrived at the end of a mapping, with a signpost that 
points to a needed further exploration of worship. This is the phenomenology of reception 
that my account has already noted, that Ward was unable to adequately make for my 
thesis purposes. It is with James K. A. Smith’s theological anthropologies and cultural 
liturgies that we now turn to understand how ‘worship works’ and seek to remedy this 
situation. In short, and in other words, I now answer the question: what makes one 
imaginary cultural liturgy more affective and effective than another? 
 
6.2 The Habituation of Imagination: Beyond competing curricula and pedagogies 
In short, the way to the heart is through the body, and the way into the body is through 
story. And this is how worship works: Christian formation is a conversion of the 
imagination effected by the Spirit who recruits our most fundamental desires by a kind of 
narrative enchantment—by inviting us narrative animals into a story that seeps into our 
bones and becomes the orienting background of our being-in-the-world. Our incarnating 
God continues to meet us where we are: as imaginative creatures of habit. So we are invited 
into the life of the Triune God by being invited to inhabit concrete rituals and practices that 
are “habitations of the Spirit”. 
 
— James K. A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works 
We have seen how imagination and desire are the forces between poiesis and praxis. Now, 
with Smith, we can examine further the nature of those forces. For Smith has produced a 
body of work that moves beyond accounts of worship as competing ascetics. He provides 
an understanding of how imagined communities give rise to competing ascetics, i.e., 
bodily habits and practice. It is not just theologians who are now alert to the nature and 
power of bodily habits for formation. Popular leadership materials draw on state of the 
art behavioral psychology for understanding the primacy and formational nature of 
habits.69 
                                                 
69 Charles Duhigg, The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do and How to Change (London: 
Random House, 2012). 
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In particular, Smith extends an understanding of desire-based anthropologies into 
the realm of imagination and liturgy. For it is a construction of a theological and, in 
particular, Christian anthropology, just as we saw Graham Ward produce, that facilitates 
an understanding of how social bodies are created in relationship and competition with 
each other. Desire-based anthropologies describe and map competing ascetics of desire. 
These mappings allow us to better understand the competing effectiveness of secular 
liturgies, like those of capitalism, for how comprehensively they inscribe individuals into 
social realities. They also make possible an understanding of competing social bodies, 
i.e., the body of Christ in relationship to other social bodies, in terms of ascetics and 
imaginations, and do so without over-dichotomizing those accounts.  
In contrast to Graham Ward, Smith’s anthropology is primary a philosophical one, 
although heavily reliant on the social sciences. Graham Ward also crosses disciplinary 
boundaries, from political theory, aesthetics, sociology, and anthropology to philosophy, 
amongst others. But Ward’s centre of gravity is the theological, whereas Smith’s is the 
philosophical. Smith is, after all, a philosopher, albeit indebted to Augustine, and drawing 
upon Aristotelian accounts of virtue.70 In particular, Smith deploys and extends Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body.71 Whilst Smith’s anthropology is established 
through the social sciences, it does not mean it does no theological work for us. Indeed, 
some might object to Smith’s anthropology as not being sufficiently Christian, due to a 
lack of explicitly theological considerations, i.e., Christology, and his less than sustained 
pneumatology, for example. Smith is clear in his theological claims however, that 
                                                 
70 For example, see James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural 
Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009) 55, 60, 196–97, where Smith shows how these 
sources fund his method and work. A much earlier work of Smith, published in the Radical Orthodoxy 
series, shows early moves from phenomenology, into Augustinian theology; see James K. A. Smith, 
Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation (London: Routledge, 2002). Here, Smith 
attempts to show how we might understand encounter between the material and divine, in terms of 
speaking about God. This Christian phenomenology is something Smith carries into his later work.  
71 Smith makes extensive use of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For example, see Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), as well as James K. A. Smith, 
Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works, Cultural Liturgies (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2013), 41–73. 
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“Christian worship is primarily a site of divine action,” where we are “invited to inhabit 
concrete rituals and practices that are ‘habitations of the Spirit’”.72  
Smith’s work in many regards is a contextual theology, with implicit theological 
considerations, as well as, at times, very explicit ones, seeking to deal with just the kind 
of “messy contingencies and miscibility of lived faith, rather than ‘ideal’ theological 
constructions of reality” that Percy calls us to consider.73 Smith’s work in this regard is 
profoundly theological, and avails itself of my claim at the start of my thesis, that 
ecclesiology, if it is to attend to the concrete of lived faith, must make use of the implicit 
theology, and indeed the inherent methods “and insights” of social theory.74 Beyond his 
method, Smith has some particular claims serviceable for my thesis, most specifically his 
diagnosis of how secular liturgies like capitalism have competing social imaginaries 
which fund that competition. The response to competing imaginaries with Christian 
imaginations is not an over-dichotomized collapse into the Eucharist, as we have seen 
others make, nor a collapse further into market imaginations, as Pete Ward calls for. 
Rather, for Smith, it is for better and more effective pedagogies around Christian 
imaginations. Yet we will see that Smith abandons an understanding of the work of the 
Spirit in worship practices for a focus on the affective nature of, and effective competition 
between, practices; a throttling down by him into the deployment of a list of competing 
curricula.75 This is a diminution of his hoped-for ‘counter-measures’ to the formational 
forces of capitalism, where worship is reduced to issues of effective curricula, which I 
believe will ultimately remain largely ineffective.  
 
                                                 
72 Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 15. 
73 My location of Smith’s work is made on correlation to claims for contextual theology by 
Martyn Percy, “Response to Part 1: On the Vocation of the Contextual Theologian,” in Reasonable 
Radical, 60. 
74 Again, see Percy, Engaging with Contemporary Culture, 8. 
75 Rather than an understanding of how the Spirit engages with the content and practices of 
worship, Smith leaves us with a list of curricula, and the hope that the content of those curricula are able 
to compete more effectively with secular liturgies. See Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 170–171. 
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6.2.1. Habitations of the Spirit: From head to heart 
The pedagogy of the mall does not primarily take hold of the head, so to speak; it aims for 
the heart, for our guts, our kardia. It is a pedagogy of desire that gets hold of us through the 
body. So what would it take to resist the alluring formation of our desire – and hence 
identity – that is offered by the market and the mall? If the mall and its ‘parachurch’ 
extensions in television and advertising offer a daily liturgy for the formation of the heart, 
what might be the church’s counter-measures? What if the church unwittingly adopts the 
same liturgical practices as the market and the mall? Will it then really be a site of counter-
formation? What would the church’s practices have to look like if they’re going to form us 
as the kind of people who desire something entirely different – who desire the Kingdom? 
What would be the shape of an alternative pedagogy of desire? 
 
— James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom 
Smith repeats here an assertion; that the way to the heart is through the body, and through 
story, and that desire takes shape somatically. Smith initiated this claim in his first 
Cultural Liturgies book and reasserted it in his second.76 In other words, the reception of 
the signs and symbols for cultural production, be that of Christian faith or capitalism, do 
not start with the head, but with the heart and the body. It is the training and habituation 
of desires that shapes us, not our theories of desire. This being the case, we can then ask 
if the stories of rival social arrangements that we have explored can be understood in 
terms of how they take hold of our hearts and bodies. This possibility speaks directly to 
the gap we need to bridge, where better theologies of competing desire remain 
disconnected from concrete reality. Smith’s cultural liturgies method allows us to connect 
the theological understanding of desire developed in the earlier chapters of this thesis 
with the epiphenomena of embodied and lived experience. For Smith, like Graham Ward, 
would have us understand all of the concrete actions of life as the habituation and training 
of desire – that all of life is constructed by worship.77 At the heart of Smith’s cultural 
liturgies project, we find: “[an] anthropology—a model of the human person that 
recognizes we are liturgical animals, creatures who can’t not worship and who are 
fundamentally formed by worship practices precisely because it is these liturgies—
                                                 
76 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 24. See also Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 14. 
77 I have already mentioned Graham Ward’s claim that all of life is constructed through worship; 
see Ward, The Politics of Discipleship, 181. 
216 
 
whether Christian or ‘secular’—that shape what we love. And we are what we love.”78 
According to this theological anthropology, worship is the horizon and field within which 
the training of desire takes place. I have already suggested that worship is the mode and 
nature of reception itself. It is through that worship that beliefs and imaginings take shape, 
and desire is habituated into concrete expression. So, if we are inherently and essentially 
‘worshiping’ beings, how does worship actually work, how does worship influence us, 
affect – and effectively form – us? Smith responds to this question of how worship is 
affective by pushing further into the construction of his liturgical anthropology. He argues 
that human beings are creatures who are defined by their loves, and those loves are shaped 
by formative practices.79 Smith’s liturgical anthropology accounts for the formation of 
our love and desires across all cultures, not just religious and institutional ones. We are 
invited to consider that we are not primarily shaped by ideas, but are shaped by that which 
we love. We are then to understand that those love-shaping practices are what we call 
‘liturgy’.80 Smith’s indebtedness to Augustine is again on display here, to “that patron 
saint of the Reformers,” for understandings of love, desire, and worship as the training to 
love the world rightly.81 Smith’s proposals allow us to consider in what ways worship 
practices might be more affective, i.e., produce a stronger orientation of the self around 
desire, than those of the cultures of secular liturgies, such as capitalism. It is liturgies, 
sacred or secular, that establish our identities, and simultaneously form our desires. So 
much so that “what defines us is what we love.”82 As Smith writes: 
 
Because our hearts are oriented primarily by desire, by what we love, and because those 
desires are shaped and moulded by the habit-forming practices in which we participate, it is 
the rituals and practices of the mall—the liturgies of mall and market—that shape our 
imaginations and how we orient ourselves to the world. Embedded in them is a common set 
                                                 
78 Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 22. 
79 Ibid., 25. 
80 James K. A. Smith “Defined by Our Loves: A Liturgical Anthropology” (11th March 2013), 
accessed 26th March 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixKR7duSamU. 
81 Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 7. 
82 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 25. 
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of assumptions about the shape of human flourishing, which becomes an implicit telos, or 
goal, of our own desires and actions.83 
We are alerted to how liturgies train our hearts through our bodies, so that our lives are 
aimed towards our loves.84 Cultural liturgies educate us pre-cognitively, having implicitly 
embedded in them an understanding of the world.85 Here is a metaphysical and 
ontological connection with Graham Ward. It is not that we require an advanced 
understanding of metaphysics, and the ontological nature of worship to engage in worship 
itself. But it does help us to understand how worship is a performative ontology, that the 
doing of cultural liturgies embeds us into social realities.86 Or, as I noted earlier, stories 
are not ontological realities, but the practices they lead to establish ontological realities.87 
Smith notes something similar himself when he comments: “Praying enacts an entire 
ontology and construal of the God-world relationship. This doesn’t mean that we need to 
pursue a doctorate in metaphysics in order to pray; on the contrary, the point is that by 
doing it, by praying, we are engaged in a sort of performative ontology that could be 
teased out in reflection and analysis.” 88 What is at stake is nothing less than the education 
and formation of our imagination.89 For this affective process Smith outlines is something 
that is not primarily about worldview and cognition. Whilst our practices take shape 
around the imaginations and longings of desire, they do so “below the head”, in the heart 
and body.90  
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 It is worth noting that Smith strays here into another discipline, that of Social Ontology. Smith 
does not define Social Ontology, or explain from where he is borrowing his understanding of it. However, 
his work with Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, implies that his use of Social Ontology is derived 
from that work and related works in social sciences and philosophy. For an overview of social ontology 
and how it is emerging as a field of enquiry and method, see Barry Smith, David M. Mark, and Isaac 
Ehrlich, eds., The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality (Chicago and La Salle: Open 
Court, 2008); and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, eds., The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin Books, 1996). 
87 Lakoff and Johnson, “Ontological Metaphors”, Metaphors We Live By, 25–32. 
88 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 193. 
89 Ibid., 25. 
90 Ibid. 
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Smith demonstrates how we might better understand how our practices train desire. 
This is not a one-way process, for our desires are being formed by our imagination, and 
lead to new and changed practices. From this, I posit again that there is a resonant spiral 
between practice and imagination, the kind that led to the perfecting of capitalist practices 
by Evangelicals. Evangelical worship which had the providence of God at the heart of its 
worship, began with a desire to see Christian identity made within new economic flows. 
But ultimately, the imagination for providence in capitalism leads to the deformation of 
desire and the deformation of worship practices. This resonance spirals until worship is 
not primarily about Christian identity and faithful living, but about God providing a way 
of life that the heart is set upon within the capitalist landscape and social imagination.  
It is here that we begin to nudge into the hopes for my thesis, the edges of the map 
of my account, that Evangelicalism contains within itself resources for a soteriology and 
theological anthropology which can place the desire for God into more affective worship 
practices. Worship practices that are, despite their previous problems, able to train and 
orient our desire ‘rightly’. Might there be the possibility for an alternative resonance 
through Evangelical worship practice that redirects desire, setting up resonances that lead 
to better practices, as ‘counter-measures’ to the deforming forces of capitalism? If we can 
better understand how worship works, we might be able to consider how evangelical 
worship could be more affective in its resonances with desire than those of the capitalist 
resonance machine. In other words, with Smith we might begin to untangle the 
Evangelical worship practices from their negative affective resonances with capitalism 
and see them redeployed to greater effect around their own inherent horizon of faithful 
living for Christ.  
 
6.2.2 Teaching the Body: Phenomenology of perception 
As Smith constructs his liturgical anthropology, he is aware of a certain irony in his claims 
that it is practice that needs to be renewed. For his primary assertion is that our 
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imagination is the precognitive means by which we navigate the world through our 
bodies.91 Yet this very understanding of formation is acquired from a cognitive process 
of reflection.92 Or, as Smith himself describes this process: “To provide a phenomenology 
of perception, then, is to try to stand on our philosophical heads: offering a theoretical 
account that does justice to our pre-theoretical navigation of the world.”93 He establishes 
this methodological possibility, through his modification of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, 
Phenomenology of Perception.94 Smith makes a complex phenomenological argument 
with a strikingly simple conclusion. His conclusion is that we do not primarily navigate 
our way through the world cognitively; rather, we have a “bodily attunement and 
perception that underwrites ‘objective’ knowledge and intellectual reflection”.95 This 
being the case, then our primary task is in asking, “How do we teach the body?”96  
Smith wants us to understand not just that our bodies make meaning from stories, 
but how that takes place through bodily actions. How do our bodies and minds function 
together in generating meaning?97 Bodies make meaning through liturgies formed around 
conceptual metaphors.98 First, we acquire primary metaphors, through our environment 
and sensorimotor experience. These metaphors are not hardwired, nor necessarily 
universal, but may be “widely shared” by others.99 Second, immersion in an environment 
with repeated experiences is what establishes those primary metaphors in us.100 Third, we 
acquire hundreds of primary metaphors by these bodily interactions in daily life, and, 
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92 Ibid., 20. 
93 Ibid., 41. 
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fourth, these primary metaphors are the “building blocks of more complex metaphors.”101 
Fifth, these metaphors “make sense” of our experience, and carry a bodily logic to them, 
such that, sixth, this bodily logic is recruited in conceptual logic, i.e., we do not have two 
logic systems, one for the body and one for the mind.102 Here, Smith relies on an 
understanding of aesthetics, drawing upon the work of Mark Johnston.103 Johnston’s 
work bridges the world of cognitive science, language studies, and aesthetic philosophy, 
as it establishes how symbols and stories are enacted and made into meaning by human 
beings.104 Smith then connects this work by Johnston into the theological, i.e., to his 
liturgical anthropology. For example, secular liturgies have different operative 
metaphors, leading to repeated co-activations of neural patterns, that inscribe us “in a 
habitual orientation to the world”.105 Knowing what we ought to love is not enough to 
form us rightly, because we imagine what we love first, where imagination is cognitive, 
but is not “intellection”.106 Being able to imagine the Kingdom of God is different to being 
able to know about it. This means that we act in the world “more like characters in a 
drama than as soldiers dutifully following a command”.107 The stories that captivate and 
form me are ‘understood’ at a gut level.108  
The process here that honours human understandings of aesthetics is what Smith 
calls “general poetics”. Here, Smith draws upon cognitive science, literary Darwinism, 
and cognitive narratology to show the intersection between biology, science, and theology 
in describing how aesthetics ‘work’ for human beings.109 There is a coherence of Smith’s 
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103 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (London: 
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liturgical anthropology with these disciplines, which enables us to say; this is how 
worship ‘works’ for all human beings. We can understand how sacred and secular 
liturgies work universally “on the same imaginative, aesthetic aspects of human being-
in-the-world.”110 What is revealed here is that counter-formation requires something able 
to overcome the “vast repertoire of secular liturgies” in which we are “quietly assimilated 
to the earthly city.”111 Smith brings us out of his discourse into the vast horizon and 
possibilities of Christian worship, beyond the narrow confines of propositional process, 
where: 
 
Christian worship invites us into a very different social ontology, through a different set of 
rituals – a counter-liturgy…Christian worship is an intentionally decentring practice, 
calling us out of ourselves into the very life of God. That worship begins with a call that is 
already a first displacement that is at the same time an invitation; to find ourselves in 
Christ. 
Marilynne Robinson, in an essay entitled, “Imagination and Community”, makes a 
similar and earlier call than that of Smith, asking us to consider from a wider perspective 
how “generous the scale at which imagination is exerted”, and how imagination generates 
communities.112 
Having established a liturgical anthropology, a theoretical model which 
“empathizes that we are not primarily theorizers,” Smith then moves to connect that 
possibility even closer to the nature of practice by way of reference to the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu.113 This work by Smith is important for my project for a few reasons. First, 
Smith outlines how formation is both acquired and natural, demonstrating that 
practitioners are not just thinkers, and that their practice is not merely driven by rational 
choice, but mostly through the habitus of complex relationships and community 
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dispositions.114 All agents have habituated inclinations “that spawn meaningful 
actions.”115 Here Smith understands Bourdieu as arguing, not that we must give up a 
theory about practice, but instead that “practice can only be grasped through constructs 
which destroy it.”116 This is where observers by their nature have removed themselves 
from the communities of practice they study, and are thereby unable to understand those 
practices, such that “Practice has a logic of which ‘logic’ knows nothing.”117 This is 
Bourdieu’s “theory of practice as practice.”118 This is a vital understanding for us, in that 
we can see how habit is the ‘embodied know-how’ that is carried within communities of 
practice, i.e., worship practices carry an embodied know-how for generating and ordering 
practice itself. Furthermore, there is a resonance between theory and practice which 
allows for the atrophy of resistance in the face of capitalist practices that we have 
observed. This is important for us, because it enables us to understand how the stories of 
Christian worship compete with those of late capitalism in the real world. Smith himself 
is hopeful that this will allow us to understand how one cultural liturgy is able to “trump” 
another.119 We can understand capitalist practices carrying within themselves embodied 
know-how, that then leads to a knowing, which in turn leads to further intensified 
practice.  
Second, and following on from this, we see that “We need to understand 
practitioners fundamentally as ‘doers’ who are acting in and upon their world, not just 
‘thinkers’ who happen to be ‘doing’ stuff.”120 There is a further understanding that habitus 
is structured, communal, individual, directed, and acquired. The structuring of habitus is 
“personal and political,” coming from outside and conditioning agents. However, that 
community in habitus is formed by agents’ actions, such that, “I need the community and 
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social body to enable me to perceive the world; however, the social body needs my body 
to instantiate its vision and practice.”121 In this conception, we are not ‘blank slates’, but 
rather have an orientation towards that world that is instinctive and that forms us: 
 
So habitus is very much like an Aristotelian habit; it is acquired, and therefore it has a 
history; it carries an entire past within it. But it has been appropriated and incorporated to 
such an extent that it is as if it were natural – it becomes “second nature.” So it’s not 
natural, and therefore not just instinctual reaction; but neither is it conscious or 
deliberative.122 
Within this framework, we can now understand how the social imagination of late 
capitalism has produced a social logic and arrangement of practices that perfect the 
human condition around its own logic. Evangelical Christian tradition understands human 
nature, i.e., a theological anthropology, to encompass a disposition of the self which is 
fallen, and bent on turning all of life around that self.123 The irony of Evangelicalism is 
revealed further; despite that understanding, its worship practices have not resisted that 
orientation but have instead re-enforced it. 
Third, the mechanisms of habitus allow us to understand how the bodies of 
individuals are incorporated into other social bodies. As Smith writes, “Not surprisingly, 
my incorporation into a social body is effected through the social body co-opting my 
body.”124 This deepens our understanding of how social bodies are competing with one 
another. Smith does not ask, as I have, what the limits are to competing social bodies, and 
what the ontological delimits are to those social realities. For example, as we saw with 
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122 Ibid., 83. We see here Smith’s lack of theological working out of how original sin might 
impair the capax dei of participation in God, and for what is normal and unnatural. For detailed critique 
of Smith’s theology of participation, see Brendan Peter Triffett, “Processio and the Place of Ontic Being: 
John Milbank and James K. A. Smith On Participation,” The Heythrop Journal, 57, no. 6 (2016): 3. 
123 Bebbington explains the Evangelical focus and priority of conversion and the underlying 
theological convictions that underpin this, such as original sin and fallenness; see Bebbington, 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 6. My own denomination’s statement of faith contains evidence of this 
ongoing theological commitment to doctrines of original sin and fallenness; see “Statement of Faith,” last 
modified 10th February 2010, accessed 17th June 2018, http://www.vineyardchurches.org.uk/tools/ 
statement-of-faith/ accessed 17th June 2018. John Stott provides an example of the Evangelical 
understanding of sin, and of how human beings are biased towards an orientation of life around a fallen 
self; see John Stott, Basic Christianity (Nottingham: IVP, 2008), 93.  
124 Ibid., 94. 
224 
 
Cavanaugh, all social bodies are antithetical to the body of Christ, but for Evangelicals, 
they are not. We can now see that, for Evangelicals, social bodies certainly compete 
against the sociality of the body of Christ. But rather than the two sharing an antithetical 
relationship, the body of Christ should provide the ordering to all other social bodies.  
This leads to a question: how does the worship of the church effect incorporation 
into social bodies, and in such a way as to rightly order all our other social embodiments? 
Also, what kind of worship is able to affectively order Christians around the body of 
Christ? Smith has a response here, where he reaches for the work of Graham Ward, and 
in deploying Ward, is reminiscent of Cavanaugh in arguing that it is the Eucharist that is 
the counter-liturgy to the social imaginary of other cultural forces.125 Yet, I argue again, 
as my previous analysis of Ward and social ontology has shown, that the Eucharist alone 
is insufficient to the task Smith has set for it, and for this thesis. Only a form of worship 
with a whole-of- life social imaginary can begin to compete affectively with the social 
imaginary of the market. Again, I suggest that Evangelical worship carries this affective 
possibility. 
 
6.2.3 A Phenomenology of Temptation: How mis-formation happens 
Having established his Christian liturgical anthropology, Smith then moves on to explain 
how various liturgies interact with that anthropology around the practices of capitalism. 
This is helpful for us in that it shows Smith’s method deployed against real world 
capitalist life, and also lays bare the limits of his method for my purposes. Smith 
constructs “a phenomenology of temptation, or at least an account of how mis-formation 
happens.”126 The social imaginaries of rival liturgies interact and shape us, and have 
implications for Christian worship as counter-formation and response to those. This is the 
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body/story nexus that Smith wants us to consider seriously, for “our identity and love are 
sharped liturgically precisely because liturgies are those rituals and practices that 
constitute the embodied stories of a body politic.”127 Our liturgies are the rituals that form 
identity around visions of the good life, and those ‘story-laden’ practices are “absorbed 
into our imagination,” such that: 
 
Liturgies are compressed, repeated, performed narratives that, over time, conscript us into 
the story they “tell” by showing, by performing. Such orientating narratives are not 
explicitly “told” in a “once-upon-a-time” discursive mode – as if the body politic invites us 
to passively sit at the proverbial librarian’s feet for “story time” while she walks us through 
a picture-book narration. No, these stories are more like dramas that are enacted and 
performed.128 
For Smith affectation and affectivity become an issue of what and how stories become 
“inscribed” into our bodies through “micro practices”.129 For, following from the work of 
my previous chapter, we also understand all practices as having ontological dispositions 
–- there is nothing neutral and uncontested in space and practice.130 Now here is where 
Smith helpfully maps and overlays his anthropology and cultural liturgy with an exegesis 
of the cultural practices of the mall. At the shopping mall, Smith identifies four key 
features that compete with all other visions for life; (1) a notion of brokenness akin to 
‘sin’; (2) a twisted configuration of sociality; (3) redemption through consumption; and 
(4) a vision for human flourishing that is unsustainable.131 Within this we see that (1) there 
is a soteriology at play in the shopping mall, where shopping trains us to see how we are 
in need, and offers the solution to our brokenness. Then (2) shopping is a social practice 
that we often undertake with others directly, and are therefore present with others who 
are shopping. Third (3) shopping is “quasi-redemptive”, in that it provides therapy to 
troubled souls, along with the “warmth” of relationship with salespeople. The secret to 
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the shopping experience is (4) that it is an experience that cannot be sustained once we 
return to our lives and homes. The “mall’s liturgy is not just a practice of acquisition; it 
is a practice of consumption.”132 Only a return to the shopping mall can recreate that 
experience. Such experience requires the disposal of our previous acquisitions, in order 
to be replaced with the new things the shopping mall is now ready to provide.133 Here, 
Smith is redolent of David Lyon, who explains how “more consumption may mean less 
puritan-style religion but not less Durkheimian sacred”.134 
For Smith himself proposes that what is required is a counter vision of life, i.e., the 
Kingdom of God, to unmask this situation and provide an alternative vision, around which 
Christian worship might retrain and form us differently and more affectively. Smith 
recognises a gap left with his accounts of desire; that visions of the Kingdom still remain 
unable to generate action that is more affective.135 But Smith fails to bridge this 
affectiveness gap, as I have already claimed, and now detail further. Peak stuff theory 
might intersect here, where we might have reached Peak worship; the commodification 
of worship by consumers might have reached its peak.136 Only if worship practices are in 
some way beyond commodification, can Peak worship be overcome. 
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6.3 Peak worship: Beyond the Eucharist and curricula 
I wish to understand the epiphenomena of worship in the real world, to make an account 
that is able to reflect on practice, so that practice might itself be renewed, concretely and 
in action. I have made my account of Evangelicalism, its beliefs and practices, within the 
matrix of capitalist practices, mindful of the theological dispositions apparent in those 
practices. We can further explore those theological orientations as they relate to the nature 
of practices themselves, via Smith. Smith lets us understand how theory about practice is 
a form of practice, such that “it’s a matter of coming up with a theory of perception that 
does justice to the fact that we don’t, first and foremost, think about the world.”137 
 
By sketching the lineaments of a liturgical anthropology, we should come to a new 
appreciation of why historic Christian worship and spiritual formation had a specific 
embodied shape. In other words, doing some theoretical heavy lifting in philosophical 
anthropology should engender a new intentionality in worship planning, spiritual 
formation, and Christian pedagogy – a new intentionality about the how, by helping us 
appreciate the why. 
Here, Smith helps us address one of the key problematics I established with the work of 
Miller, concerning how better theologies do not necessarily lead to better practices. With 
Smith, we might bridge this commodification gap, where beliefs are separated from 
practices, by being able to understand how the imaginations of life within late capitalism 
are more affectively organized by the practices of late capitalism. I detailed earlier in this 
thesis Miller’s proposal that the solution for responding to commodification is through 
the deepening of agency, but such deepening is subject to the problems of basic human 
nature. In Miller’s theological anthropology and soteriology, such human nature prefers 
the liberation of the self, where the deepening of agency is likely to be always seen as a 
restriction on the self. In other words, the commodification of late capitalism panders and 
perfects too well the shallow desires of fallen human nature, such that any Christian 
identity and agency remains largely opposed and rejected by the auto-poetic self.  
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We can understand how what is imagined is practised, and how what is practised 
is then imagined. Evangelicals, engaging in capitalist practices, sought, à la Bebbington, 
to approach the world with a new epistemological confidence. In doing so, they missed 
that the way their perceptions of the world were really taking shape were pre-cognitively 
and somatically. Their practices in capitalism intended meaning of the world, more 
through their bodies and less through their heads, and the construction of ‘better’ beliefs. 
It is not just that commodification separates beliefs from practice, in the method Miller 
outlined for us, but it is also that commodification relies on this embodied perception and 
knowing of the world, and it is affective and effective because it engages human beings 
at the deepest levels of how they make, and intend, meaning as agents in the world. As 
Smith writes, “We are what we love precisely because we do what we love.”138 If I may 
parse that more crudely, and simply; what we love, not what we give intellectual assent 
to, is what we do, and what we do is then what we become in our experience and 
imaginations. The mission drift by Evangelicals from claimed beliefs about faithful living 
for Christ takes place because of a Christian theological anthropology that combines with 
a liturgical anthropology. Fallen human beings are prone to disordered love, and to loving 
the world wrongly. Capitalism, and the mechanisms of commodification, leverage that 
ontological reality and identity, such that even the worship of Christians becomes 
commodified into dispensing religious goods and services. Here is the atrophy of 
resistance that takes place through moments of co-creation with capitalism. 
Yet, we have to face again the limits of Smith’s proposals. Smith asserts that his 
methodology is not a universal and naturalised liturgical anthropology, where the work 
of God is marginalised and the activity of the Spirit unnecessary.139 For Smith is careful 
throughout his work to show how: “Christian formation is a conversion of the imagination 
effected by the Spirit, who recruits our most fundamental desires by a kind of narrative 
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enchantment – by inviting us narrative animals into a story that seeps into our bones and 
becomes the orienting background of our being-in-the-world.”140 Despite those claims, 
Smith never fulfils them. For, on the one hand, Smith’s liturgical anthropology is 
concerned with understanding universally the affective nature of practices around the 
imagination, yet, on the other, the counter-formation he seeks through this understanding 
is one that is distinctly Christian, with the Spirit forming the imaginations of formational 
practice. But instead of making this pneumatological move, Smith defaults to detailing 
competing curricula. Smith provides a summary of liturgies from the Catholic and 
reformed tradition as examples of Christian worship that would provide the affective 
shaping and formation he seeks.141 It is as if Smith brings us to the edge of a theological 
possibility, exploring how the Spirit is mediated through practices for reception, and how 
the Spirit intends and forms worshippers. Instead, Smith pulls back from this and 
collapses his counter-measures away from the Spirit into suggestions for reformed 
liturgies, whose ‘content’ might be able to combat the forces of consumer liturgies. In 
explaining how one cultural liturgy might ‘trump’ another, Smith reduces liturgies to a 
competition of affectiveness – i.e., my content and liturgical curricula trump yours. The 
history of Evangelical engagement in culture can be viewed as what happens when 
leaning too far into attempts to trump cultural affectiveness. Miller would remind us that 
this is a dangerous mode in which to operate, and that commodification is waiting to 
eviscerate the content of all competing cultural liturgies to its own end.142 
Smith, in essence, moves towards the trajectory set out by Milbank, a re-
Catholisation of worship, albeit one that is slightly closer to Canterbury and Geneva than 
to Rome. To put it more crudely, I find myself with the unpalatable situation of refuting 
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the re-Catholisation of Milbank, only to then be invited by Smith into a renewal of the 
reformed tradition as my main response. And it is not that I have any quarrel with 
Anglican or Catholic liturgies, as my first chapter makes clear. It is the reduction of 
worship to competing curricula that is the problem, and again over-dichotomising the 
church against the world in this context. 
This leaves Smith in a similar cul-de-sac to Cavanaugh, Bell, etc. Whilst he does 
not dichotomise the world and the church into the Eucharist, he instead locates worship 
more broadly within a wider range of liturgical practices. Yet there is more ontological 
bite to Cavanaugh: he may be more limited in his focus on the Eucharist, but at least he 
does not understand the Eucharist as merely more affective content. Something takes 
place in the Eucharist, that the Spirit does to ontologise agents in the real world. With 
Smith, we are left with a list of liturgies to try out in order to see how effective they might 
be. These liturgies are extant, available, and practiced, and there is no evidence that they 
lead to a more effective radical counter-formation by church traditions that practice 
them.143 There is something we can trace and learn from Cavanaugh and Bell into Ward 
and Smith, however. Evangelicals would do well to be alert to the competing of the social 
bodies of capitalism and the deforming forces of the practices of commodification. 
Recovery and use of counter-formational liturgies, mapping those against an awareness 
of the liturgies at play in Evangelical worship on Sundays and out in the world, would 
undoubtedly help in counter-formation and faithful living for Christ. In other words, 
telling a better story and inhabiting it through worship is a good start. But something is 
still missing; a Spirit-led, Christ-formed experience where co-creation can take place and 
resistance occur simultaneously, where the counter-measures of Christianity are not 
reduced to more effective liturgies.  
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There is another concern I have over Smith’s methodology, one to which he himself 
is alert.144 Given the nature of Evangelical piety, with an anti-intellectual orientation to 
culture, is there a danger that Smith’s work further encourages a call towards less 
thinking? As Mark Noll has shown us, "The scandal of the evangelical mind is that there 
is not much of an evangelical mind."145 Smith’s response is that whilst he claims worship 
is integral for Christian formation, he is not claiming that any worship is sufficient for 
formation.146 Worship for Smith is not the dissemination of intellectual ideas and the 
formation of thinkers, but the formation of agents, such that “the goal is not to denigrate 
the intellect; rather it is to situate theoretical reflection within the wider purview of our 
fundamental pre-theoretical orientation to the world”.147 In other words, we need to attend 
to the intellectual for certain, but we must also ensure that we locate this within a “pre-
theoretical register”.148 If Smith is right about the nature of worship, the implications for 
us are that: a) we need a story able to counter those of other cultural liturgies; and b) those 
stories must be enacted in worship at, and through, the level of this affective 
understanding.  
I have proposed, in the minority report that is my thesis, that Evangelical worship 
has this story and affective nature within capitalism. I propose that with Smith’s 
understanding of worship, we might begin to see how Evangelical worship, despite claims 
of instilling cognitive propositions about doctrine, has instead been more affective in the 
deployment of its imagination around the narrative of capitalism, and through resonance 
with capitalist practices. It is the recovery of that affectiveness that my thesis now points 
towards for Evangelicals and others.  
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6.4 Four Moments of the Christ Event: An affective Evangelical social imaginary 
The burgeoning tradition of contemporary worship has received little attention 
academically, beyond some historical notice. The attention that it has received has 
generally been negative and rapidly dismissive; indeed, it is striking how often academic 
discussions of Christian worship in contemporary Britain and/or America fail to notice the 
tradition at all. If discussed, it is asserted to be theologically anaemic and musically poor, in 
contrast to the richness found in ancient liturgies, or the great hymnody of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. On the rare occasion when a writer pauses to give any evidence 
for these rather sweeping judgements, it will usually involve citing the words of a 
particularly trivial chorus, with expressed incredulity that something so lacking in content 
could have ever found its way into Christian worship. 
 
— Stephen R. Holmes, "Listening for the Lex Orandi” 
At the edge and end of all my maps, I look at where I would go next if my thesis had 
room for this excursion, demonstrating how Evangelicalism has, within itself, the 
resources to respond to the problems it has caused. Stephen Holmes reminds us how all 
too easily Evangelicalism is denigrated and found wanting by those unwilling to examine 
its fecundity and other such possibilities. Attention to actual Evangelical social 
imaginaries would reveal the possibilities for their affective nature and allow for an 
internal resourcement by Evangelicals from their own tradition. So, what is an 
Evangelical social imaginary? I believe O’Donovan provides the outline of one:  
 
In following the narrative which the early church told of Christ and the Kingdom, we shall 
mark four ‘moments’, which we shall refer to as Advent, Passion, Restoration and 
Exaltation […] The four moments can claim to represent the essential structure of the story 
[…] There is one story not four, and the division into four moments is an exegetical device 
only.  
   Through the Spirit the church recapitulates the whole saving event, Advent, Passion, 
Restoration and Exaltation. In Christ it is represented in that event; in the Spirit it 
participates in it.149 
 
O’Donovan’s “four moments of the Christ-event” offer a credible and serviceable 
Evangelical social imaginary to counter the forces of capitalism. It is the affective 
dynamics of this social imaginary, in how it is an emotional counterpoint able to respond 
                                                 
149 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 133, 145, 161. O’Donovan is an Evangelical ethicist, his 
work made from an Evangelical standpoint. His accounts are made from a post-Christendom and 
Augustinian perspective of co-creation and resistance with Christian worship and practices.  
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to the imaginations and practices of capitalism, that are most promising. For O’Donovan, 
the church is to be understood as Catholic in its authorization, and in its social reality. For 
“the catholic identity of the church derives from the progress of the Spirit’s own 
mission.”150 But within this, the church in its structures is always catching up with that 
mission of the Spirit. If the church has any generic shape at all it is only insofar as it 
“recapitulates the Christ-event itself, and so proclaims the Christ-event to the world.”151 
O’Donovan writes: 
 
…the relation of the church to Christ, to which the Pentecostal Spirit admits it, is itself a 
formed relation: it is a recapitulation of the Christ-event, by which the community 
participates in the acts and experiences which the representative first undertook on its 
behalf. The shape of the pre-structured church, then, is the shape of the Christ-event, 
become the dynamics of a social identity.152 
In articulating the possible marks and shapes of the church, O’Donovan reveals a 
curriculum and imagination for ecclesiology. It is the faithful retelling and reliving of the 
whole story of the life of Christ that is the content and practice for Christian worship. 
Where O’Donovan claims that the recapitulation of the Christ-event constitutes the basic 
shape of Christian moral thought and action, I suggest we can also understand this re-
capitulation as constituting an Evangelical social imaginary for belief and practice. 
Evangelicalism is not unique in claiming an orientation around the person of Jesus Christ 
– the wider church can be measured by such creedal and confessional claims.153 But within 
its own social imaginary, Evangelicalism lays a specific claim to this self-understanding, 
as we saw with the early chapters of this thesis, and with Bebbington’s Quadrilateral. 
O’Donovan is careful to define the four marks of the Christ-event as being heuristic and 
not a “hard and fast” delineation and structure.154 This heurism allows us to trace the 
                                                 
150 Ibid., 169–170. 
151 Ibid., 174. 
152 Ibid., 171. 
153 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life, 9, explains this theological orientation by which 
all churches can be assessed. 
154 O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, 173. 
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“correspondence” between the worship acts of the church and the manifest shape of the 
Christ-event.155 O’Donovan’s heurism is not without problems and critique.156 For my 
purposes, it is not the delineation of the moments of the Christ event, but the notion of 
recapitulation of that event, that is the greatest opportunity. 157   
We have seen where the church became “instrumentalized as a consumer-oriented 
vendor of a salvation that is intrinsically private and individual.”158 Within this, the value 
of church has often become how well it helps in the realising of the imaginaries of 
capitalist lifestyles. This instrumentalizing arrives at the terminus of a ‘churchless faith’ 
where individuals within the social arrangements of capitalism use the resources of 
Christianity to achieve the social imaginaries of capitalism. O’Donovan’s Evangelical 
social imaginary could further help us understand non-mediated modes of ecclesiology. 
We see in O’Donovan’s work something that Bryan Stone also claims; that “salvation is 
in the first place, a distinct form of social existence.”159 The worship practices and habits 
of church are then something that name and instantiate the social realities and experience 
of salvation. This does not mean that I am merely repeating in a new guise that the church 
remains ‘useful’ for experiencing salvation. Recent widespread and popular re-
imaginings of the church as ‘missional’ have often fallen foul of this de-ecclesialising of 
                                                 
155 Ibid. 
156 O’Donovan lists four worship practices – four sacraments of baptism, Eucharist, keeping the 
Lord’s Day, and the laying-on of hands – that he sees as correlate to this recapitulation. Many 
Evangelicals would find that too prescriptive. See Ibid., 73. Bretherton determines that O’Donovan has 
conflated two distinct moments within the third mark of Christ’s exaltation; see Luke Bretherton, 
Hospitality as Holiness (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 104. Bretherton would see moment three as 
corresponding only to resurrection with a distinct moment of ascension, and the Pentecost event (Ibid., 
104-105). 
157 O’Donovan’s more recent work on ethics begins with a volume on moral agency. In this work, 
he does not develop the four movements of the Christ-event, but there are developments concerning 
agency that we can connect here. Most specifically, that acting the faith (ethics) is also thinking the faith 
(theology), see O’Donovan, Self, World, and Time. Agency is formed by theological virtues where the 
‘reflective moment of practical reason turned outwards to reality’, 125. 
158 Bryan Stone, "The Ecclesiality of Mission in the Context of Empire," in Walk Humbly with the 
Lord: Church and Mission Engaging Plurality, ed. by Viggo Mortensen and Andreas Østerlund Nielsen 
(Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans 2011), 106. 
159 Stone, The Ecclesiality of Mission, 107. 
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the church.160 On the other hand, as an Evangelical, I do not want to over-ecclesialise 
salvation. God’s mission in the world is ecclesial, the formation of a people. We can then 
press on to understand how the church as an ecclesia, a social body, is vital to Evangelical 
mission. Evangelical worship and practices should therefore bring people into a 
‘practical-prophetic’ ecclesiology where the mission of God comes into all social 
realities, and simultaneously orders all those social realities around mission. The re-
capitulation and Four Moments of the Christ-Event provide a far more extensive worship 
curriculum. They can encompass the Eucharist and other liturgical realities, but also make 
possible a far wider range of affective practices outside the range of Anglo-Catholic 
resources. The recapitulation of the Christ-event could allow us to consider how current 
Evangelical worship could bring the right ordering to all social realities, rather than trying 
to out-narrate and completely overcome them in competition. That is a distinctly 
Evangelical imaginary. For Evangelicals, the recapitulation of the Christ-event is not 
about the homogenizing of identity in the face of the exciting self-expression encouraged 
by capitalism. Rather, it is about the freedom that can only come when God seizes us, 
and, through worship, we discover how there are no limits to the depths of identity-
formation in the Christ-event.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: The Scandal of Evangelical Christianity 
The scandal of Evangelical Christianity might not be in its previous claims that, unless 
intellectual assent is given to propositional beliefs, an eternity in hell awaits people.161 
                                                 
160 For example, see Michael Frost and Alan Hirsch, The Shaping of Things to Come: Innovation 
and Mission for the 21st-Century Church (Peabody, MA.: Hendrickson, 2003), 209. Here, Frost and 
Hirsch make the claim that ecclesiology is merely a form and function determined completely by mission. 
The person and work of Christ determine that mission. This completely separates the person of Christ 
from the body of Christ in mission, and relegates the Church to a completely instrumentalised tool for 
individuals.  
161 Richard T. Hughes, “Are Restorations Evangelical,” in Donald W. Dayton, Robert K. 
Johnston, eds., The Variety of American Evangelicalism (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1991), 116. 
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Rather, it might be that the scandal is in the face of consumer agency, to claim that we 
are not free to be whoever we choose to be. We will only know who we really are by the 
re-ordering of our agency, the transfer of object and subject of self, in relationship to the 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The depths of this experience no-one has fully 
plumbed. Here might be the relief from the very real suffering of life in late-capitalist 
societies, with new islands of social care. It is all too easy to decry current western 
economic pressures as insignificant, compared to those of the developing world. Yet, 
there is a kind of ‘bondage’ to create a self in consumer culture – the sheer scope of what 
self-creation means in capitalism is a type of suffering. The self, understood within the 
recapitulation of the Christ-event, might find needed relief from the perverted liturgies of 
capitalism. And Evangelicals might find a more faithful living of life for Jesus Christ.
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion: Blending recipes, methods and ingredients 
 
 
The art of theology lies in the blending of recipes, methods, and ingredients. 
 
— Martyn Percy, “Confessions: Tone and Content in a Reasonable Radical” 
My thesis is a tool, a map to be deployed, a reductionist device for others to use as a road 
map to the overt representations and propositions held in similar contexts. I have 
heuristically traced correspondence between the practices of the Evangelical church with 
capitalism, and its faithfulness to a horizon of a life around Jesus Christ. How well I have 
achieved that, or not, is the place to begin my conclusion, and to assess how well I have 
blended the recipes, methods, and ingredients of my thesis. 
 
7.1 Necessary Limits and Implications: Other possible mappings 
My research points to many related avenues of exploration, places my mapping method 
might have considered further, but which I determined I was unable to explore. In 
particular, I noted the value of a fuller Augustinian account of Desire, and correlations 
with assessments of Evangelical accounts of desire, while acknowledging the reasons 
why such work would be beyond my thesis remit. At one point in my research, I explored 
in detail a historical accounting of Evangelicalism in capitalism. Indeed, I made an 
extensive excursion with a review of historical texts to trace the moments of 
intensification between capitalism and Evangelicalism. That work was undertaken as a 
kind of ethnographic, an alternative reductionist account, to the reductions of 
Evangelicalism through congregational studies that practical theology sometimes makes. 
Ultimately, that method was a bridge too far for my work, and was discarded from my 
writing. It formed, however, a helpful background to the wider aspects of my research, 
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and allows me to know and connect my research to an account of Evangelicals in the real 
world, and to their concrete history.1  
I did not review the “prosperity gospel”, being an obvious manifestation of the 
capitulation of Christian faithful living to market imaginations.2 For I was concerned not 
with that particular manifestation within capitalism, but with a broader understanding of 
the general perniciousness of the forces at work between Evangelicalism and capitalism. 
However, my research might go some way to explaining some of the nature of prosperity-
based Christianity, as it would other versions of Christian faith within capitalism. 
Then there are other significant domains that my research touched upon, where I 
had to make limited sorties and excursions, for instance, Evangelical ecclesiology. For 
my thesis has an ecclesial focus, seeking an understanding of the shape and forces in 
ecclesial life of Evangelicals by capitalism. We have seen that an Anglo-Catholic 
ecclesiology carries a theological critique of capitalism, and a way of worshipping and 
constructing the social reality of the church in the midst of that critique. I have charted an 
ecclesial course between this, on the one hand, and the collapse into market life for 
ecclesiology by Pete Ward, with Liquid Church, where shopping becomes an ecclesial 
practice. I have asserted that the former notion of ecclesiology makes too much of the 
church for Evangelicals, whilst the latter makes too little of the church, displacing too far 
all notions of social reality to market practices and imaginations. Yet I have not 
articulated what Evangelical ecclesiology actually is. As noted already, many might, and 
many have, assumed Evangelical ecclesiology is an oxymoron.3 Evangelicals might seem 
to have no ecclesiology, as we saw Connolly claim, other than that made from market 
imaginations, or voluntarist behaviours, as Milbank asserted. But that is not the case.4 
                                                 
1 I have inserted many footnotes throughout the thesis to the historical sources of that research, in 
order to ensure that my account is undergirded by concrete historical examples.   
2 See again Kate Bowler, Blessed. 
3 Bruce Hindmarsh, “Is Evangelical Ecclesiology an Oxymoron? A Historical Perspective.” 
4 For a rare study on the doctrine of the church held by Evangelicals, see Mark Husbands and 
Daniel J. Treier, eds., The Community of the Word: Toward and Evangelical Ecclesiology (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP USA, 2005), 125.  
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Indeed, some of the practical theology studies of congregations that my introduction 
surveys, do reveal the broader terrain of Evangelical ecclesiologies. My thesis does not 
seek to confirm such ecclesiologies, but rather is built upon those studies and assumptions 
about them. I believe this was one of the necessary limitations for my research. Moreover, 
within the large domains of my thesis, I am also aware of the difference between, as well 
as the overlapping of, Evangelical and Pentecostal Ecclesiologies.5 
In addition, I criticised Smith for drawing back from understanding how the Spirit 
brings the church into existence, and instead collapses understanding of worship into 
issues of competing liturgies and curricula. Yet Smith, in some earlier work, reviews how 
Pentecostal practice gets much closer to the ontology of worship, and how the Spirit 
inhabits those practices.6 To be fair to Smith, understanding where God is in the practices 
of the church is a major theological undertaking. However, I wish Smith had marked the 
path more clearly. I am left needing to consider how the church is, as Reinhard Hütter 
states, “the public of the Holy Spirit.”7 Indeed O’Donovan reminds us that the Spirit 
authorises and empowers the church. It is through the Spirit that the church recapitulates 
the Christ-event. Such recapitulations are re-narrations and instantiations of the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus. The authorisation and empowerment for all of this begins 
at Pentecost. O’Donovan helped us to see the link between pneumatology and the Christ-
event. But his pneumatology is minimal, unable to answer our thesis questions in several 
key regards. There is a distinct moment of ascension and Pentecost in the Christ-event. 
This moment is where the social practices of the church are embedded in social realities, 
and take place through worship. O’Donovan’s pneumatology is central to understanding 
                                                 
5 For example, see John Christopher Thomas, ed., Toward a Pentecostal Theology: The Church 
and the Fivefold Gospel (Cleveland, TN: CPT Press, 2010). 
6 James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy, 
Pentecostal Manifestos (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 86. 
7 Reinhard Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2000). Bonhoeffer has much to say about how the Spirit creates the church through its 
worship, as it exists between the ascension of Christ and His Parousia; see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Sanctorum Communio. 
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the agency of the church, but in such a way that this pneumatology is minimal to that 
agency. Ultimately O’Donovan ties the practices of the church, its sacramental nature, 
too closely to the resurrection, and away from the moment of Pentecost.8 Certainly, 
O’Donovan helps us move beyond the false binaries of the sacramental and capitalism, 
but his sacramentalism remains limited and disconnected from the Pentecost moment. 
The result is a minimal pneumatology that leaves him with a truncated articulation of 
sacramental life.9 In O’Donovan’s most recent work, his second chapter explores in detail 
and develops ideas of how prayer and the curricula of worship are how our agency before 
God is renewed.10 Yet even here, O’Donovan’s explanation of how it is the Spirit that 
uses the actions and resources of prayer to convert and transform us, is fleeting, 
tantalising, and made almost in passing.11 What is still needed, and my thesis points to, is 
a robust theology of the Holy Spirit that engages with the formative practices of 
capitalism.  
My research points to some additional potential ecclesial research projects on 
Evangelicalism and capitalism. In particular, using ethnographic methods, as a corollary 
of the binocular of my research method. For I have been deliberately self-conscious about 
my “methodological syncretism”.12 The returning of my research within that method, 
leads me not just to the theological, as above, but also to the ecclesial via ethnography. 
For the ethnographic is important to bring accounts of social reality into contact with 
social theory, and with theology. In other words, I find myself wanting to know if what 
is described is really there, and heed Pete Ward’s warning not to mistake social theory 
                                                 
8 We have already noted that O’Donovan is careful not to be fixed on any number of sacraments, 
unlike other authors we have examined earlier who deploy the Eucharist as their primary sacramental 
movement. 
9 We saw a similar problem with our other key interlocutors, like Cavanaugh, Miller, Graham 
Ward, and even Smith. They reduce the nature of how the body of Christ is made flesh in the world to a 
restricted sacramental curriculum.  
10 Oliver O’Donovan, chapter 2 “Faith and Purpose”, Finding and Seeking: Ethics as Theology, 
vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2014). 
11 O’Donovan, Finding and Seeking, 41–43. 
12 Percy, “Confessions,” 331–332. 
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for social reality.13 Part of my returning has me wanting to survey my thesis constituents 
to listen further with additional methodological modes, in order to better “comprehend 
the depth, density, identity, and the shaping of faith communities”.14 For instance, an 
ethnographic survey of what Evangelicals share in their prayers with others, as a sampling 
of ‘the scene of the crime’, to map, and make explicit, Evangelical social imaginaries, 
would be illuminating. Correlating such an account against the modulation of Weber I 
have made would allow for production of an Evangelical Work Ethic within late 
capitalism. Another project would be a sampling of concrete Evangelical worship 
practices to identify moments of co-creation, resistance and atrophy, and a correlation of 
those moments with the theological findings of my thesis. Then there is some work to be 
done on where Evangelicals locate themselves in their social arrangements. For 
ethnographic research on how and where Evangelicals invest in and situate their 
embodied relationships could then be compared with my theological understandings of 
how the social imaginary of capitalism orients people in their social arrangements. This 
would further reveal the concrete commitments by Evangelicals, and what funds and 
underpins their social and embodied arrangements. 
 
7.2 Summary of Findings: Evangelicalism — creature of and response to 
capitalism 
We have seen that Evangelicalism was a creature of, and a response to, capitalism. 
Evangelicalism is not the bastard child, à la Milbank, of capitalism. Nor is it responsible 
for creating capitalism. It has a much more complex and resonant relationship with 
capitalism, fraught with many inherent problems. We are now in a better position to 
understand the real nature of the relationship and some of its problems. Also, we saw how 
many critiques of Evangelicalism presumed Weber’s account of the Protestant Work 
                                                 
13 Pete Ward, “Introduction,” in Perspectives 4. 
14 Ibid., 333. 
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Ethic. We have seen that whilst Weber’s ethic still holds some water, we have arrived at 
a post-Protestant Work Ethic in late capitalism. Those who build their accounts on Weber 
would do better to consider how Weber must now be modulated.  
Within this post-Protestant Work Ethic, I have shown how concerns with the 
doctrine of assurance migrated into considerations of providence. Anxiety about 
assurance in a new Protestant world, combine with anxieties about life in new economic 
flows of developing capitalism. My thesis identified that a focus on epistemic issues to 
explain the development of Evangelical belief and practice was only part of the story, and 
that an understanding of faith within economic arrangements was needed. For we can 
now see that while Protestants focused on epistemic issues for belief and practice, and 
Evangelicals obsessed about propositional formulations of faith for cultural apologetics 
and faith formation, something else was taking place. Commodification eviscerated every 
increasing ‘better’ and more foundationalist epistemologies by Evangelicals. The 
imaginations for capitalist life, through the embodied practices of life in capitalism, re-
embedded imaginations for life into Evangelical narratives. Where once the Protestant 
Work Ethic resisted the deforming forces of the capitalist lifestyle, it now capitulated to 
them and, in many ways, perfected them. Providence was the doctrine that smuggled the 
social imaginaries of capitalism into Evangelical belief and practice. 
Moreover, we can now understand theologically how human nature, the disposition 
of human beings to love the world wrongly, allows for this resonant behaviour in the first 
place. The pincer movement of capitalism is to bypass beliefs and capture human agents 
at the affective location for their poiesis that then flattens their agency into shallow 
consumer constructions for identity and meaning. A resonant feedback loop forms in 
capitalism, of habits and micro-practices that train and order desire around further 
engagement in those habits, leading to a further disordering of desire. Evangelicals, as 
they have sought close missional engagement with culture, thinking they can safely 
deploy those cultural resources within epistemic boundaries, have inadvertently missed 
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the Trojan horse of commodification. Evangelicals need to pay heed to these forces, and 
how they are centred around desire and the embodied practices of everyday life. By 
having too low a view of ecclesiology, of the body of Christ, social imaginations that are 
neither Christian, nor Evangelical, have become the ecclesial social constructions for 
many Evangelicals. The result has been the translation of Evangelical Christians into the 
anomic social arrangements of capitalism. This is the logical post-church, and post-
ecclesial, terminus to which Liquid Church points. But what are we do in response? We 
cannot be guardians and gatekeepers of life within capitalism. Like so many of my thesis 
interlocutors ask: can we have any hope to overcome the deforming forces of capitalist 
life?  
We have seen that the social imaginary for Evangelical life would benefit from 
more carefully choosing the stories it retells – from selecting and making use of worship 
curricula that retell a Christian story, to those that also respond to the competing nature 
of consumer liturgies. But my thesis has shown how, ultimately, this is not enough. 
Evangelicals being true to their nature cannot simply pursue a counter-liturgical pathway 
too far, for fear of over-dichotomising the church against the world. Also, we have seen 
how competing curricula are not sufficient to the task of more effective competition for 
formation. 
I am proposing that if capitalism is able to co-opt the fallen nature of human agents, 
i.e., due to their theological anthropology, we cannot reduce formation to one of 
competing liturgies. What is required is a reordered theological anthropology, one made 
possible by relationship with the object of the Christian faith, Jesus Christ. My thesis aims 
were to diagnose theologically what it is about Evangelical faith that led to loss of 
resistance within capitalism. It was always beyond my remit to explain how 
Evangelicalism might then recover its resistance gene, rather than only to point to that 
possibility. This, ironically, is my minority report for my thesis. That despite the problems 
it has caused, Evangelicalism contains within itself an affective theological anthropology 
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that is the antidote to the deforming forces of life in capitalism. The pathway into 
resonance is also the potential pathway away from resonance. My work is the intramural 
examination and admission of the problems, made in order to fund responses that are 
Evangelical. My thesis brings me to that possibility and location. In closing, I offer an 
outline for this grand aim and future possibility.  
 
7.3 Here Lie Dragons: Prisoners of geography and the future of Evangelicalism  
 
Scully: On the old mariner maps, the cartographers would designate unexplored territories 
by simply writing "Here Be Monsters."  
Mulder: I've seen the same thing on maps of New York City. 
 
— The X-Files, "Quagmire" 
Vladimir Putin cannot make mountains appear in the Ukraine to protect the flatland 
territories of Russia.15 Similarly, I cannot make the current situation of Evangelicals 
within capitalism something that it is not. Some, as we have seen, believe they can do so 
by positing the replacement of capitalism, while at the same time failing to understand 
the real nature of Evangelicalism.16 Capitalism may well be nihilistic, and manifestly 
irrational, in the way it undermines basic human needs. But I cannot replace the open and 
inviting flatlands of capitalism, or create mountains to protect and stop agents from a life 
within capitalism. I can, however, unmask the challenges of that environment and draw 
upon the resources Evangelicals have to respond to that situation with understanding and 
hope. I find myself, like many of my key thesis interlocutors, wondering if any theological 
formulations and a diagnosis can aid in the protean nature of capitalism. Perhaps we have 
reached a moment of “Peak Evangelicalism” in the USA.17 Meanwhile, in the UK, 
                                                 
15 Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know 
About Global Politics (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2016). 
16 This is a failing on the part of Milbank, Connolly and Bell that I have demonstrated. For an 
additional example of this failing, see this interview with Milbank in “The Other Journal: An Intersection 
of Theology and Culture,” accessed 3rd April 2018, https://theotherjournal.com/ 2005/04/04/theology-
and-capitalism-an-interview-with-john-milbank/. 
17 It seems American institutions are abandoning the use of the name Evangelical in a post-
Donald Trump world, where Evangelical has come to equal Republican; see “Are Pastors Discarding the 
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Evangelicalism is already in marked decline with the post-church movement, where 
middle-class Christians participate in ecclesial life only when they have nothing better to 
do.18  
Yet, I have claimed Evangelicalism thrives on contestation and renegotiation of 
its identity in the face of over-accommodation to cultural contexts, and my thesis provides 
resources for such renegotiations.19 Contestation implies some energy and vigour in the 
face of Christian apathy and indifference. This claim of possible re-negotiation is perhaps 
the location and signpost into some of the most important possibilities for research on the 
future of Evangelicalism. Martyn Percy has made his own map and account of the future 
of Evangelicalism that would seem to diagnose and point to “Peak Evangelicalism”.20 In 
particular, for the Charismatic Evangelicalism, which is my own ecclesial location, Percy 
predicts a bifurcating choice, between either ongoing assimilation into mainstream 
                                                 
Word “Evangelical”? We Surveyed Hundreds,” Christianity Today, last updated November 2016, 
accessed 17th June 2018, https://www.christianitytoday.com/ pastors/2016/november-web-exclusives/are-
evangelical-pastors-discarding-evangelical-label.html. Biblical scholar and academic Scot McKnight has 
called for the term Evangelical “to be buried;” see “Bury the Word “Evangelical,” Patheos, last modified 
16th October 2017, accessed 17th June 2018, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/jesuscreed/2017/ 
10/16/burying-word-evangelical/. 
18 Cory Labanow completed his congregational study on my own church in 2001–2002; see Cory 
Labanow, Evangelicalism and the Emerging Church: A Congregational Study of a Vineyard Church 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). Whilst many pastors in my Vineyard Church movement were averse to such 
interviewing of their members, I welcomed this study. In Labanow’s original survey of my congregation, 
it was a surprise to see how many people, if not most, self-identified as regular weekly attenders. As a 
participant observer and pastor of the congregation, I knew this was not the case, and most of the people 
responding were some of the most absent week by week. In a personal review of this with Labanow, it 
seemed what was likely was that people meant when they were not on holiday, not at a sporting event, not 
catching up on work, undertaking a fun run, not taking a break for a week, etc, they still considered 
themselves weekly attenders. Now, attendance is not the same as engagement by any means, but it 
remains an indicator of the other social arrangements and commitments by Christians week-in and week-
out. This same decline with the ‘nones’ and the ‘dones’ in the USA, with its own growing post-church 
movement, is something observed in my thesis; see chapter 1, page 7. 
19 Beyond US intra nos review of the use of the term Evangelical, an example of the willingness 
by Evangelicals to examine and admit to the ‘toxic evangelicalism’ in daily life and to renegotiate its 
contested identity, is seen in the meeting of Evangelical leaders at Wheaton College in Chicago, and 
elsewhere in Illinois, April, 2018. Fuller Seminary President Dr. Mark Labberton’s presentation at the 
meetings shows the willingness by some Evangelicals to name, own, and respond to state Evangelicalism 
has ended up in with its cultural accommodations; see Mark Labberton, “Political Dealing: the Crisis of 
Evangelicalism,” Fuller Theological Seminary, last modified 20th April 2018, accessed 17th June 2018, 
https://www.fuller.edu/posts/ political-dealing-the-crisis-of-evangelicalism/. An admission of Evangelical 
complicity with damaging capitalist lifestyles is made by Labberton. 
20 Percy, “Symbiotic Alchemy”, 31–49. 
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denominations, or sectarian isolation and annihilation.21 Here at the end of my thesis, 
constructed to resource the future of Evangelicalism, I open out my ‘maps’, overlaying 
them on the larger mapping produced by Percy. This generates for me a similar question 
to Percy’s, as he concludes his predictions of Evangelicalism’s future, “To what extent 
do the maps reflect the reality that might be on the ground?”22 As a junior map maker, I 
want to know how my map might now work in practice for those seeking to navigate the 
terrain of Evangelicalism in a capitalist context. My thesis shows how Percy’s two 
trajectories are indeed manifest and writ large, but offers a signpost to a different future 
for Evangelicalism; one that would be true to its own identity and tradition. For I have 
shown, on the one hand, that resistance to the pernicious forces of capitalism is to be 
found in making more of the church and in a turn towards Canterbury. But those 
deleterious forces remain extant for mainstream denominations to continue to negotiate. 
The turn back into the church might be a comforting temporary rerouting for 
Evangelicals. Then the previous Emerging Church, with ‘Fresh Expressions’, et al., is 
revealed by my thesis to be birthed from an Evangelical contestation about identity, one 
which has largely capitulated to the imaginations of capitalism for its ecclesial 
arrangements. This is a genetic dead end, in terms of sterilising its adherents, and in being 
unable to produce communities of faith formed around the mission of Christ in the world. 
Now, my own mappings do not provide a new route or the opening of a new 
passage to navigate and escape the forces of capitalism. My project does, however, call 
for a denouement of sorts and for an Evangelical ressourcement and aggiornamento, for 
a renewal via an understanding of the context in which it is now situated. Roman map 
makers, faced with the end of the known world, marked terra incognita with the 
inscription HIC SVNT LEONES – Here are Lions. In the Middle Ages, the edges of the 
known world were delineated on maps with drawings of dragons, sea serpents, and other 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 44–48. 
22 Ibid., 48. 
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portentous creatures.  Rather less dramatically, medieval map makers simply noted “Terra 
incognita” or “terra ignota”.23 Where Percy would seem to see a dissipation and inevitable 
flow of Evangelicalism in to the rivers of mainstream churches or underground into 
sectarian isolation, I remain hopeful for something different: for a new generation of 
Evangelicals, who will emerge, led by the Spirit, to navigate the terra ignota that lays 
before them. That hope is not just wishful thinking, but stems from my review of the 
nature of Evangelicalism, and a warranted conviction of how the Spirit authors the 
church. 
Over time, cultural change reshapes the landscape, and reveals new places that 
can, and need, to be explored. Evangelicals have no excuse not to “see where they are on 
the map,” for globalised culture, social media and technology make such self-location 
easier whilst, at the same time, limiting previously unfettered notions of extensity.24 Percy 
points towards the new landscapes revealed with the “sea changes” in modern culture, in 
particular of gender, with women in ministry, and the even more seismic changes around 
LGBTQ+ issues, all of which Christians are increasingly unable to ignore.25 The maps 
before Evangelicals now contain the symbols of these new landscapes Evangelicalism 
has yet to navigate. Evangelicals might all too easily continue to label these new locations 
with “here lie dragons.”26 My own mappings reveal something as seismic, and rather more 
subterranean; a place where the dragons and monsters are not new landscapes of ‘others’, 
but are in fact a self-location for how Evangelicals have been co-opted by the 
                                                 
23 Despite references in popular culture, The Hunt-Lenox Globe of circa 1510 is the only known 
map that bears the phrase “HIC SVNT DRACONES” (here are dragons) near the coast of eastern Asia. 
The Hunt-Lenox Globe is housed in the collection of the New York Public Library, “Treasures of the 
New York Public Library,” accessed 16th June 2018; http://exhibitions.nypl.org/ 
treasures/items/show/163. 
24 Percy, “Symbiotic Alchemy”, 46–47. 
25 Ibid, 42–44. 
26 The Nashville Statement on sexuality would seem to want to roll the sea back over revealed 
landscapes, and render these cultural locations as places to enforce conservative convictions. For nothing 
but “total allegiance” is allowed for their story of the “path” for following Christ; see “Nashville 
Statement,” Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, accessed 16th June 2018, 
https://cbmw.org/nashville-statement/. 
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imaginations and practices of capitalism. The greatest monsters to face and navigate are 
always those of our own making. Capitalism and its developments have been the sea in 
which Evangelicals have been swimming, and within which they have worked to perfect 
life. 
Mappings of crimes have become rather sophisticated in recent years. You can 
insert your post code in the UK into an online map and explore the nature and exact 
location of crimes.27 Chalk outlines once used at crime scenes are now a literary trope in 
modern culture, and are unused by modern investigators. The cliché of the trope is the 
chalk outline of a body at the scene of a crime. There is, perhaps, a scene of the crime 
map for Evangelicals, a chalk outline of where bodies interacted with each other, around 
the body of Christ, at the fulmination of the forces between capitalism and faith. That 
location is where, week by week, Sunday by Sunday, when they are not otherwise 
engaged in leisure and consumer experiences, Evangelical Christians gather and pray for 
each other. At this location, the scene of the crime, my thesis makes an honest confession 
before Connolly, Milbank, and others: Evangelicals have all too often instrumentalised 
worship, so as to leverage a consumer lifestyle and the social imaginaries of capitalism.  
In my own church location, we practice the laying-on of hands. People here are 
engaged in deeply somatic experiences where they open up and share their inner 
struggles, dreams, hopes, anxieties, and aspirations with others. These are then re-
narrated, as those praying with them share words and pictures, scriptures, and 
encouragements. The possibilities and practice of re-narration are deeply engrained in our 
worship liturgies, be they singing, coffee, doughnuts, ministry to the poor, praying for the 
sick, or ‘healing on the streets’.28 All these moments extend the avenues and opportunities 
of re-narration in late-capitalist society. Jesus Christ in these contexts remains the 
                                                 
27 See “Police UK,” accessed 5th April 2018, https://www.police.uk/metropolitan/ 
E05000557/crime/. 
28 Those practices are evidenced in the extensive ethnographic study of my denomination in 
Tanya M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with 
God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).  
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overwhelming object of our desire, and the measure of our living. Here, Evangelical 
worship may provide one of the greatest possibilities for countering the pathologies of 
late capitalism. For it continues to locate the training of desires around Jesus and His 
Kingdom, offering a deeply somatic whole-life engagement through our worship.29 My 
own denomination has been the subject of extensive ethnographic studies. These studies 
confirm these concrete worship practices and Evangelical imaginaries, along with 
examples of the scenes of the crime. I point to them to show that I am not party to just 
wishful thinking, but that the actual practices of Evangelicals carry, not only ongoing 
problems, but the opportunity for response that my research seeks.30 At the scene of the 
worship crime, instead of asking Jesus to provide consumer lifestyles, remains the 
opportunity to recover a Christ-centred lifestyle, and this centring is not alien to 
Evangelicals. This is the main horizon to which my thesis points for further exploration. 
Here, perhaps, despite the problems Evangelicalism has caused, is the greatest possibility 
and unique opportunity for alternative formational practices within late capitalism. 
 
                                                 
29 This corelates with Smith’s claims for the ontological nature of Pentecostal worship; see Smith, 
Thinking in Tongues. 
30 Luhrmann, When God Talks Back; Jon Bialecki, A Diagram for Fire: Miracles and Variations 
in an American Charismatic Movement (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017); Andy Park, 
Lester Ruth, and Cindy Rethmeier, Worshiping with the Anaheim Vineyard: The Emergence of 
Contemporary Worship (The Church at Worship: Case Studies from Christian History) (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2017); E. Mary Neve, Power Praying: An Evaluation of Prayer Ministry in the Teaching 
of John Wimber and the Vineyard Movement (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012); Martyn 
Percy, Words, Wonders and Power: Understanding Contemporary Christian Fundamentalism and 
Revivalism (London: SPCK, 1996). Away from my denomination, a PhD study on Hillsong diagnosed the 
enmeshment with capitalist markets, but also the simultaneous assistance of Evangelical worship to help 
Christians navigate capitalist society; see Tanya Riches, “SHOUT TO THE LORD! Music and change at 
Hillsong: 1996-2007” (Master’s thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2010); and Tanya Riches and 
Tom Wagner, eds., The Hilllsong Movement Examined: You Call Me Out Upon the Waters (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Then, there are these additional comprehensive studies and surveys; Esther 
Elliott, “Worship Time: The Journey Towards the Sacred and the Contemporary Christian Charismatic 
Movement in England” (PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1999); James Stevens, Worship in the 
Spirit: Charismatic Worship in the Church of England (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007); Monique M. 
Ingalls and Amos Yong, eds., The Spirit of Praise: Music and Worship in Global Pentecostal-
Charismatic Christianity (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015); Wee 
Hong Lim and Lester Ruth, Lovin' on Jesus: A Concise History of Contemporary Worship (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2017). 
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7.4 Reflexivity: Meta-reflections on thesis learning 
 
Question: Who called the cook a bastard? 
Answer: Who called the bastard a cook? 
 
— Eric Partridge, A Dictionary of Catchphrases 
This World Ward I riposte fits well the discussions about a PhD candidate’s abilities and 
progress, and their supervision. Several changes in supervisor in my project, due to 
faculty moving institutions, led to many challenges for me. As a result, the design of my 
research method and understanding of what I could achieve, and how to do so, came late 
in the process for me.31 Then, like many other researchers, the warp and weft of life, over 
so many years, has added to the texture of my research and writing.32 
I went into my research and thesis wanting to better understand something: how 
and why the forces of life in capitalism often overwhelm the aspirations and beliefs of 
Evangelical Christians for faithful living for Christ. My understanding of methods to 
conduct that review, and how they would need to be limited, took some time to realise. I 
initially thought I would be able to describe and diagnose the problem fully, and make a 
full proposal for remedy. It was not until the writing-up stage that I realised I had several 
theses of work within those aspirations. Pruning much away, I came to realise that my 
thesis had to be much smaller in scope. I arrived instead at an account that described the 
relationship between Evangelicals and capitalism, and did so from a particular and limited 
perspective. I then used that perspective with some very specific theological resources to 
point to the possibility of remedy, rather than offering the solution. In this regard the 
research process trained me to realise the need for limits; limits to what can be diagnosed, 
and what can be proposed.33 
                                                 
31 I have had five wonderful supervisors attached to my work. 
32 I have faced many other personal challenges to my research, the suicides of both my parents, 
and protracted SEN legal battles for my autistic daughter. 
33 Professor Matt Might’s illustrated guide to a PhD, for the orientation of new PhD students, 
reminded me of the small dent a thesis usually makes in human knowledge: 
http://matt.might.net/articles/phd-school-in-pictures/, accessed 3rd April 2018. 
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The binocular method of Martyn Percy has allowed me to complete Percy’s 
fivefold process that respects my subject being addressed, i.e., Evangelicalism, but has 
also allowed me to view the incompleteness of my subject.34 As Percy predicts, such a 
process of study has changed me as much as, if not more than, any hoped-for futures of 
my thesis subject.35 That fivefold process has allowed me to, first, notice something in 
plain sight, of Evangelical life within capitalism, and then to see the bigger picture and to 
see it in detail, this bigger picture being my accounts from social science with Bebbington, 
Weber and Polanyi. My detailed examinations, up close, were then conducted by drawing 
upon neo-Augustinian theological sources. Second, it has allowed me to read my subject 
with a method suited to my thesis aims. For my method based on Percy’s binocular, fulfils 
the nature of such readings as “constructive” and “experimental.”36 Using this method, I 
have at times engaged in extensive critique of my sources. But at other times, I have 
borrowed sources with less detailed critique — yet always still situating my use of those 
sources in their critical contexts, which is part of the nature of making constructive 
accounts, such as mine. I believe my reading with this critical and constructive method 
has produced a ‘thicker’ account of my subject for myself and others. Third, I have 
interpreted my reading. At times my thesis has certainly struggled “under the weight of 
the method” and the complexity of my subject. This is not a failing, but an expected 
outworking, and the nature of the research method concomitant with the complexity of 
the subject being interpreted. There can perhaps be nothing more complex to interpret 
than ecclesial life that causes even the most complete theological explications to unravel 
under the weight of their methods and findings. Fourth, there is a reframing that I have 
attempted, where my findings are offered as a “temperate, modest exercise, involving a 
blend of caution and risk.”37 Fifth and finally, there has been a returning with my tentative 
                                                 
34 Percy, “Confessions,” 329–331. 
35 Ibid., 330. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
252 
 
analysis and conclusions to the subject that generated my research. I stand as a pastor 
within the congregational life I have sought to understand, at a place of beginning, 
knowing some insights will be “vindicated” and others will require further “adjustment.”38 
My study began as the credit crunch was starting to unfold. I sense my intuitions for 
research are now mapped extensively into the daily life and experiences of my 
congregants, at a far more conscious register. The toll and price of a life lived under 
commitment to capitalist social imaginaries are extant, be that divorce, declining mental 
health, ulcers, and self-harm.39 These are the epiphenomena of pastoral life to which 
people are perhaps readier to admit, to examine, and attend to, with the social imaginaries 
of the Gospel.  
 
7.5 Epilogue 
Evangelical Christian (EC): So, what is your PhD about?40 
Me: I’m exploring the nature of the relationship between Evangelicalism and capitalism. 
EC: Why are you doing that? 
Me: Evangelicals like you and I are supposed to live our lives faithfully around Jesus. 
Everything we have; all we own, our jobs, homes and relationships, are meant to be given 
in service of a life lived around Christ. 
EC: They sure are! 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 330-331. 
39 Proving this claim would require a thesis itself, but my pastoral observations and anecdotes 
have much warrant with this UK research on the growth of mental health illness and self-harm within the 
context of current economic changes, “Fundamental Facts About Mental Health 2016,” Mental Health 
Foundation, accessed 17th June 2018, https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/sites/default/files/fundamental-
facts-about-mental-health-2016.pdf. 
40 As a participant observer, I offer this composite summary of the hundreds of times I have been 
asked about my PhD by Evangelicals from the most conservative to the more progressive, be they church 
members or students I have taught. 
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Me: So, my research explores why that so often isn’t the case. Why do Evangelicals say 
that, but then live something different? I’m trying to understand how, instead of life 
invested in Jesus, we expect Jesus to provide us with stuff for the life we want, and expect.  
EC: {Sighs}Yes. I have noticed that too. I wish we were more faithful to what we say we 
believe. Tell me more; what’s going on? 
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